

The Protracted Conflict in the Kivu region of the eastern-DR Congo - Connecting the Pieces and Making Sense of the Situation

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Historical Perspective of the Kivu Region

- **Socio-culturally linked to the East African Coast and the east African trade networks.**
- **Semi-autonomous “Swahiliphone” region during Mobutu’s regime.**
- **Diverse cross-border communities (Tutsi, Abahima, Bemba, Batoro, Bakiga..)**
- **Limited access to Kinshasa**

Militarization of the Kivus Region

- 1994 Ex-FAR and Interahamwe militia force thousands of Rwandese refugees into Zaire.
- They maintain military and administrative structures in the refugee camps in Goma and Bukavu and regularly make incursions into Rwanda.
- The militarisation of the camps leads to scaling down of humanitarian activities in Goma and Bukavu.

UNAMID Troops in the eastern- DR Congo region of North Kivu



The Militia Schism

- Various combatant groups emerge from the Ex-Far and Interahamwe groups
- PALIR- Peoples Army for the Liberation of Rwanda led by Dr. Casimir Bizimungu
- FDLR – Democratic forces for the Liberation of Rwanda led by Ignace Murwanashyaka (formerly led by Major General Paul Rwarakabije who surrendered to rwandan Authorities in 2003)
- FLOT-Front contre l'occupation tutsie : armed wing of UFLD - Union des Forces Vives pour la Liberation et la Democratie en RDC-Zaire, Congolese Hutu
- Les mongoles
- ARD -Alliance pour la resistance democratique

Other Combatant groups in North Kivu

- CNDP – National congress for the defence of the People led by Gen Laurent Nkunda
- Mai Mai- led by Kyungu Mutanga, Louetcha, Padiri, Dunia, Chinzachinza.
- FNI - Front des Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes led by Peter Karim
- UPC – Union of Congolese Patriots led by **Thomas Lubanga** (Currently in custody in the ICC)
- FPLC –Peoples forces for the Liberation of Congo led by Bosco Ntaganda
- FRPI- Patriotic Force of Resistance in Ituri led by **Germain Katanga** (Currently in custody in the ICC)
- FRP - Forces Republicaines et Federalistes, defensive force to protect Banyamulenge citizens

MONUC Led DDDR Fails

- Gen Nkunda withdraws the 81st and 83rd Brigades from the reintegration process and forms the CNDP
- Smaller Rwandese Hutu militias join the FDLR
- MONUC fails in demobilising and disarming combatants
- The killing of Congolese Tutsi's on the Masisi-Sake axis in 2004 triggers renewed attacks from the CNDP
- Peace deal signed in January 2008 between DRC Govt and the CNDP



The Conflict Territory

- Attacks on the CNDP positions by FARDC forces supported by FDLR troops and MONUC logistics triggers current fighting – August 2008.
- CNDP captures all major towns around Goma and press further North capturing Kiwanja and Nyanzale.
- FARDC troops are overrun by CNDP in North Kivu and flee South towards Bukavu leaving 800 MONUC troops to hold Goma.
- Gen Nkunda issues ceasefire and does not move on Goma.


Current Situation

- **CNDP forces out manoeuvre FDLR and Govt Troops and control most of North Kivu.**
- **Gen Nkunda threatens to escalate the conflict to Kinshasa.**
- **MONUC outnumbered and outgunned but not immediately threatened.**
- **Rwanda reiterates that they are not part of the conflict.**

Combatants in Proximity to Goma

- **CNDP** : led by Gen Nkunda - 8,000 fighters
- **FDLR** : Rwandan militia - 6,000-7,000
- **Mai Mai** : pro-government militia - 3,500
- **MONUC** : UN peacekeepers - 6,000 in North Kivu, including about 1,000 in Goma, and 5,000 in South Kivu (17,000 nationwide)
- **DRC army** – insignificant numbers in Goma 90,000 (nationwide)

Present Deployments in the Kivus



Prospects for Peace in the Kivus

- A political solution must be found to diffuse the current tension.
- The protagonists in the conflict must be part of the solution
- The Rwandan militias operating in the Kivu region must be disarmed and demobilised in accordance to UN resolutions as a prerequisite for Peace.
- Regional players (Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania) should be involved in the process.
- The war economy must be transformed into the main stream economy.

I THANK YOU

Scope

- **Summary of the three countries**
- **Cross-cutting Recommendations**

Strategic

Multi-Dimensional

Military

Police

Civilian

Burundi



Burundi

Key lessons:

- **Mediator must be seen to be impartial, consult with all relevant stakeholders, regularly publicise progress, and be available more or less full-time to unblock difficulties**
- **Capacity building required for parties engaged in negotiations**
- **Transitions from AU to UN to AU missions: importance of having relevant instruments in place (MoU), understanding mandate and financial implications, undertaking joint planning for transition**

DR Congo



The DR Congo (Kivus)

Key lessons:

- **PCRDR should be based on an overall strategic vision, with carefully selected priorities, strong coordination and a commitment to long-term engagement**
- **Political and economic engagement should not diminish after peace agreement**

The Sudan (Darfur)



Map No. 3707 Rev. 10 UNITED NATIONS
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The Sudan (Darfur)

Key lessons:

- **Strong political engagement is required in support of military deployments. This could take the form of an on-site team to support Joint Mediator, as well as a strong diplomatic mission in the country**
- **PCRD activities and economic engagement should also accompany troop deployment**

Recommendations

Strategic level:

- Support capacity building and operationalisation of the peace and security architecture of SADC and the AU, through provision of financial support, technical assistance, secondment of technical personnel and leveraging of support from international partners. In particular, bolster the capacity of the AU Commission to manage peace operations, accelerate operationalisation of the African Standby Force and expedite the establishment of continental EWS.

Recommendations

Multi-dimensional:

- Enhance gender mainstreaming of peace missions by: providing training on gender mainstreaming to all relevant personnel at headquarters and those deploying; increasing the number of qualified women candidates (especially for leadership posts) and prioritising them on the standby roster for posting to missions; prioritising the deployment of women, particularly to missions where gender-based violence has been an important element of the conflict.
- Create a lessons learned desk or unit in all Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) There should be constant monitoring and evaluation of peace missions to draw the relevant lessons, which should then be disseminated and fed into decision-making and planning. Thorough post-mission debriefings of those who serve in peace missions should feed into the lessons learned process, as well as into future planning, decision-making and training.

Recommendations

Multi-dimensional:

- **Develop a rapidly deployable multi-dimension and integrated peace operations (MIPO) standby capacity, encompassing military, police and civilian components. Determine and assess what capacities are available and what additional capacity development is required. Create a standby database of qualified personnel, particularly for the civilian functions. Develop appropriate personnel, procurement, finance and other regulations/policies for rapid deployment. Put in place pre-agreed standard contracting agreements for commonly used logistic supplies that can enhance rapid deployment and mission start-up capacity.**
- **Create and maintain a roster of qualified personnel (police, military and civilian, for all standard post profiles) to be able to propose them for key posts at AU or UN headquarters as well as leadership of future missions. Monitor openings so that when positions become available, candidates can be put forward and supported**

Recommendations

Multi-dimensional:

- **Develop a media strategy for each peace mission**, to educate and inform the public and ensure support. Peace Mission departments in all TCCs should coordinate and oversee the strategy, with inputs and support from all relevant departments.

Recommendations

Military: (Planning & Support)

- **Deploy troops together with all of the necessary mission enablers (transport, logistics, engineers, medical) for support, improved effectiveness and protection.**
- **Send a reconnaissance team for a significant visit to the whole mission area before deployment, to assess the climate, terrain and political situation. The assessment should inform pre-deployment briefings and planning/support for the mission. The assessment team should be multi-dimensional from the beginning, so that plans are aligned with multi-dimensional missions.**

Recommendations

Military:

- **Increase the hand-over period for heads of key sections** to ensure everything is in order, verify equipment, get briefed on situation and get introduced to local community leaders—for continuity of relationships.
- **Develop a Quick Impact Projects (QIP) policy.** The military should only undertake humanitarian or development work as a short-term measure, and ensure that such projects are coordinated through the HQ of the peace-keeping mission, particularly by the humanitarian, and/or civil affairs units, to ensure that they a) meet real needs; b) do not duplicate other humanitarian work; c) will not be perceived as showing partiality; and d) create benefits that can be sustained after the troops are withdrawn. It is useful to work in partnership with UN agencies and/or NGOs, as they have more expertise and longer-term presence.

Recommendations

Military: (Equipment)

- Undertake an assessment and begin a programme of acquisition of appropriate equipment for peace missions, and involve African defence industries in development and production.
- Train African military planners on contingent-owned-equipment (COE), so they have a thorough understanding of what is required for reimbursement and self-sustainment. Heads of relevant sections deployed in the mission should also receive training on COE.

Recommendations

Military: (Troops)

- Brief troops on the overall purpose of a mission and their role in it so they have a sense of purpose. Units should develop a mission-specific-business plan with clear objectives and time lines during deployment, to monitor progress
- Improve troop welfare by: providing information and news from home; ensuring that deployed troops have internet and communications equipment; and organising R&R trips for troops, at least during the 3rd-4th month if not more frequently.

Recommendations

Military: (Training)

- Provide leadership training to commanders (staff officers), incorporating: the vision of African renewal, and the objectives of the deployment (mandate), as well as management skills, problem-solving, team-building and negotiation, communication. Officers should be encouraged to do UN peacekeeping courses.
- Provide language and cultural awareness training, as well as training and simulations (training exercises) for specific posts in peace missions.
- Update the pre-deployment and mission-readiness training regularly, based on de-briefings of deployed personnel.
- Increase the numbers of qualified technical personnel, such as mechanics or pilots, as well as specialised units likely to be required in missions, through targeted recruitment, training and develop a retention strategy.

Recommendations

Military: (Force Generation)

- To reduce problems with composite units, consider deploying battalions that have participated in pre-deployment and mission-readiness training. If a composite unit must be assembled, bring together all of the personnel earlier to spend more time training together before deployment.

Recommendations

Police:

- Consider forming a REC-wide female formed police unit (FPU), with female police contributed by various REC countries.
- Increase the number of women police in training so there is a pool of them ready for deployment on peace missions.
- Increase gender awareness training for all police before deployment, due to the nature of civilian-police tasks and the use of sexual violence in current conflicts on the continent.

Recommendations

Civilian:

- **Conduct a transparent and inclusive Policy Review process on Peace Missions (or White Paper).** Non-governmental interest groups can enrich the document plus an inclusive process would enhance buy-in. **The White Paper should have broad guidelines and principles rather than detailed processes or procedures,** to allow for flexibility in the case of urgent situations. The full range of actors involved in peace missions should be included in the White Paper guidelines.
- **Engage in mediation/ political/diplomatic processes in conflicts where troops are deployed.** Such engagement is necessary to accelerate the safe return of troops. Mediation efforts should be supported by **ongoing strategic analysis of the internal/external forces affecting the success of the mediation** and accompanied by **capacity building for the parties to enhance their mediation and governance skills.**

Recommendations

Civilian:

- **Develop a broad strategic plan for PCRDR engagement that incorporates the roles of all stakeholders, has clear objectives, desired outcomes, time lines and a detailed budget.**
- **Involve CSOs and other stakeholders in peace missions. They can provide training, capacity building, research and analysis, and engage with local CSOs in the mission area.**