EUROPEAN AND AFRICAN RESPONSE TO SECURITY PROBLEMS IN AFRICA

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PROLOGUE
“We cannot live with security unless there is development, and there can be no development without security.” Kofi Annan, General Secretary of the UN (1997-2006).

Africa is no longer the forgotten continent; it has consolidated its deserved space and role in the contemporary world’s complex game of international relations, with its own voice and a clear set of objectives. We should be ready to respond to this new reality with knowledge of the cause and sufficient criteria, as it’s full of opportunities and challenges and it has the potential to be enriching for everyone.

African governments and institutions, in collaboration with international organisations, attempt to obtain a suitable level of sustainable development that reaches the continent’s inhabitants. Development requires an atmosphere of security, and without this, there is no chance for progress.

Based on this concept, the joint idea of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies (IEEE) and of Casa Africa to prepare, as part of the collection of IEEE «Cuadernos de Estratégia», the publication that the reader holds. Its objective is to promote reflection on the African and European efforts currently being carried out in the area of peace and security. Our aim is for the text to be disseminated to a large audience, which is why it has been edited in Spanish and English, and it will be available for all the analysts or academics of this topic at the IEEE (www.ieee.es) and Casa Africa (www.casafrica.es) websites.

It’s important to point out that Spain has made an important change in its foreign policy towards the African continent, assuming a new and
different focus from other European nations. Therefore, this issue aims to convey to our country the African view of international policy and its intra-state relations so that, ultimately, Spain may contribute towards providing African solutions for African issues.

For this reason, we have wanted to bring together leading African specialists on this subject so that, along with Spanish and European experts, who have extensive experience regarding the continent, they may provide a response to the problems of peace and security from a supranational perspective in which the Treaty of Lisbon offers a new opportunity to reinforce the link between development and security, of the actions for maintaining peace and good governance.

Thus, this compilation of essays aims to serve as a consultation book, but it also aims to touch our conscience, disregarding common places that have not been sufficiently questioned to date. Through its pages, we invite you to submerge yourselves into the complex African reality, we invite you to listen to opinions that are not usually conveyed, we invite you to question, as Africans do, the solutions that we often consider to be valid, yet have failed repeatedly because they have been imposed from abroad.

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INTRODUCTION
AFRICA: A NECESSARY CONTINENT
Africa is the necessary continent. This is the case in various aspects—because we share many of our problems with Africa, and more importantly, we should also share the solutions with Africa. Thus, it’s not that Africa can be ignored, but rather that without it, we wouldn’t be able to address many of the urgent issues that affect us. We must face them together, and we want to as well. In fact, in an increasingly globalised world, it is worthwhile to seriously consider the possibility of whether there can only be «African solutions to African problems.»

Because the reality is that the events that have traditionally been associated with African problems (coup d’états, wars and warlike conflicts, poverty and misery, drought and hunger, terrorism, etc.) are not specific to Africa because they also appear in other continents, and they introduce and intertwine themselves in an extensive network of causes and effects in which we all participate and are all responsible. In other words, African phenomena transcend Africa and assume a global dimension.

This does not mean that African nations should ignore the specifically African nature and origin of most of the problems, or blindly accept foreign solutions. However, they should be aware of the interdependence that conditions the current international situation, or the value of exchanging information and the effectiveness of coordinated actions.

Because although African nations share many of their problems with other parts of the world, there is at least one differentiating aspect: the African continent has the highest levels of warlike conflicts, political instability, poverty, disease, social and human rights violations, illegal immigration, etc. The quantitative character provides a qualitative dimension that requires more intense and urgent solutions.
The question lies in how to undertake these serious problems with urgency and effectiveness, when in many cases, the primary instrument for intervention (the State) is fragile or an open failure. Let’s not forget that Africa is the continent with the greatest number of failed or fragile states.

**A geographic brushstroke**

The African continent, with more than 30 million square kilometres, is the third largest continent in the world and represents 25% of the Earth’s land. For several years, its geographic positioning between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans led to the debate of whether, from a strategic perspective, it was especially advantageous or disadvantageous in terms of globalisation.

This extension and geographic situation have determined the continent’s complexity and diversity, where no less than 850 million people live.

The political, economic and social problems that Africans face are of a diverse nature, and they vary tremendously from one region to another.

Traditionally, there has been a high birth rate, but also a high child mortality rate, resulting in a scarce hope for life due to the insufficient sanitary and environmental conditions that have favoured the rapid spread of epidemics and pandemics. Additionally, the extensive phenomenon of young people that immigrate, especially in Northern regions and Sub-Saharan Africa, which tends to reduce the active labour market, has a strong effect on Africa’s population structure and the economy. The metropolitan scarcity (fewer than 10 cities with one million inhabitants), an urban growth index that is significantly higher than the rural one, the increasing concentration,(1) the distribution by age (more adults in the North and in the Sahara, and more young people in Sub-Saharan Africa) and gender (a predominant male population in the north and a female on south of the Sahara, although with notable exceptions).

An irregular population distribution, tied to the existence or lack of natural resources, leads to important consequences for understanding the situation of security in which the continent’s inhabitants live. The extensive and unpopulated regions of the Sahel, along with the absence of central government authority, facilitates the activity of terrorist groups

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(1) In the next 25 years, the population could double and even triple in the cities.
and organised crime. On another hand, in those areas with a wealth of natural resources, with a much higher population concentration, there is an abundance of non-state actors that attempt to take advantage of the local governments’ inability to impose their authority.

**Economic fragility, again**

The abundance of resources made it especially possible, along with other factors, for the strong economic growth registered between 1995 and 2005.

However, up until then, the African economy experienced a clear stagnation (1975-1985 period) and even suffered a certain collapse (1985 and 1995) (2). As stated earlier, during these long decades, analysts shared the belief that Africa’s disadvantageous positioning with respect to globalisation and its processes had relegated the continent to the merely passive role of a supplier of raw materials. In fact, while the international economy grew and overall poverty was cut in half throughout the world (from 40% to 21%), it continued to grow in Africa (from 42% to 47%). This situation led to the generalised conclusion that Africa was the «clear loser in the global geo-economic board» and the dramatic belief that «if Sub-Saharan Africa were to disappear as an economic agent, the global economy would hardly notice» (3). In this way, we witnessed the paradox that the African continent’s abundant resources were more relevant for globalisation processes than for internal development, and contributed more towards accentuating foreign dependence than African development.

Africa went from a growth of more than 4.5% in the 60s to stagnation in the mid 70s (3%) and a drop in the second half of the 80s (2.8%). At the end of the 90s, it once again emerged with unexpected strength (a 4.1% growth) (2).

(2) It was during these periods that, in an attempt to face the deteriorated economic situation, Africa’s regional economic organisations were created or reactivated, with the exception of the Economic Community of West African States ECOWAS (1964) and the Arab Maghreb Union AMU, created in the 1960s and reactivated in the 80s. Southern African Development Community SADC (1979), Economic Community of Central African States ECCAS (1981), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa COMESA (1993) and Community of Sahel-Saharan States CEN-SAD (1998).

average between 1997-2002), until reaching the highest point in 2004 (6.9%), maintaining very high levels in the following years: 5.2% (2005), 5.5% (2006), 5.9% (2007), until the crisis arrived.

The OECD has identified three primary factors that explain the African continent’s growth phenomenon at a rate higher than 4% annually during more than a decade after the spectacular jump in 2004: the strong global demand for petroleum and other mining resources that attracted strong investments in these sectors; conditions that were conducive to agriculture in most countries; and third, maintaining «healthy macroeconomic policies» in many nations that have reinforced the trust of companies. The African Development Bank (African Economic Panorama) has interpreted this event in terms of the continuous global expansion, more development assistance, and the improved macroeconomy. Finally, the IMF coincides with this double diagnosis and attributes the Sub-Saharan growth of recent years to improved petroleum exports and achieving a certain stability, which in turn has spurred the interest of foreign investments.

It seems clear that the sustained African growth, until the arrival of the crisis, has had well defined factors that are related to raw materials and petroleum exports, with the affluence of foreign aid (either in the form of investments or aid programmes), or thirdly, with the internal improvements introduced by the governments that have provided stability and security.

In fact, the continued worldwide development created a strong demand for petroleum and other raw materials, which in turn led to increased production in these sectors and stimulated investments and the arrival of capital. Two additional circumstances must be added to this fact. The first is that petroleum prices increased during the periods in question and the sale of raw materials benefited from favourable prices, avoiding the traditional deterioration in the relation of this type of exchange, internal deficits, and increased public debt. The second is that the internal measures implemented by the Governments favoured a certain moderation of inflation, which was cut half in one decade (from 13% to 7%), despite increased investments and foreign aid, introducing stability and calmness in domestic markets and favouring development.

The question now being considered is to what point can the current global crisis affect Africa, and enable or hinder its growth (4).

(4) For this topic, refer to the interesting chapters about «Africa and the International Economic Crisis: Effects, Consequences and Measures,» with three different visions from
Everything seems to indicate that the crisis has altered the operation of the three main factors that motivated and accompanied economic development in the African continent.

First of all, the decreased global demand has reduced the rate of exports, including petroleum, which were the first to be affected and comparatively the ones that have most suffered, with reductions that in some countries reached 45% (Equatorial Guinea) and 60% (Chad) between the summers of 2007 and 2008 (5).

Something similar would have to be said about the export of solid minerals, as this sector has strongly felt the reduced labour market, in some cases dramatically.

In any case, the depth of the crisis’ final effects will largely depend on the evolution of demand and prices, because what we are witnessing is reduced demand and lower prices for raw materials. Of course, the effects of the crisis are not distributed homogeneously. Nations that import petroleum and food may benefit from lower prices. However, on a global level, exports decrease at a faster rate than imports, and a significant deceleration of global demand will ultimately damage the African economy in two ways—by weakening the prices of raw materials and reducing the level of exports, which continues to be the African continent’s leading growth factor.

Additionally, the reduced arrival of assets to Africa in any of the traditional forms (investment capital, foreign credit, development aid or immigrant remittances) will affect growth in most nations.

Africa is the continent that receives the least amount of private investment, which is primarily aimed at the petroleum sector followed by the

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(5) To put into perspective the real dimension of the African nations that traditionally export petroleum, compared to other countries, it must be pointed out that the average per capita income of the first group, Gabon (4,128), Equatorial Guinea (3,455), Angola (1,315), Cameroon (1,315), Congo (1,158), Chad (296) and Nigeria (611), calculated using the 2007 dollar-euro exchange rate, is only slightly higher ($715) than the average for Sub-Saharan nations ($667), doubling that of low income countries ($306) and multiplying by six that of the most «fragile» states ($110), and it is lower than that of medium income countries such as Seychelles (7,536), Botswana (6,244), Mauritius (4,501), South Africa (3,723), Namibia (2,271), Cape Verde (1,668), and Swaziland (1,535), according to data collected by the IMF for the mentioned period.
extractive or food sectors. The decrease in demand has reduced production, which in turn has lowered investments, while problems related to liquidity in the international financial markets have complicated access to credit and made it significantly more expensive. Just as private projects have seen themselves be cancelled or delayed due to a lack of investors or those who have pulled out, bonds issued by several States have had to be cancelled or postponed. Public aid for development that could compensate, even in part, this deficiency does not offer better perspectives despite promises from Western nations, since their economies are suffering the difficult conditions of the crisis, considerable budget deficits, and high levels of unemployment that in turn have affected remittances from immigrants who have lost their jobs in developed economies, as they are the most vulnerable piece in the labour market (6).

As can be observed, the international crisis has weakened two of the pillars on which African development has based itself in recent years--raw materials and petroleum exports, and foreign investments and contributions. Both are related to the foreign sector, and as a result, they have turned out to be transmission elements of the international crisis. Because one of the clearest effects of this crisis has been to witness the enormous risks of foreign dependence through monocultures and concentrated exports.

Finally, the efforts made to improve internal policies must be mentioned. The beneficial effect of having maintained inflation under control during the years of expansion has already been mentioned. The market diversification policies introduced even by the petroleum producing countries such as Nigeria, Angola, Cameroon and Congo, among others, must also be mentioned, since growth that is not related to crude oil has increased at a must faster speed than other Sub-Saharan groups. Others, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, began strong infrastructure investments. The impulse provided by tourism in many countries must also be taken into consideration. Although this has been affected, and very seriously, by the crisis due to its clear foreign dependence, it’s equally predictable that the effect is stronger in those countries with qual-

(6) Although in overall terms, development aid and immigrant remittances do not represent a very significant amount (6% of the GNI), in some countries and for certain social sectors, these make up an incredibly important factor. In Burundi, between 2004 and 2006, development aid represented 50% of the GNI. This percentage is also applicable for Mozambique, while in Sierra Leone, it’s 40% of the national budget. Similarly, immigrant remittances represent 20% of the GDP in Lesotho, 10% in Sierra Leone, 8% in Guinea-Bissau, and 7% in Gambia. Vide Jonh Anyanwu and Iza Lejárraga. Op. cit. p.43
ity tourism and high incomes than in those nations with more popular tourism that could even benefit from the substitution effect. In any case, those countries that were able to introduce effective diversification elements into their economic policies will be in an equally and relatively better situation to face the negative effects of the crisis. However, there is no doubt that although good policies are able to buffer the worst effects of the crisis in some countries, it doesn’t seem that they will be avoided if one takes into consideration the fragility of these financial and economic structures and the level of foreign dependence of African nations.

In this way, after decades of sustained growth, the economic crisis opens the recurrent chapter of fragility, because in any case, as is clear, those nations and populations with more fragile economies will suffer the effects of the crisis more intensely (7).

The reduction of exports, investments, aid and remittances will reduce the incomes of African companies and States. The economic slowdown will ultimately limit the resources for sustaining the achievements that have been obtained and will reduce the effects on the population, especially in the most affected and vulnerable sectors. Thus, the economic crisis could generate social tensions and reopen former conflicts, aggravate current ones, or deteriorate those that are in progress of being resolved. In this way, aspects related to peace, security and stability gain renewed importance from the economic crisis, especially if one considers that the resources destined for these purposes may be affected.

REFLECTIONS AND RESPONSES

This event has generated various levels of reflection and responses, of which three have been particularly important. The first is centred on how to strengthen State authority in Africa. The second is focused on the consequences that the state’s collapse could have on the stability, security and peace in the African continent and the rest of the world. Between

(7) The IMF has established (2007) a list of African countries with low average incomes (around $300) and «fragile» nations (under $220). From both lists, it is deduced that there are 16 countries with incomes of $300 or less, which are: Mali (300), Madagascar (288), Burkina Faso (283), Gambia (282), Uganda (281), Rwanda (278), Sierra Leone (241), Central African Republic (239), Guinea Bissau (132), Liberia (132), Togo (226), Niger (176), Eritrea (172), Ethiopia (166), Malawi (165), Democratic Republic of the Congo (97).
both if these, as the connecting bridge, is the need to analyse in depth the democratic value within African political systems.

The objectives of democratisation and strengthening the State

The processes of expanding democracy and strengthening the State are considered to be simultaneous, converging and univocal, in the belief that respecting human rights, the ruling law, and good governance ensure a strengthened State and its ability to guarantee stability, security and peace. Therefore, democratisation is alluded to as a way of strengthening state authority and the formula to resolve political conflicts and ensure social harmony.

However, this approach, which is formal and politically correct, and even effective as a long term result, leaves quite a few loose strings and open questions in the short and mid term evolution.

Democratic processes have undoubtedly spread throughout Africa. In fact, 80% of African nations have held elections in the last ten years, and a greater degree of electoral participation has been confirmed, with an average above 60%. The theory of elections as the primary legitimate source of power has been generalised, and the belief in the democratic system has deepened.

However, it is not enough to simply refer to strengthened formal democratic procedures and processes in order to extract firm conclusions. First of all, democracy cannot be reduced to merely complying with the periodic rite of elections. In many cases, these have been fraudulent or affected by serious irregularities, they have been used for deceitful legitimisation of leaders who are clearly undemocratic in power, they have been the reason for strong clashes, and quite a few States have suffered or currently suffer the consequences of poorly planned electoral processes that have been carried out disastrously. In other words, elections don’t always provide real advances in democracy or stability, although without elections, these two aspirations are not possible.

Therefore, the perspective must include the social and economic aspect that should support the democratisation process for it to be truly effective, given that up until now, most of the theoretic and doctrinal focus has proceeded in line with what Paul-Simon Handy has called «the depoliticisation of analysis,» associating the mechanical form of democratisation process-
es with those to reinforce the State, omitting, for example, that democracy entails the increasing dissemination of power among a constantly growing number of agents so that it is more participative, while reinforcing the State frequently requires a higher degree of concentration of power in order to overcome its fragility. As a result, the democratisation processes, which may converge in the long term with those to strengthen the state’s authority, do not necessarily coincide either all the time or in every instance.

This has led some authors, such as P.S. Handy, to distinguish not only between actions destined towards reinforcing democracy from those aimed at empowering state power, but rather to differentiate degrees of fragility (high, medium or low) within the State’s reinforcement process in order to identify the type of intervention required (more or less intense), such as in the case of Emile Ognimba. While sectoral interventions would be sufficient in slightly fragile situations, a true reshaping of the State, and even of society itself, would be necessary for extremely fragile instances.

In line with what was stated earlier, and in accordance with the need to equally consider economic and social matters as well as the political aspect, it’s necessary to take into consideration that in the case of failed States—as certain definitions seem to induce, including those of the actual failed State «failed State or failed concept» (H.-J. Spanger)—it not only consists of a collapsed State or failed policies, or according to the prevalent French belief, of a social collapse—which also exists—but a failure of the entire system: economic, social, cultural, etc., and the real source of state fragility must be found here.

The collapse of political authority is not unrelated to social collapse (anomie, fragmentation, discrimination), judicial collapse (offences related to organised crime), of the economy (poverty, misery, hunger), or of cultural values (corruption, nepotism, intolerance), but rather of all of them, meaning that any of them ultimately involve the entire system. This forces African societies that have suffered the collapse of their system of coexistence to withstand permanent situations of risks and threats to personal and collective security on all fronts.

Risks and threats

It is true that when referring to a fragile State, stability and peace, by definition, are weak. As a result, the mechanisms to identify and prevent risks are equally collapsible. Where to begin?
By simple logic, it’s always less risky and costly to attempt to prevent a conflict as opposed to successfully resolve it once it has begun. For this reason it’s natural to give priority to prevention, and consider, along with Juliette Khady Show, prevention as a response to fragility; in fact, as the first response.

However, what are the risks to be avoided and how are they identified? Depending on the comprehensive focus adopted, risks and threats in the African continent are of different natures and types, and as a result, they present different causes and effects (8).

First of all, Africa experiences certain structural weaknesses. Some are derived from the past international context, and others are current. Colonisation obliterated the traditional organisational structures as well as the native values of coexistence, establishing instead artificial barriers between natural groups and creating imported ways of life. The consequences have been lasting and have resulted in frequent wars and continued border tensions. In many cases, there continues to be a feeling of belonging to the strongest group rather than a bond with the State, and this does not contribute towards strengthening political power. In the cases of conflict between both of these, there tends to be a dispersion of authority towards groups and ethnic groups. Similarly, the strong and prevalent feeling of belonging to a tribe or clan (or other symbols of group identity) have created an ideal situation for cultivating clashes between ethnic groups or between religious or political groups, sometimes with dramatic consequences.

However, if colonisation obliterated the original organisational structures, decolonisation did not end economic and commercial dependence, and after decades of neocolonialism, we are currently witnessing a renewed interest from large countries for the natural resources, especially minerals, of the African continent, which combined with an unequal trade system, is generating new international tensions that are projected, through their competing interests, in and between African nations.

Internally, the risks entailed by situations of poverty, hunger, epidemics and pandemics are obvious, not only related to personal security (resignation, desperation and death), but also collective (massive emigration,

rebelliousness, conflicts and wars for access to basic resources, especially land and water), because in a situation of social hardship, there is a higher risk of confrontation for the possession of resources.

If hunger and disease are related to natural factors (scarcity of food and pathogenic factors) that the State and society have not been capable of, or known how or wanted to distribute or prevent, the simultaneously connected risks of extreme hardship and exorbitant social inequality (misery and opulence), which are frequently tied to corruption and nepotism, then a disproportionate anxiety may result for the appropriation at all cost—even criminal—of economic or social resources on behalf of the least favoured groups, or it may generate situations that provoke conflicts. Additionally, the illegal appropriation and the endogamic and clientelist distribution of resources presents another aspect tied to the fight for power (9).

Insofar as the control and the proximity to power are decisive criteria for the appropriation or beneficial distribution of resources, the fight to conserve or gain access to power represents a strong obstacle for democratisation (exclusion of certain groups, negative response to political alternation, electoral fraud) and a risk to stability (coup d'états, military group revolts, social and political destabilisation campaigns).

All of this reflects the way in which the political, economic and social aspects and interests are mixed and intertwined, in such a way that the groups removed from power that are not in a position to have access to power opt for the privileges that power grants in other ways and outside of the system, giving way to the organised delinquency that directly challenges the State.

**Exercising threats: non-state armed agents**

Over the background of these tensions, criminally organised or armed groups have formed, which are more effective in committing crimes than the State in repressing them, with an ability to generate armed conflicts as well as carry out and control activities related to kidnapping, piracy,

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(9) The economic aspects of the clientelist use of power are well known: economic and commercial concessions or debt condonations for related people and sectors, manipulation so to exclude concessions, license withdrawals, imposed administrative or fiscal sanctions, use of inspections as a tool for pressure, expropiations and confiscation of goods from people or rival groups, etc
and illegal human trafficking, weapons and drugs. It is precisely the effective operation of these groups that has led to the State’s collapse in its most emblematic aspects: security (personal and collective), stability and peace.

It must again be pointed out that this does not consist of exclusively African phenomena, although some display a special relevance in Africa.

Let’s begin with a brief reference to the migratory phenomenon, without the need to highlight the obvious: crime does not result from migration, but rather in the criminal and illegal trade that organises and benefits from illegal human trafficking, primarily young people, women, and even children. The associated consequences are clear: loss of the best human resources and the most promising capacities for the future; ruthless human exploitation with enormous health risks and a large number of lives lost in the desert or at the sea; facilitated channels for organised crime, terrorism and other illegal trafficking (prostitution); increased social marginalisation and the possibility for tension and crime in the transit nations, etc.

Unlike migration, which is a natural phenomenon in itself but should be regulated and channelled so as to free it from its humiliating and criminal servitudes towards human dignity, kidnappings constitute a direct and essentially criminal activity per se. Allegedly justified in the rebellion of certain sectors because of unfair distribution of mining resources (Niger Delta) or in the permanent social marginalisation of certain groups (Mali Tuaregs), the truth is that the protests and initial revolts have not only ended in banditry rebelliousness against the State, but the existence of these activities in the extensive Sahel-Sahara region, which is difficult for the State to control, has favoured the appearance of terrorist groups influenced by Al Qaeda.

As in the case of large desert areas, the extensiveness of the sea, combined with the collapsed State power, has facilitated piracy along the coasts of Somalia in Eastern Africa. Aimed at kidnapping and obtaining a ransom, it only differs from the other type because of the specific characteristics of its sea setting.

Another threat that directly and frequently affects stability, security and peace in large areas and many places in Africa is arms trafficking, especially and generally those that are light or of small calibre. Originating from residual stocks from the Cold War era or disarmament, demilitarisa-
tion and reinsertion processes that are in progress or poorly completed, these weapons tend to end up in the hands of rebels that fight against regular armies or other paramilitary groups. Aside from being the cause of horrendous crimes, intense arms trafficking constitutes one of the most generalised risks and dangers in Africa: it feeds armed disidence and warlike clashes between ethnic groups, politicians or religious groups, it consists of the most generalised threat against peace and security, it causes the greatest number of violent deaths, it contributes towards socio-political fragmentation, and it frequently places at risk the State’s power and authority.

Finally, drug trafficking, as well as money laundering, which tends to accompany nearly all organised crime activities when it does not comprise the main activity, is another danger and challenge that impedes security in Africa.

In any case, the flows and benefits that illegal activities provide organised crime groups, aside from permanently damaging people, groups, society in general and the adequate reinforcement of the State, they comprise a clear danger because of their ability to finance international terrorism.

As a result, at least three possible and serious consequences that involve the referred risks and threats may be summarised:

1. Damaged social peace, political stability and personal security.
2. Weakened and reduced authority of the States in Africa
3. Creation and availability of channels for action and funding of terrorism

This represents a considerable level of challenges for Africa and the world, which must be urgently faced and controlled for the benefit of all.

THE REBIRTH OF AFRICA

Regarding Africa, it was at the end of the 90s, when in light of the growing number of conflicts (10), a series of processes were implemented that aimed to impede their appearance, ensuring peace and stability as a condition prior to development.

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(10) In 1999, Africa was the setting for half the conflicts that were taking place throughout the world.
In terms of descriptive clarification, two significant lines of action can be distinguished. One, promoted institutionally within the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) through its Summits. Another, driven by countries and individual leaders that attempted to unify political ideas around their proposals (11).

Regarding the Summits, the one at Algiers (July 1999) was the first to introduce security and defence topics in its meeting agenda, with the approval of the «Convention on preventing and fighting against terrorism.» At the next Sirte Summit (Libya, September 1999), Nigeria proposed the creation of a permanent Pan-African Conference for security, stability, and development, which never occurred. However, the Inter-Ministerial Conference of the OAU, held a few months later in Nigeria (Abudja, May 2000), adopted a Solemn Declaration and a Plan of Action, which was fully approved shortly thereafter at the Lomé Summit (July 2000). The following year, the Lusaka Summit (July 2001), with the security and defence topic already incorporated to Africa’s displeasure, opened the transition towards the reconversion of the OAU into the AU (African Union).

As part of the second aspect (of individual initiatives by certain countries and leaders), two are especially relevant. First, the Millennium Plan for Africa’s Rebirth, presented by the Presidents of Algeria (A. Bouteflika), Nigeria (O. Obasanjo) and South Africa (T. Mbeki). Their objectives were centred on political development, democracy, governance, and respecting human rights. Second, the Omega Plan, presented by the President of Senegal (Addulaye Wade), which searched for stability and economic recovery for all of Africa by means of economic development, taking advantage of the growth phase started in recent years, promoting investments in education, public works and infrastructures (roads, railways, ports, airports) through a continental authority (12). Both plans, as a re-

(11) As indicated in the text, the difference between both lines of action is merely for clarification, because in reality, they were intertwined. In this way, the mandate to manage the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (MAP), in which the first ideas of Presidents Mbeki and Bouterflica were documented, was approved at the Sirte Summit (Libya), and the Omega Plan by President A. Wade was also presented at this Summit (after the Franco-African Summit in Yaunde, January 2001). At the Togo Summit (July 2000), the three Presidents (South Africa, Nigeria and Algeria) made a call to developed nations for a combined effort in relaunching Africa.

(12) Antonio Sanchez-Benedito has highlighted, although in another context, the meaning and importance of the States that he refers to as «Anchor Nations» in the integration and vertebration of the African continent, for which it is also a good example. «The AU and «Anchor Nations» as Instruments of Peace and Security in the African Continent»
As a result of the mandate issued at the Sirte Summit, were combined into the resulting New Initiative for Africa (NIA), approved at the mentioned Lusaka Summit in 2001 (13). This initiative was gradually extended until including 15 States, becoming the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) with headquarters in Pretoria (14).

The coinciding timing of these two processes and their culmination at the Lusaka Summit, the last of the OAU, has led many authors to state the parallelism between the two processes for the creation of NIA/NEPAD and the AU. However, both processes form part of a much larger evolutionary framework.

In fact, during the decade that ended and opened the way to the new century, a series of events of special relevance took place in Africa. First of all, the amount and the intensity of conflicts had generated intense pessimism (Afro-pessimism) regarding the ability of African people and governments to equip themselves with a stable system of peaceful coexistence. Secondly, the long economic crisis, which had been dragging along since the mid 70s, had generated not only strong levels of poverty, but also of discouragement and desperation (African fatigue). All of this led to the perception that after the end of the Cold War, the African continent had lost all strategic value and that because of its lack of development and governance, its excessive corruption and conflictivity, it was beyond globalisation and ignored by investments and aid from the international community.

It was the strong reaction against this situation that promoted the movement in favour of Africa’s rebirth, which was in turn supported by a series of events of opposite significance. First of all, the existence of a

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(13) Aside from combining the two MAP or Millennium (South Africa, Nigeria and Algeria) and Omega (Senegal) plans, the Algiers Conference of Finance Ministers (May 2001) promoted the consolidation of both with the Global Compact Plan of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), developed by the Commission’s Secretary, K.Y. Amoako.
(14) After the Sirte Summit, Senegal joined the MAP Steering Committee. Egypt did so as well. After the Abudja meeting (June 2001) between the Steering Committee and experts from nine nations and the Southern Africa Development Bank, Gabon, Mali, Mozambique and Tanzania were invited to form part of the initiative. Later, Botswana, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Tunisia, Rwanda, and São Tomé and Príncipe participated as members of the MAP Steering Committee meeting held in Cairo (June 2001) in order to consolidate the MAP and Omega plans.
pleiad of exceptional leaders, such as those mentioned, who knew how to set the focus of a new political purpose. The triumph over the South African apartheid policy and its enormous contribution towards renewal, ending the last after-effects of colonialism and returning Africans their own destiny, generated a new climate of optimism as well as a stimulating invitation for the continent to accept its own responsibilities. Secondly, the favourable economic change, which began at the end of the 90s and early 2000, and which accompanied this renewal process. This new focus was preceded, as in the case of the end of the colonial system, by recognising the collapse of neocolonialism, which also contributed strongly towards overcoming pessimism and discouragement, and reinforcing the various initiatives in favour of economic renewal. This explains the coinciding processes of economic development and democratic values; in other words, sustained development supported by peace and stability guaranteed by good governance, justice, and respecting human rights.

It is in this climate of renewal in which the process of creating the AU appears. Although its structure is profuse and complicated (15), its objectives, in turn, are clear and ambitious, and may be grouped into four categories. Political: defend the sovereignty, integrity and independence of the States and simultaneously achieve greater unity, integration and solidarity between nations and people of Africa, promote peace, security and stability in the continent, promote democratic principles and institutions, reinforce and protect human rights. Economic: create the necessary conditions to allow the continent to play its fair role in the global economy, stimulate sustainable development in economic, social and cultural terms,

(15) The AU includes the Assembly (Chiefs of State and Government Leaders), the Executive Council (Ministers), the Permanent Representatives Committee (Ambassadors), the Commission (the Organisation’s Secretariat), the Pan African Parliament (265 members), the Court of Justice, the Peace and Security Council (which, due to its relevance, we will refer to immediately), the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (destined as a participation channel for civil society), the Specialised Technical Committees, and the Financial Institutions. The Peace and Security Council mentioned above is the specific tool for the matters we address. It is made up of 15 elective members according to certain criteria, including regional rotation and representation for periods of two years for ten of them and of three years for the remaining five, with the aim of avoiding complete renewals and guaranteeing continuity between Council Members. Among its functions, the following stand out: the promotion, maintenance, re-establishment of peace and post-conflict actions; preventive diplomacy and alert systems; mediation, intermediation and good practices; humanitarian actions and disaster management, etc.; as well as any others assigned by the Assembly or the Executive Council.
and coordinate and unify the policies of the Regional Economic Communities. Social: cooperate in all areas of human activity in order to improve the quality of life for African people, work intensely towards the eradication of diseases and the promotion of good health, intensify educational efforts and foster scientific-technical development. In the international area: promote and defend common African positions regarding matters of interest for the continent, stimulate international cooperation, especially regarding the United Nations and the Declaration of Human Rights.

In summary: the goals of Africa’s rebirth, in addition to promoting continental integration and unity, essentially consisted of three. In the political aspect, to establish and ensure democratic systems, good governance, justice, and respecting human rights. In the economic aspect, to recover control of the economy, establish new relations with developed nations, free itself of debt and renew Africa’s position in the global economy. In the peace and security aspect, to prevent the appearance of conflicts, to channel the problems of the various groups, to quickly and effectively resolve conflicts, and above all, to guarantee peace and stability.

In any case, and this is important to highlight, ensuring peace and preventing conflicts are not only unrenounceable and urgent objectives, but also prior requirements or unavoidable pre-conditions of any political, economic and social development for both NEPAD as well as the AU, and which must be addressed throughout the continent by means of the five subregional groups that comprise it: Northern Africa, Western Africa, Eastern Africa, Central Africa and Southern Africa.

It was precisely in Western Africa, specifically because of the War of Liberia, when the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) decided to establish a preventive regional framework in order to ensure stability, security and peace, aiming to avoid uncontrolled conflicts in the region. For this, an institutional framework based on two supports, to which a third was added later: a Control Group for preventing armed conflicts, and when applicable, the cease fire, management, and resolution of conflicts; a detection and early response mechanism, based on a network of local instances disseminated throughout the region and destined to collect information regarding risks and threats; and after the war of Liberia (1989), a military force to credibly support the peace process (16).

(16) This force has also acted in Sierra Leone (1997-99), Guinea Bissau (1988-99) and the Ivory Coast (2002). Since then, it participates with the AU and the UN, and it has established a collaboration commitment with the OSCE.
Immediately after its creation (2002), the African Union assumed this initiative, giving it more depth, magnitude, and continental extension, creating what is called the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), built around the following levels: a Peace and Security Council as the highest leadership body; a Panel of Experts that provides advice and assessment through its experience; a continental early warning system; and finally, a reserve military force or a fast action contingency deployed in each of the five continental regions.

THE GREAT NATIONS AND AFRICA

As has been established, a very important aspect of the reflection that led to Africa’s rebirth was the search for mechanisms to introduce the new international order that appeared after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disappearance of the Cold War, that fit in the globalisation processes. In this manner, the Presidents of South Africa and Nigeria presented their concerns to the G-8 and the Bretton Woods institutions at the Non-Aligned Movement Summit and the G-77 Summit in Havana (April 2000). At the OAU summit, which was held a few months later in Togo (July 2000), the previously mentioned Presidents, in addition to the President of Senegal, invited developed nations to an association for the regeneration of Africa. Around this same time, they presented the same topic to the G-8 leaders during their meeting in Japan (2000) (17), as well as at the World Economic Forum in Davos (January 2001), the first worldwide forum where the Millennium and Omega Plans were presented. Since then, and especially since the creation of the AU, the search for cooperation with the various international instances (UN, G-8, EU), would be continuous.

Additionally, within the new international order, Africa had become a preferential centre of attention for the UN, the Great Powers, the European Union and Spain.

The United Nation’s preferential interest in Africa appeared in the two important programme documents promoted by the Organisation’s two African General Secretaries: the «Peace Agenda» (Boutros Ghali) and the «Millennium Goals» (Kofi Annan). Since then, Africa has been the inexcusable reference in any international debate about security, develop-

(17) The Japanese Prime Minister, Yoshino Mori, invited the Presidents of Algeria, Nigeria and South Africa to present their plans for Africa at the G-8 Summit held in Okinawa.
ment and peace. Not in vain, it’s the continent where the most peace maintenance and reconstruction operations have been carried out, and where the highest number of nations have been involved in them.

The Great Powers have also shown their collective interest in Africa, as proven by the Okinawa Summit, the G-8 meetings in Geneva (July, 2001), the very important Glenn Eagles (Scotland, 2005), or the more recent London Summit (2009) and L’Aquila Summit (Italy, 2009).

Although the interest in Africa by the great nations has a common element--the African continent’s mineral and energy potential--the motivations and the focus of each of those nations is different.

The United States showed a limited interest in Africa during the Cold War, in part because of the scarce space available by the ideological hegemony that dominated the continent at the time since most of the States were ascribed to the Non-Aligned Movement, formally situating themselves as the Third World beyond the Washington-Moscow capitalism-communism bipolarity, and in part because of renouncing in favour of its allies, better situated and positioned, given the historical relations with the African continent and the United Kingdom, France or Portugal, primarily, despite the tensions following the decolonisation processes.

It was after September 11 when North America’s interest in Africa was renewed, because Washington understood that the new threats approaching its territory and the rest of the would could be more serious than those of the Cold War. In fact, these came from a powerful State, but with well defined policies and objectives, which were foreseeable and predictable. Those, in turn, resulted to be less calculable and more surprising and destabilising. In summary, the reason for Washington’s recent interest in Africa is largely related to security and the fight against terrorism, and more specifically, with the risk that organised crime groups in some Muslim countries in northern, eastern and central Africa, increasingly influenced by Islamic fundamentalism, take advantage of the fragility of certain African States in order to commit terrorist acts. As a result, it is a strategic interest motivated by the markets´ energy security and the defence against a terrorist threat.

However, North America’s interest in Africa seemed to acquire a new dimension after President Obama’s election, his emblematic trip to Ghana and his public commitment with Africa, upon displaying a more cooperative and all-inclusive approach rather than only focusing on the fight
against terrorism. Because security and peace cannot be undertaken from a perspective that is neither exclusively nor predominantly confrontational, and especially not military. Quite the contrary; the aim is to move Africa away from any warlike option. The number of deaths and refugees due to armed conflicts in Africa are dramatic, and the economic costs of a single year of war are comparable to losing ten years of development (P. Collier). The relation between security and development is so close and mutually conditional that, as Kofi Annan stated, development cannot exist without security and security cannot exist without development, so both should be indissolubly connected for their respective progress and to reinforce human rights.

The situation in Russia is different. Moscow, which at one point held an enormous political influence (especially ideological) throughout the African continent during the Cold War, and which played a highly relevant role in training African leaders, technicians and professionals at Russian universities, clearly lost this hegemony after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disappearance of the USSR. In fact, many of the new African leaders and intellectuals accused it of having contributed, through its support of certain «national liberation» movements and other ideological clashes, the climate of conflitivity that has dominated the African setting. As a result, Africa has remained outside of Russia’s focus during these last decades.

However, during the last decade, Moscow’s leaders have once again shown signs of renewed interest in Africa and certain African nations (especially those with mineral resources). President Putin’s initial trips few years ago have been followed by the most recent ones by President Mevdevev, aimed at recovering part of the former influence and shape its energy policies on a global level. The priorities have been primarily aimed at countries such as Algeria, Angola, the Ivory Coast, Egypt, Libya, Namibia, Nigeria and South Africa, with which agreements have been signed or a more intense cooperation policy has been designed. To highlight its new disposition towards the continent, it has cancelled important amounts of African debt and it has offered generous aid in terms of cooperation and unrequited assistance. However, Moscow aspires a spectacular strategy of great reach in Africa’s gas sector: to finance a 4,000 kilometre long trans-Saharan pipeline to Europe from Nigeria, one of the countries with the most gas reserves in the world, an initiative that would be complemented with another pipeline in the North, in conjunction with the Italian Eni, for taking gas from Libya to the Mediterranean, closing Europe’s circle of dependence on Russia in the gas sector. These
interests in the African mineral and energy sector also reinforce Russia’s overall interest in the continent’s development and stability.

Like Russia, China also has a long history of influence in Africa. Since its founding in 1949, and after defining the principles of peaceful coexistence that would govern its foreign relations based on rejecting its own colonial legacy, it supported the African independence movements, establishing a network of special relations with many African nations. The disintegration of the USSR, the subsequent fall of communist ideology, China’s internal withdrawal, and the concentration of efforts in developing its own economy created a pause in its relations with Africa. Oddly enough, however, the harsh criticisms that followed the Tiananmen events found an unexpected coinciding echo between many African leaders and China in rejecting Western democratic pressure and the imposition of hegemonic interpretations about human rights, which favoured China’s return to Africa, supported by the climate of renewed cooperation based on mutual respect, not interfering in internal matters, respecting sovereignty and accepting diversity, principles that were equally welcomed by the continent’s governments (18).

In 2000, the China-Africa Cooperation Forum was created, which has developed joint economic and social programmes, some of great importance (19). On another hand, it has carefully focused on addressing cooperation sectors that will display its interest through overall development with enormous programmes for infrastructures (roads, ports, reservoirs and dams) and the population, with important programmes related to agriculture the distribution of food, as well as building hospitals.

However, China has not forgotten its economic and commercial interests in Africa, where an enormous number of contracts have been signed (20), or the interests related to its own internal development. In

(18) It is worth considering in the mid term, after the AU’s solemn acceptance of democratic principles of good governance and respecting human rights, the admissibility of Chinese (and Russian) tolerance regarding certain internal situations in some African nations. For example, Peking maintains close ties with the governments of Sudan and Zimbabwe. Russia also avoided condemning this last nation’s regime at the UN.

(19) By applying the principles that inspire it, China has cancelled 10 billion in debt, it has considerably softened payment conditions for more than 30 nations (second Forum, 2003), and it has offered a preferential credit of $2 billion (third, 2006).

(20) Africa has become the second largest contractual market for China, with agreements for contract projects with a value of more than $125 billion, and more than $68 billion in closed business deals for 2008.
this manner, driven by the imperious need for raw materials required by
the vertiginous pace of its development and the volume of its enormous
economy, China is present in those nations with large petroleum resour-
ces such as Angola, its primary supplier, and Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria,
Gabon (21), as well as Chad, Sudan, and mineral producing companies
such as Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as the third
most important partner in these sectors, after the United States and the
EU, and in front of Russia.

For reasons related to geographic distance and historical disassocia-
tion, Japan traditionally maintained a certain disinterest in Africa. How-
ever, as of the new millennium, its interest in the African continent has
grown. As a result, in 2001, the Japanese Prime Minister, Yoshiko Mori,
completed the first visit by a Chief of Government to Africa (Ethiopia and
Ghana), followed by a second one five years later by Prime Minister Koizumi
(Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa). The reasons that have motivated
this increased Japanese interest in Africa are of various natures: the lack
of raw materials in the Japanese territory; the impulse to balance and
compensate China’s growing presence in the African economy; the as-
sumption of new commitments as a responsible member of the Interna-
tional Society, a natural decision associated with its aspirations for a per-
manent position in the Security Council after its possible future reform;
recognising the effects of certain phenomena (AIDS, bird flu, etc.) that
spread beyond continental borders; and the need to contribute towards
developing African nations as the best way to avoid or limit the levels of
conflictivity in the continent, which through globalisation, affect interna-
tional security.

As a result, Japan has increased its active participation in the process
of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD),
which it has hosted on four occasions and it has assisted in humanitarian
aid (Chad Sudan), reconstruction (Liberia and Sierra Leone), as well as
UN Peace Missions and Peace Mission Training Centres.

However, along with its increased commitment to aid, Japan has not
forgotten its economic and commercial interests in Africa, which have
increased significantly, although at levels far below those of China (22).

(21) 25% of the petroleum production in the region of the Gulf of Guinea is destined to
China.
(22) At the end of 2008, Japanese trade with Africa reached $26.6 billion, compared to
China’s $73.5 billion.
EU-AFRICA RELATIONS

Europe and Africa have always been two neighbouring and connected continents. Colonisation generated ties of dependence that changed after decolonisation. Independence brought new types of relations, of varied nature depending on how the independence process was carried out. In most cases of policy, there was a prevalence of neo-colonialism accusations in the rhetoric of special relations based on shared ties of language and culture, continuity of the State’s organisational, educational, legal or judicial models, and the economy. Regardless of the assessment of these historical periods, no one can deny that Africa is the continent closest to Europe and the one that is most familiar with it, and they have established the most interrelations.

The end of the Cold War opened a new period in which development cooperation policies were intensified, especially through bilateral programmes, with the appearance in the last decade of a new impulse towards multilateral cooperation for which precedents can be found in the Lomé Agreements.

It was during the validity of these Agreements, within the general framework of European cooperation with ACP nations (Africa, Caribbean, Pacific), and more specifically during the 4th Lomé Convention, when the European Commission began to tenuously introduce matters related to conflict prevention, democratic consolidation, and the fight against certain threats (drugs) in various Regional Indicative Programmes (RIP).

The European setting in which the EU’s relations with Africa have traditionally been inserted, in the area of security and defence, has been that of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) / European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), where the European Council has placed the skilled core for crisis management, both humanitarian and evacuation, as well for maintaining peace, that includes sending troops and carrying out military operations when applicable. For this, the EU has established an Operations Centre (OpsCentre) and a fast response unit. Based on the European Security and Defence Policy (now the Common Security and Defence Policy), the EU has carried out more than twenty operations in Europe (Balkans), Asia, the Middle East, and Africa (23).

(23) The EU has participated in more than a dozen peacekeeping missions in Africa: Artemis, in the DRC (2003), EUROFOR DR Congo (2006), EUPOL Kinshasha (2007), EUFOR Chad (Somalia) as well as EUPOL-DRC and EU Support for AMIS (Darfur).
But the EU has also wanted to share Africa’s aspiration to effectively manage its own crises and to cooperate with it by preparing the Plan for Building African Abilities in Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Management, adopted by the General Affairs Council (November 13, 2006).

One year later (December 2007), the EU-AU Summit approved the Strategic Alliance or EU-AU Joint Strategy in Lisbon, establishing a Peace and Security Partnership that places the EU as Africa’s main partner and ally (24).

It consists of a global alliance between equals and for matters of common interest. The global nature means that it is not limited to certain areas, such as in the case of technical or sectorial cooperation (political, economic or military), but rather that it includes any space of shared interest. The global nature implies acknowledging the close tie between security and development, because only development includes the global objectives that security provides. Since it is an alliance between equals, it lacks any concept of dependence and any donor or receiver position, just as the reference to common interests reinforces the alliance’s global nature (any topic deserving the attention of the parts) as well as its joint character (impossibility of contributing factors that are not shared).

Although the objectives of this Partnership are for the long term, a Plan of Action has been prepared for the more immediate horizon (2008-2010), in which eight political, economic, social, environmental, and educational-cultural-scientific areas of interest are established (25). These include the peace and security area for which three priorities have been set: political dialogue, supporting the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and guaranteed funding for peacekeeping operations in Africa (26).

(24) The Partnership is formed by: On behalf of the EU: Germany, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Spain, France, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden and the European Commission. On the African side: Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Morocco, Uganda, the AU Commission

(25) The eight areas are: peace and security, democracy and human rights, regional integration, energy, climate change, emigration, and concluding with education, information and space.

(26) At the G-8 Summit in L’Aquila (July 8-10, 2009), the AU presented six issues of special interest related to peace and security: reinforcing the APSA, funding peacekeeping operations in Africa, supporting the AU in matters of post-conflict reconstruction, the common African defence and security policy, constitutional normalisation in Somalia, and implementing UN Resolutions and those of regional organisations. Of these topics, the first two coincide exactly with the priorities established with the EU, and of the rest, most fit with the dialogue topics.
The aim of political dialogue is to reach common positions regarding peace and security. An effective dialogue entails identifying topics, actors and formats.

Among the topics, five areas of special attention stand out: Small and light weapons, remaining or remnants of explosives and anti-personnel mines; women (resolution 1325) and children (resolution 1612) in conflict and post-conflict situations; causes of conflict, including terrorism; conflict management and resolution, referring to mediation; the role of civil society, especially in preventing conflicts.

Regarding the actors, the upper level on the dialogue table is attributed to the semi-annual troika of the EU and the AU Commission. However, below this level, the number of conferences and meetings has multiplied, both on a political as well as a political-technical level, in various formats of joint EU-AU meetings about regions in post-conflict situations (DRC), or conferences like the ones held in 2009 about conflict mediation (Finland, March), European and African civil society (April), or the control and disarmament of light weapons (Rome, July) (27).

Regarding the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), it has been considered a priority to train personnel in order to make their actions more effective. For now, the attention has been focused on identifying programmes, courses, and centres of excellence, both in Europe and Africa, as well as any other part of the world, and not only related to military training, but also the civil component in conflict management (28).

Regarding guaranteed funding, the aim is to have predictable and secure financing mechanisms in place for peacekeeping operations in Africa.

In summary, although the cooperation between the EU and the AU is the most important and has achieved significant levels of achievements, there is still room for self-analysis for even greater effectiveness (29).

(27) Among other periodic meetings for dialogue, it’s important to mention a possible seminar for assessing the terrorist threat in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, led by the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism, in Algiers, and scheduled meetings with accredited African representatives at the UN headquarters in New York and the EU’s General Secretariat before the Organisation.

(28) Along these same lines, and related to strengthening the African Security Force (ASF), EUROCAMP has been built, making it possible to carry out joint exercises.

THE INVOLVEMENT OF SPAIN

Spain, with a more limited involvement than other European nations in the African continent’s historical colonisation processes, but with the closest geographic positioning, has decided to give political and strategic priority to its relations with Africa, shaping this priority in the «Africa Plan» as well as in the «Programme for the Spanish Presidency of the European Union» (January 1 - June 30, 2010).

Africa Plan

The first Africa Plan (2006-2008) configures for the first time the strategic and political priority of Spain’s foreign actions related to the African continent, a priority consummated by Parliamentary agreement and supported in the coordinated actions of territorial Governments and local authorities, the programming and organised execution of the cooperation and aid programmes for development, and the solidarity of the Spanish people and the civil society.

The positive results assessment after the first Plan was applied resulted in extending the two-year planning to four years for the second Plan (2009-2012). However, aside from the time extension and in addition to its expanded content and scope, the new Plan reinforces mechanisms for dialogue and concertation for facing shared challenges more effectively, both as a European nation as well as the country closest to Africa, which according to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Miguel Ángel Moratinos, wants to transform this proximity into a bridge between two continents.

The current Africa Plan is focused on three transversal objectives: Human Rights, gender equality and the environment, and it articulates and dynamises into a series of lines of action, of which the first is to support the peace and security processes.

For the Africa Plan, the concepts of security, development and human rights are inseparable elements of a single and global process, in such a way that fostering human rights is only possible in a setting of stable peace, citizen equality, and sustainable development.

In order to reach the peace and security objective, the lines of action are focused on three directions:
A) stability and democratic governance.
B) implementation of mechanisms to prevent and manage conflicts, as well as post-conflict reconstruction.
C) cooperation in defence and against organised crime.

A) Regarding good governance and sustained democratisation, actions are aimed at developing an inclusive population that, far from relegateing, isolating or discriminating certain groups or social categories, reinforces the sectors of a civil society and promotes political participation, including that of women. The goal is evident: «Improved social cohesion prevents fragile situations.» In this sense, the Plan includes support of strategies to reinforce political parties, as well as the impulse to create organisations and networks with active participation by NGOs, business associations and unions. As social cohesion and institutional participation appear to be more natural on a local level, the Plan also supports endogenous decentralisation processes in various nations (Mozambique, Cape Verde).

B) Regarding the prevention and resolution of conflicts, reinforcing Africa’s capacity to prevent and manage crises, guarantee peace via the creation of units, and strengthening African organisations destined to these goals all make up the Plan’s top priority in this line of action. In this sense, Spain is committed to contribute the initiatives for reinforcing the effectiveness of the actions carried out within the African Peace and Security Architecture, and in particular, towards strengthening the African Peace Facility.

On another hand, on a domestic level, Spain is committed to continue promoting the National Plan for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts (2002), which includes preparing analytical risk indicator reports in various countries, reinforcing the coordination between relevant instances and exchanging information with African centres in order to prevent conflicts or reduce their effects, as well as promoting early response mechanisms for humanitarian crises.

Regarding conflict resolution, the Plan includes the support for those methods and mechanisms of peaceful resolution that may result most suitable in each case (mediation, intermediation, negotiation, etc.), and the participation of Spaniards in consolidated peace missions in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Finally, regarding post-conflict reconstruction, Spain will drive humanitarian de-mining actions as well as aid for victims, their families and
communities, support the return of refugees, back the disarmament and
demobilisation processes, and join the fight against impunity through
Special Courts, all in line with UN principles and norms.

C) Regarding cooperation of defence and against organised crime,
the lines of action are aimed at reinforcing the security systems and the
response structures in light of risks and threats, understanding that both,
because of their dual dimension (regional and international) are shared
between Spain and Africa (terrorism, proliferation, organised crime, kid-
nappings, piracy, drugs, etc.).

The priority actions are aimed at reinforcing African abilities in this
field, intensifying Spanish cooperation with the AU and the Regional Or-
ganisations, especially with those, such as the Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS), that already have specific structures
or programmes (e.g., money laundering and funding terrorism), and ex-
changing experiences of bilateral interest.

In order structure cooperation better in this sector, the actions are
organised by sectors or areas.

In the defence area –which is a sector that has experienced a strong
development in recent years– bilateral contacts have been established
with the Ministries of numerous countries in order to create, according to
each situation, bilateral agreements, mixed commissions (primarily with
nations in the Gulf of Guinea), or cooperation programmes (Southern Af-
rica, South Africa in particular). Regarding cooperation for the creation of
units, the Plan highlights 50 scholarship courses offered for military edu-
cation in at least nine Sub-Saharan African nations, and it offers to also
expand and promote military cooperation in the healthcare sector via the
donation of materials and aid (military telemedicine) to African hospitals.

In the subject of terrorism, in which Spain has extensive experience
and a significant technical assistance capacity (terrorism funding, border
control, police and judicial cooperation, etc.), the Plan’s focus, indepen-
dent of some nations that due to their particular proximity or circum-
stances have a special priority, is to collaborate with initiatives of the
AU (30), the regional African organisations (31) and the United Nations
offices, especially in Western and Central Africa.

(31) Such as the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), the African
Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), in Algiers, or the Capacity
Regarding arms proliferation, the Plan’s aim is to support the initiatives that are in progress and those that may arise in the future for eliminating or limiting to a maximum arms trafficking, especially light and small calibre weapons.

In the field of drugs, the Plan establishes that Spain will contribute towards promoting the plans prepared by the regional African organisations, such as the CEDEAO’s «Plan of Action for facing the growing problem of illegal drug trafficking, organised crime, and drug abuse in Western Africa during the 2008-2011 period», and it will collaborate with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in its regional activities in Africa.

Regarding migrations, the Plan adopts a balanced focus of positive cooperation with the dual aim of fighting against mafias, organised crime, and illegal human trafficking, on the one hand, and organising legal migration on another. While this is considered to be an opportunity for personal and social development, the other is valued as a threat to individuals and the community, and in order to avoid it or slow it down, proposes: support for the structures, organisations, policies and programmes that fight against mafias and illegal trafficking of migrants; stimulus for the processes of technical police cooperation (training, information exchange, border control, etc.); joint programmes to prevent illegal immigration of minors, and lastly, training sea rescue abilities. To organise legal migration, the Plan proposes, among other things, the creation, consolidation and perfecting of institutions and hiring mechanisms at the origin, in accordance with the correlation between labour supply and demand, suggesting the creation of Labour and Immigration Departments in Embassies, or establishing selection processes by the companies in the countries of origin, as well as an awareness campaign against illegal immigration and information regarding the legal opportunities and alternatives for job offers and hiring.

Finally, regarding piracy, Spain, which has promoted and supported all of the Security Council’s resolutions as well as the International Community’s actions for their application, and which has participated from the start in the EU initiatives, particularly in the approval and launch of the ATALANTA operation, is committed to maintaining this political focus, and supporting and promoting coordination with international or regional initiatives in the fight against acts of piracy and kidnapping.

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Building Program against Terrorism (ICPACT) of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).
Programme for the Spanish Presidency of the EU Council

The Spanish Presidency of the EU Council (January-June 2010) has provided an excellent additional opportunity for reinforcing Spain’s and Europe’s commitment with Africa, which is reflected not only in the extensive subject matter and consideration agreed upon with the African continent in this Presidency’s Programme, but also in its level of commitment.

Although, on the one hand, it’s extensive and ambitious because it covers not only the internal institutional aspects of a recently renewed European Union, but also the external ones that correspond to a global actor such as the EU which has decided to be responsible and supportive; on the other hand, the Programme is constrained to a framework of priorities that are forcefully limited by effectiveness and timing requirements.

Therefore, there are global aspects in the Programme for the Spanish Presidency of the EU that naturally include Africa, although not only Africa, and specific aspects aimed only and specifically towards Africa.

Among the first, it’s worth mentioning, first of all, those matters related to cooperation for development, in which most African nations participate. In this regard, the Programme states that «the Spanish Presidency will defend the compliance of international commitments related to the fight against hunger and poverty, funding for development and effective aid, and will work intensely so that a European position is adopted that is ambitious and focused on the United Nations Conference on Millennium Goals.» (32).

Similarly, regarding the relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) nations, the Spanish Presidency will also work towards «holding the Joint EU-ACP Conference and will aim to include the second revision of the Cotonou Agreement and the X FED review in a satisfactory manner for the subsequent execution of the adopted measures.»

Also, regarding matters of global trade, it is established that «the Spanish Presidency will promote the prompt conclusion of trade negotiations taking place within the WTO’s Doha Round.»

(32) Perhaps it’s convenient to point out that in parallel to the fight against hunger and poverty, the priority reference in the Programme for «defending the right to drinking water and sanitation,» which are highly relevant topics in Africa, as well as, regarding financing for development and effective aid, the positioning in favour of what has been agreed upon at the Accra (effective aid) and Doha (funding) Conferences.
Similar positions may be found regarding climate change, promoting and defending rights and liberties, women’s equality and gender violence, among many other topics.

In any case, the Programme of the Presidency clearly states that all the actions included in it will be carried out within the «commitment towards balanced development of the Organisation’s three pillars: peace and security, sustainable development, and human rights.» This statement also conveys the permanent priority given to the aspects of peace and security, as well as their invariable relation with development and democracy.

In this manner, and without delving deeper into the ambitious global objectives of the Programme for the Spanish Presidency of the EU, in which Africa is involved, and centred on the specific framework of security and defence, the Spanish Presidency has assumed the priority of «making a special effort towards supporting the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy and so that the EU may strengthen its nature as an international reference in matters related to crisis management.»

This is where the dual objective appears of increasing European effectiveness and maintaining the moral stimulus so that the EU may be a useful and recognised actor in peacemaking situations and processes, with the dual consequence that a more capable Europe can carry out more international commitments and in a better fashion.

Among these commitments, relations with Africa are a priority, which is acknowledged emphatically: «the Spanish Presidency will contribute towards the consolidation of the privileged, strategic relation between the European Union and Africa, based on the renewed association at this past Lisbon Summit.»

After recognising the privileged character of this strategic relation, the Programme declares that «it will promote the application of the Joint Strategy and it will reinforce the European Union’s mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation with the African Union and with the regional African organisations (ECOWAS, SADC, CEMAC-ECCAS, IGAD).»

Based on these budgets, the Programme stresses on the most relevant aspects in the area of security and defence: the preventive aspects and the management and resolution of crises and conflicts, referring to certain threats (terrorism, arms proliferation, illegal immigration, drugs) and establishing some priorities for certain geographic regions.
Regarding prevention, the Programme is based on a vision, already stated, of the deep correlation between peace-security, sustainable and balanced socio-economic development, and respecting human rights and democratic processes. It hardly seems appropriate to once again stress the strong preventive value of this correlation.

In any case, the Programme states that «preventive democracy and institutional reinforcement will be promoted as effective tools for ensuring peace and security in Africa.» Following this stated principle, it presents a specific action proposal: «to promote the presence of EU missions to supervise and observe the electoral processes in the region of the Gulf of Guinea, when circumstances allow it.»

Regarding management crisis, the Programme does not make academic distinctions between strictly preventive crisis management and managing conflicts in progress. Instead, it seems to understand crisis management in its dual facet--preventive (avoiding deterioration of the crisis) and resolvent (searching for an end to the conflict). However, although it states as an undisputed priority the need to institutionally strengthen States, it especially focuses on reinforcing European capacities for a better response of the foreign actions in this field.

In order to reach this objective, a triple line of action is designed: First of all, adjusting all the actions of the European Security Strategy: «The European Security Strategy, updated at the European Council in December of 2008, under the French Presidency, will continue to be focused on the EU’s foreign actions.»

Secondly, strengthening the European Defence Agency and a more effective and flexible use of Combat Groups. In this regard, the Programme insists on the imperious need for better coordination between civilians and military personnel, and determines that not only «will the efforts to improve civilian-military coordination be maintained,» but that «the Spanish Presidency will work towards making the qualitative leap regarding the Union’s civilian and military capacities.»

Finally, third of all, the clear and categorical commitment towards international legality and effective multilateralism as an essential central point. While the first is based on «coordinating with the United Nations, as well as with the regional Organisations such as (...) the African Union,» the second one, of a more technical nature, seems to especially refer to
«consolidating the strategic association between the EU and NATO, and promoting the work of the European Defence Agency.»

In any case, it is worth mentioning, as a result of the above, that the final objective of the Spanish Presidency is summarised in «that the EU must be in a position to contribute, through crisis management operations, towards the prevention, stabilisation and resolution of conflicts.»

Regarding the cause of conflicts, or if preferred, the types of risks and threats, the Programme maintains a similar posture as the one adopted towards important objectives, since it understands that they are all global and require a shared treatment.

Such is the case, for example, of emigration, for which «the Spanish Presidency will promote a common policy for immigration and asylum, developing the postulates of the Global Focus on Immigration and the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum. We will strive for this to respond to its objectives of achieving organised, legal immigration, fighting against illegal immigration and human trafficking, and controlling the Union’s foreign borders, intensifying cooperation with the countries of origin and of transit.» Regarding this last point, the Programme recognises that «the reinforcement of aid, cooperation, and readmission agreements with countries of origin is essential in the migratory aspect.»

Following the statement of these principles of action, the human dimension reappears, especially regarding children and minors, for which «special attention is applied,» especially those who travel «unaccompanied.» By having already included this matter in the Stockholm Programme, the Union may begin adopting the first decisions in this area, which should take into consideration the preventive care, protection, and return of minors to their families or the tutoring institutions in their countries of origin. In any case, so as to avoid evident risks, «the development of a cross border alert system will be promoted in relation to the disappearance of minors and individuals of special risk.»

To conclude this matter, the Programme does not omit the greater responsibility of host nations and states that «the Spanish Presidency will promote policies to integrate immigrants, based on the Union’s values, education, inter-cultural dialogue, and access to and fostering employment diversity.» Aside from acknowledging the requirements imposed by justice and human dignity, these measures, as far as reinforcing personal stability and social order, confirm that respecting human rights is the best
guarantee for peace and security, and the most effective way of neutralising threats.

The idea of needing coordinated action and joint policies in light of the threat also appears in the fight against terrorism, «so as to reinforce operational cooperation, starting from a shared commitment,» or in the area of proliferation, coordinating positions «in preparing and leading the efforts of the NPT Review Conference» or, in matters of conventional weapons, «paying special attention to advancing debates for a future International Treaty for regulating weapons trade» or regarding drug trafficking and organised crime.

Finally, the Programme for the Spanish Presidency of the EU refers to four regional priorities and three specific nations.

The first, mentioned earlier, is aimed at the Gulf of Guinea, where it has been proposed to «begin a process of reflection» about the region’s situation «in order to contribute towards promoting democracy and the State of Rights» by sending EU observation missions. The second is aimed at Western Africa and the Sahel, which deserve «special attention in light of the potential effects derived from threats related to terrorism, drug trafficking, and other illegal trafficking,» among which kidnappings must be specifically highlighted. The third refers to the Horn of Africa and «especially the stabilisation process in Somalia.» In conclusion, «the evolution of the situation in the region of the Great Lakes of Africa will also be carefully followed.»

Regarding the countries, except for Somalia, «the development of the EU-South Africa Strategic Association and the EU-Cape Verde Special Association will also be addressed.»
CHAPTER ONE

THE AFRICA-EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP ON PEACE AND SECURITY
THE AFRICA-EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP ON PEACE AND SECURITY

CLAUDE-FRANCE ARNOULD

«The partnership is guided by the fundamental principles of the unity of Africa, the interdependence between Africa and Europe, each party concerned assuming control of its own destiny, and shared responsibility».

Such were the terms used in December 2007 by the Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted in Lisbon to fix the framework of the new partnership between the European Union and Africa.

The transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) in 2001, the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD, 2001), the Protocol Relating to The Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (2002), the development of the European security and defence policy, the European Security Strategy (2003), and the emergence of new global challenges are examples of developments which have brought the EU and the African continent to modernise their long-standing, complex relations.

This entails first and foremost the institutionalization of a political dialogue which transcends the framework traditionally limited to development aid and economic exchanges (ACP).

It is also founded on the principle of «appropriation», which recognizes Africans’ right to both the main initiative and responsibilities of the actions to be performed and on which any type of commitment by the European Union is based. The principle of interdependence is also recognised for the first time in the history of these relations.

When the Treaty of Lisbon entered into effect and the European External Action Service was established, this partnership enables both parties
to align their views and better confront the prevention, management and resolution of the crises in Africa together.

For the African partners, this entails taking responsibility of the collective security system needing to be put in place on the African continent, with the full support of the Europeans. For the EU and its Member States, it is a chance to go beyond aid policies and to participate in a global, more consistent process. This partnership is multifaceted undertaking which combines the various instruments at the European Union’s disposal: the development policies, but also the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as well as the European security and defence policy (CSDP).

The Europeans’ commitment to contribute to resolution of the crises in Africa has taken on a totally new dimension since 2003 with the EU’s first military operation in Africa (Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo). There have been other operations and missions since then in DRC, more recently in Chad, and today in the Horn of Africa. The EU has complemented these actions with reform missions in the security sector, whether relating to police, armies or justice.

The implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon must help to achieve greater consistency in the means of action and to further enhance the effectiveness of this Africa-EU partnership.

To begin with, it must strengthen the indispensible connection between security and development. A successful end to a crisis depends in large part on the pertinence of the connection between peacekeeping operations, development activities and governance and the level of involvement of the State concerned in these processes.

The new treaty will also improve overall coherence, effectiveness and visibility of the European Union’s external action. The treaty brings two key innovations: the role of the High Representative, who is also the Vice-President of the European Commission, and the European External Action Service.

THE EU-AFRICA «PEACE AND SECURITY» PARTNERSHIP: A GLOBAL RESPONSE TO FRAGILE SITUATIONS

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy is organized around eight partnerships (1) Among these, the «Peace and Security» partnership. Taking into account

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(1) Peace and Security; Democratic Governance and Human Rights; Trade and Regional Integration; Development; Energy, Climate Change; Migration, Mobility and Employ-
its intrinsic link with the CSDP, the interest of the Member States and the considerable budgets put in place, this is the most advanced area.

**Priority actions**

The «Peace and Security» partnership has chosen three tasks to perform as a priority: strengthening of the political dialogue between the EU, the AU and regional African organisations; implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA); and the financing of the AU’s peacekeeping operations. Over two-thirds of the activities agreed in the framework of the three abovementioned priority actions in the first action plan have been launched.

In the past few months, political dialogue has intensified through regular consultations on the crises and an ongoing strategic dialogue. We can cite, for example, the collaboration between the AU and the EU for the International Contact Group on Guinea to help the latter restore stability and democracy. But there are fact many other examples: Niger, Madagascar, and Somalia, to name a few. Since 2009, the AU’s Peace and Security Council and the EU’s Political and Security Committee have met regularly. The dialogue with Regional African organizations is moving forward, namely with the SADC in southern Africa, the ECOWAS in West Africa, the ECCAS in Central Africa, the IGAD in East Africa and the AMU in North Africa. The EU Council decision of 27 October 2009 on security in the Sahel region could pave the way for dialogue between the EU and the Sahel region. The Akosombo Conference held in Ghana in 2009 allowed us to strengthen these relations in a trilateral framework between the EU, the AU and the African regions.

At the same time, these relations are being strengthened with the African states most involved in regional security – such is the case of Nigeria and South Africa, with which regular political dialogue sessions are held. Moreover, relations with Egypt and Morocco (2) are also very important, and there is mutual interest to cooperate in the framework of joint security and defence policy.

The dialogue held with the different States by virtue of Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement often encompasses the questions of peace and security and supports the objectives of this partnership.
Initiatives such as the one which associates the 5 States of the Arab Maghreb Union and 5 States of the Southern EU help to further the dialogue, as recently illustrated by the gathering organized by the Spanish Minister of Defence, Ms. Carme Chacon, in Palma de Mallorca, between the 27 EU Defence Ministers and their homologues from the UMA.

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) continues to develop. Four key principle areas of activity have been selected: conflict prevention; training and validation of the Africa Stand-by Force; equipping and transporting the latter; and post-conflict reconstruction.

The objective as regards conflict prevention is to reinforce the capacities of the political-military structures of the AU and of regional organizations, as well as complementarity with the EU. I will cite two examples as an illustration: a) the support given to the Continental Early Warning System, in particular by means of the European Union’s Situation Centre (SITCEN), the Joint Research Centre of Ispra and certain European Union Member States, namely the map making carried out by Germany, and b) the Franco-British initiative on putting in place a Common Interactive Watch and Anticipation Mechanism (MIVAC). To improve the interaction between the AU and African regional organisations, the EU offers its support to the regions’ AU liaison offices in Addis Ababa.

The objective in terms of training and validation of the Africa Standby Force (ASF) is for the latter to acquire an initial operational capacity by the end of 2010, as provided for in the AU Protocol on Peace and Security. This organization focuses, in particular, on the AU’s ability to plan and conduct peacekeeping operations. After the support provided to AMIS in Darfur, the EU’s current support for AMISOM in Somalia and the MICO-PAX in the Central African Republic are very much in line with this object.

The training and assessment of the ASF are done in the framework of the AMANI AFRICA training cycle which commenced in November 2008 in Addis Ababa. Centred around the concept «Strengthening African Peacekeeping Capabilities» (EURORECAMP), this two-year cycle, which transferred an initially French programme to a European setting, aims to assist the AU in the process of certifying the ASF Africa Stand-by Force and in training African decision makers, whether military or civilian. A final exercise (Command Post Exercise) involving the AU’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations is set to take place in October 2010.
Another key activity in this regard is the programme of support for African training centres. Depending on the outcome of a joint EU-AU study, this programme should strengthen African training capabilities. The effective launch of this programme is set for the first semester of 2010.

Improving the logistical and equipment capabilities of the Africa Stand-by Force remains a problem, particularly where funding is concerned. As they are currently defined, the EU’s aid instruments do not permit the funding of this type of expenditures, which are purely military in nature. On the international level, and in particular in the case of the G*++, this question remains on the table. In addition to funding issues, this very design of the standards on equipment, its storage and its maintenance have yet to be harmonized between Africa and its parties. The EU is wholly involved in current discussions and the search for solutions.

In terms of post-conflict reconstruction, the objective is to share the experience acquired by the two parties, notably in the areas of security sector reform, disarmament, the fight against the illicit circulation of small arms, drug trafficking and terrorism. This exchange of expertise, analysis and experience should enable the AU to consolidate its doctrines and concepts in these areas.

**Instruments**

The Africans and Europeans have formed implementation groups which unite the AU’s Commission and Member States and the EU’s Commission and General Secretariat of the Council and Member States. Leaders have been appointed for each of the partnerships. This responsibility lies with the EU Council in the case of the «Peace and Security Council». The initiatives are relayed on the ground through the representation of the EU at the AU and through representation before the United Nations. The formation of joint EU-AU groups of experts for the partnership’s implementation should also be noted. The last meeting of the joint «Peace and Security» group took place in October 2009 in Addis Ababa.

Coordination with international partners occurs through dialogue between the EU and its main partners and international forums, such as the G8++’s Africa Clearing House and the group of AU partners in Addis Ababa.

The main sources of funding are funds managed by the European Commission. The Peace Facility for Africa, with nearly EUR 400 million
The Africa-EU strategic partnership on peace and security

represented by the European Development Fund (10th EDF), is the key financial instrument of the partnership. Part of these funds are allocated to cover the salaries of AMISOM soldiers. The rest is reserved for strengthening Africa’s peacekeeping capabilities. Indicative regional programmes are also planned for all of Africa’s regions and also include this security dimension. Moreover, «the Instrument for Stability», the objective of which is to respond to a situation of urgency, crisis or emerging crisis, accounts for nearly EUR 250 million and can be mobilised as a complement to the EU’s crisis management actions. This, in particular, is what was done in Chad to support the training of Chadian police officers by the UN.

The creation of the Peace Fund at the AU level, where AU Member States deposit their financial contribution, is noteworthy and its potential should be the object of further development.

All in all, upwards of one billion Euros can be mobilized thanks to the EU and EDF to support the European Union in matters relating to peace and security in Africa. Added to this are the bilateral contributions of the EU Member States.

THE EU’S GROWING COMMITMENT TO CONTRIBUTING TO RESOLVING CRISES IN AFRICA

Initially focused on the Balkans, European security and defence policy was quickly called upon to meet the needs of peace in Africa. In 2003, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan submitted a request to Javier Solana, the Secretary General / High Representative, that the EU be able to offer immediate support to the UN Congo mission (MONUC), which had to face the massacres perpetrated in the Iturbi region. Within two weeks, relying on France, which had accepted to be the lead nation, and on several Member States, notably Sweden, which had committed special forces on the ground, the EU deployed the Artemis operation. This operation put an end to the acts of violence and brought a critical solution the MONUC at a time when the latter was building up strength. Non-European States also contributed their support to this operation, namely South Africa, Brazil and Canada.

Once again, during elections in DRC, the SG of the United Nations solicited the intervention of the European Union as an element of «reassurance». This was done from the Headquarters in Potsdam, Germany, with the launch of the EUFOR DR Congo Operation.
During the Darfur conflict, at which time responsibility was entrusted to the African Forces (AMIS), the EU was asked to offer its support in funding, planning and strategic transportation. The EU committed to providing direct support to the AMIS operation.

Moreover, this conflict also threatened to destabilize neighbouring countries Central African Republic and Chad. At the request of the authorities in these two countries, the EU also intervened in Chad and in the northeast of the CAR for a one-year operation called EUFOR Chad/CAR. This European military operation was part of a broader, multifaceted mission of the United Nations. The UN advised and contributed to the training of the Détachement Intégré de Sécurité (Chadian police charged with protecting refugee camps and locations of displaced persons); the EU assumed responsibility for the general security of the zones concerned. This operation ended on 15 March 2009 after being taken over, as planned, by the UN mission, MINURCAT.

Currently, the EU is involved in the fight against piracy along the coasts of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden through the Atalante operation, which protects the vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP) and improves security for maritime traffic and fishing activities in the region. This operation aimed to address the effects of the Somali crisis, although the EU is determined to treat the root causes by supporting the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia and by contributing to the creation of a state of law and conditions for security in Somali territory.

This is how the military transformation mission called EUTM Somalia, with its 2,000 Somali troops, was launched on 07 April 2010 in Uganda. This mission is commanded by Spanish Colonel Elul. Its objective is to train young Somali officers and sub-officers and provide specific training in such fields as urban combat, awareness of the dangers of mines and IEDs, first aid and respecting human rights. This campaign is carried out in close cooperation with the United States. It is undertaken in coordination with the United Nations and the African Union, in charge of the peacekeeping operation, AMISOM, which will play a key role in monitoring and integrating trained soldiers. Uganda, which plays an essential role in this mission, is the main contributor of troops to AMISOM.

At the same time, the EU contributes to the political efforts and strengthening of regional capacities in the fight against piracy, particularly by training coast guards.
In addition to the EU’s commitment to responding to situations of open conflict, it also provides support to the «security sector» (army, police, justice). The DRC has already been touched upon. The EU has not only got involved by deploying a force temporarily on two occasions. It is currently conducting two missions there: supporting the police (EUPOL) and reforming the army (EUSEC). This, in particular, has helped set up a payment procedure to ensure soldiers’ wages are paid.

In the same spirit, in Guinea Bissau, the EU is committed to helping reform the security sector by providing expertise and advice in the areas of military, judiciary and police.

What makes these actions significant, for all of the operations I have just referred to, is their inclusive nature. Inclusive in three senses: including on a growing basis all of the EU Member States, including our partners and the AU Member States, and contributing to the implementation of all of the EU’s means of action.

The EU’s activity in Africa has become wholly European as it has transcended the traditional attachment of some of its Member States. The evolution in this regard is quite astonishing. Indeed, the involvement of States with historical and geographical ties to Africa remain important. But the involvement of an increasing number of Member States scarcely familiar with Africa, and even, in some cases, without a tradition of peacekeeping intervention, is giving rise to an authentically European policy vis-à-vis Africa. Germany has thus played a key role in the second operation in RDC, and Ireland, Poland, and Austria, for example, have made significant contributions to EUFOR Chad/RCA, of which the Operations Command was Irish. The Scandinavian countries participate systematically in the operations, and the «Battle Group» they (Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Ireland and Norway) have formed to contribute to the rapid intervention capabilities was trained on crisis scenarios in Africa.

Secondly, Europe is conducting these operations in close cooperation with other partners, organisations and States. The European Union’s effort aims to support, as prescribed by the European Security Strategy, «effective multilateralism». First of all, this entails supporting the United Nations and continental and regional organisations. The campaigns I have mentioned have been lead either under the mandate of the United Nations, at its request, or in close cooperation with it. Interaction with the Peacekeeping Operations Department is ongoing, both during the operations and on a structural level to learn from shared experience and
better prepare themselves to work together. All of these campaigns have also involved, in some cases, consultations or operational cooperation with the AU.

They have benefitted from the assistance of third-party States. In some cases, there is direct participation in the operations: I’ve already alluded to the participants in ARTEMIS in Congo: South Africa, Brazil and Canada, for EUFOR Chad / CAR, Russia has provided helicopters to the inside of the operation and Croatia has deployed a reconnaissance team. Ukraine will soon join Croatia, Norway and Montenegro to participate in the fight against piracy. The Republic of Serbia has requested to participate in the EU missions in Congo, Afghanistan and Uganda. In other cases, there is a form of cooperation, such as with the United States, in the training of Somali troops, or in the seas off Somalia, with China, Japan and India.

Finally, this action is comprehensive because it includes all the instruments available to the EU. I have mentioned in the first part of this article the development tools mobilized for the strategic EU – Africa partnership. Managing the crises calls for further consistency among all of the development programmes, humanitarian programmes –while respecting their respective principles– and the political action of the EU and its Member States.

THE CHALLENGES OF THE «PEACE AND SECURITY» PARTNERSHIP

This partnership must meet several challenges, both in its substance and how it is implemented. These challenges address Africans and Europeans alike.

Promoting Africa’s own structures

The principle of ownership by Africans is the partnership's most innovative aspect.

In practice, many African nations favour bilateral relations at the expense of the African Union, which is making progress in terms of its overall structure, but which needs efficient management mechanism in order to implement Euro-African programmes and projects.

These mechanisms do exist, but they must be further fortified with various types of expertise, while still maintaining an adequate geographical equilibrium in Africa.
Promote the AU Peace and Security Council

The Peace and Security Council (PSC), a Pan-African body, was created by the Peace and Security Protocol in 2002 and launched on 25 May 2004 on the occasion of Africa Day. Its main functions are promoting peace, security and stability, preventing and resolving conflicts, consolidating peace and post-conflict reconstruction processes, humanitarian action and disaster management.

If the PSC now has many strong points, its role as the key actor in a new architecture of stability in Africa is remains limited by:

- the weakness of the legal instruments at its disposal: the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance adopted in January 2007 has yet to be ratified. The PSC currently relies on the minimal sanctions of the Lomé Declaration:
- the difficulty of enforcing its decisions due to the AU’s lack of material resources and human resources;
- The Chiefs of Staff Committee set up to advise and assist the PSC on all military and security matters on the continent is not yet fully operational:

Harmonise relations between the AU and regional organisations

The other great challenge for Africa is that of integration on the continent.

In July 2008, the AU and regional organizations signed a Memorandum of Understanding to reinforce ties between the two regional and continental entities. Further to the principle of subsidiarity, this memorandum calls for a certain autonomy of the regional organizations in how they use their crisis management capacities (regional standby brigades, etc.). Still, a balance between being autonomous and the complementarity between the regional organisations and the AU must be struck; considerable asymmetry can be observed if one conducts a comparative analysis between the different organisations.

The coordination could be strengthened, on the one hand, by getting the regional organizations and voluntary States more involved in the works of the AU and in international meetings (G8++/Africa Clearing House), and by laying out the respective prerogatives of the AU and the regional organisations more clearly, on the other. This is the objective that was set at the Akosomobo conference in Ghana in December 2009.
Link local development policies with conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction

The effectiveness of prevention and post-conflict reconstruction policies depends in large part on their link with development policies on the local level.

The reinsertion of young soldiers, the reform of the security sector and post-conflict reconstruction should be accompanied by adequate socio-economic development programmes. In the campaigns, for example, the training and insertion of youths in the farming development programmes could not only contribute to their personal growth but also pave the way for the continent’s future. In the framework of security sector reforms, a sort of voluntary military service adapted to the socio-economic environment on the ground could be set up (acquisition of a civilian trade at the same time as military training). There are examples, such as in France, where this type of programme has been implemented with encouraging results in the French departments and overseas territories.

Coordinate European and Community policies

For the EU, the key challenge is to improve coordination among the commitments and policies of its Member States and its institutions. This quest for coordination requires a consensus on essential issues, such as the very idea of «peace and security», shared sovereignty and multilateralism.

The general coordination of all European actors involved (state and institutional) must find its culmination at the new European External Action Service provided for in the Treaty of Lisbon.

Improve the effectiveness of the EU’s financial tools

The European Union’s second challenge is to adapt its financial instruments to fragile situations. Here, the challenge lies in coordinating instruments as well as improving responsiveness.

Today, there are many financial instruments, but these mainly go by their own principles and are not easily combined. For example, the Peace Facility for Africa -- because it was derived from the EDF-- can only fund military projects stricto sensu, according to existing rules. One could imagine creating new instruments, expanding some, or even merging them,
to reflect all of the effort devoted to this matter by the German presidency in 2007.

Given the administrative and legal rules, decision-making structures and payment obligations, it is also easy to observe a certain «budgetary» blow out. The synergies between the programmes with a geographical approach and those with a thematic approach can still be improved.

Responsiveness is also at the centre of concerns and must be improved to ensure that envisaged funding reaches the intended beneficiaries with the desired time frame. The thing about crisis management is that the window for action is often very narrow.

**Make the EU’s political and crisis management structures more flexible**

The European Union’s third challenge is to adapt its structures to its foreign policy ambitions. The strategic partnership between the EU and Africa is dependent on the EU’s foreign relations structures and crisis management structures. The creation of a single crisis management directorate at the General Secretariat of the Council and the provisions of the new Treaty will facilitate this adaptation.

The Treaty of Lisbon gives added means to ensure the overall coherence of the EU’s actions. The very role of the High Representative / Vice President of the Commission, C. Ashton, the External Action Service, which will provide the means ensuring that all instruments are implemented consistently to fulfil the defined policy objectives, coupled with unified EU representation in third countries, will be a key asset to a delivering an action which is comprehensive, organized, visible and effective.

This will allow us to transfer this enhanced coherence and efficiency to our commitment and our partnership with Africa. But this remains a partnership, and the foregoing shall only bear all of its fruits if regional structures and the capacities of African States themselves are strengthened through an ongoing willingness to develop structures which are in sync with the operational realities and constraints to ensure that our collaboration has a direct impact in view of ensuring, together, the peace and security of men and women in Africa.
References


ABBREVIATIONS

ACP - African, Caribbean and Pacific States
AMIS - African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM - African Union Mission for Somalia
APSA - African Peace and Security Architecture
ECCAS - Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS - Economic Community Of West African States
CPS - AU Peace and Security Council
ASF - Africa Stand-by Force
IGAD - Intergovernmental Authority on Development
MICOPAX - Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic
NEPAD - New Partnership for the African Development
SRO - Subregional Organisation
CSDP - European Security and Defence Policy
SADC - Southern African development Community
AMU - Arab Maghreb Union
CHAPTER TWO

EFFORTS WITHIN, COMPLEMENTARY PROCESSES AND PROBLEMS OF COLLABORATION IN ADDRESSING SECURITY CHALLENGES IN 21ST CENTURY AFRICA: CASE OF THE AU AND THE EU
INTRODUCTION

On a topic like ‘African and European Answers to Security Problems in Africa’, there is an obligation on the part of an African contributor to fully take advantage of the opportunity provided to articulate what Africans themselves have done and continue to do to address the security challenges facing Africa. Having done that, one then proceeds to belabor on what Africans and non-Africans have done well or badly and could further do in collaboration, thereby providing additional momentum to efforts to address the security challenges facing Africa.

This is the approach adopted in this contribution. The problem of how to promote more effective collaboration will also be addressed in this setting.

In this contribution, African and European answers to security problems in Africa are viewed as issues relating to the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa. Steadfastly promoting peace, security and stability in Africa is a way of neutralizing the eruption and recurrence of conflict and crises situations in the Continent. Notably, in recent years, Africa has seen the redefinition of security, which now includes both the traditional notion of State security and human-centered security. The latter informs the attachment of the African Union (AU) today to the sanctity of human life and the protection of the property of individuals and communities. Furthermore, cognizance is taken of the fact that the factors that go into interplay to provoke both inter-state and intra-state conflicts negatively affect, not only State security, but also human security in its holistic essence.
One could reasonably argue that putting an end to persistent and recurrent violent conflict and bad governance, in all their forms, and the building of a culture of peace guided by democratic values and practices, acceptance of diversity, inclusiveness and justice, remains a foremost challenge for Africa. It is noteworthy that since the beginning of the post-independence era, the continent has not had a respite from the ugly scenarios of violent conflict and troublesome political and economic governance. Indeed, today, there are real opportunities for Africa to promote sustainable peace, security and stability, all of which are essential conditions to move forward the process of socio-economic development and integration in the continent. These opportunities exist, thanks mainly to the impact of the ongoing implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)(1) as launched by the African Union (AU) in 2002.

The essence APSA is articulated in the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. The advent of APSA was a turning point in Africa’s peace efforts as a new and proactive institutional arrangement was put in place to deal with conflicts and crises.

More than ever before, this is happening on a solid basis of an overriding conviction among the Africans that they themselves should forge solutions to problems besetting the continent. In this endeavor, actors from outside the continent are expected to play a complimentary and supportive role. In the case of the AU and the European Union (EU) this is the way the relationship between the two is evolving in the area of peace and security.

The African Peace and Security Architecture is a holistic approach relating to the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa which links together the aspects of «anticipation, prevention, management and resolution of conflicts and crises, as well as post-conflict reconstruction and peace building in Africa» (2). Also, APSA links together, for enlisting support to the work of Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU), the role and efforts of other AU policy organs, African Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms and civil society organizations. Furthermore, APSA enlists the «role and efforts of interna-

(2) See PSC Protocol, articles 6 and 7
tional organizations»(3), particularly the United Nations and the European Union, towards the work of the PSC. Thus, APSA provides a comprehensive framework guiding the work of the PSC, with the support and cooperation of various entities, in the promotion of peace, security and stability, as well as the undertaking of related activities, in Africa.

WHAT SECURITY CHALLENGES CONFRONT AFRICAN IN THE EARLY 21ST CENTURY?

Let us start with a positive note to say that the problems of absolute tyranny, brutal military rule and the one-party State practices now belong to the continent’s history. It would be a counter-current that any of these phenomena return to the African political landscape. Indeed, countries like Mauritania fell into coups d’état in 2006 and again, in August 2008; the Republic of Guinea followed suit in 2008, whilst Madagascar plunged into an unconstitutional order in March 2009. But these events have been ferociously opposed by Africa as a whole, at the level of the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Given the re-appearance of the phenomenon of unconstitutional changes of government, as embodied in the three cases above, the African leaders have taken firm decisions for addressing this phenomenon.

The above said, some of the major security challenges confronting Africa today could be stated as follows:

- Proliferation of small arms and light weapons;
- Drug trafficking;
- Money laundering;
- Piracy;
- Terrorism;
- Religious extremism;
- Socio-economic inequalities;
- Over-crowdedness in urban and rural areas;
- Gender inequality;
- Exclusion of sections of the population;
- Manipulation of elections;
- Manipulation of a constitution or a constitutional review process
- Unconstitutional changes of government (both by military forces and civilian incumbents);

(3) Ibid, article 17
– Lack of political competition and viable alternation in the exercise of power and,
– Environmental degradation.

EFFORTS WITHIN AFRICA

The introduction and implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture, driven by both hindsight, present day circumstances and foresight, remains the most innovative enterprise in the ongoing African efforts with the leadership of the AU to overcome security challenges in Africa. APSA did not just emerge, but came of concrete experiences of suffering from violent conflict and material destruction in Africa.

Background

The 1980s and 1990s, and even the decade after, were characterized by a proliferation of internal crises and violent internal conflicts in different parts of Africa, all of them closely linked to both internal and external factors. During this period, conflict brought up more suffering among people, socio-economic regression in the affected countries, destruction of infrastructure, triggering off large fluxes of refugees and internally displaced persons, as well as the flight of skills and brainpower from the continent. Mention should also be made of the disequilibrium that Africa plunged into following the end of the Cold War around 1989/1990. The African one-party regimes established during the Cold War, founded on either socialist policies or military rule, collapsed in a chain reaction one after another, leaving a trail of uncertain political transitions and a syndrome of instability in each affected country, with cross-border implications. The subsequent shift to a multiparty system was not all that smooth, thereby creating further risks of instability.

Yet the continent was so ill-prepared and ill-equipped to deal with those crises and conflicts, notwithstanding the many efforts of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), to provide the continent with effective mechanisms to prevent and resolve conflicts. Alas! In 1994, the horror brought up by the Rwanda genocide imprinted a new African awareness and conscience of developing a more robust continental arrangement for anticipating, preventing, managing and resolving conflicts. This conscience was also reinforced by what was seen by many Africans as slug-
Admore Mupoki Kambudzi

gish, if not inadequate, response by the United Nations (UN) to conflict and crises situations in Africa.

It was against this background that the Africans developed the notion of an «African Peace and Security Architecture, which, indeed, should be viewed as the key African answer to security problems in Africa». Going by a simplified definition, and drawing from article 2 (1) of the PSC Protocol, the African Peace and Security Architecture is a «collective security arrangement for Africa» (4) and operated by the African Union (AU), as the primary Organization in the continent. It is essentially founded on a central pillar, which is the «Peace and Security Council (PSC)», as established in July 2002. In its functioning, the PSC is supported by several structures, namely, the Commission, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, the African Standby Force and the Peace Fund, as well as cooperation/partnership arrangements.

The conception of the new peace and security architecture was essentially premised on the necessity to overcome the weaknesses and ineffectiveness of the peace and security mechanisms of the OAU. The main considerations in preventing, containing conflicts, or diminishing the probability of violent conflicts, as envisioned in APSA, hinge on the protection and preservation of African lives, property and habitat, as an underlying rationale for a new arrangement to deal with conflict. Thus, there is an element of the injection of norms relating to protection of civilians against brutalization by power incumbents or political and armed groups.

Also, the drive towards this architecture came from the long cherished conviction that it is within Africa that solutions to problems must be sought. Driven by the «belief in African solutions» (5), former President of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, made various contributions towards preventing and resolving border disputes between Ethiopia and Somalia (the two fought border wars in 1973 and 1978), as well as between Kenya and Somalia. In recent years, the idea that the Africans have to oblige themselves to find remedies to African problems was more clearly expressed by the former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki. Whilst addressing the Economic Forum of Southern Africa in Durban in June 2001, Mbeki

(4)Ibid, article 2
(5)In Thabo Mbeki’s address to the Economic forum of Southern Africa, Durban,June 2001; Refers to a common catch phrase in the work of the AU in peace and security insisting on the leadership of the AU in the preventing and resolving conflicts.
asserted that “many things have gone wrong in Africa since long time ago. If we do not rise to reverse this trend, this would create the impression that we are not capable of solving our problems, and we cannot accept it” (6).

The hindsight into the obstacles that undermined the OAU’s efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts and crises was quite instrumental in building the foundation of APSA. In fighting the scourge of conflicts, the OAU’s efforts were undermined by several factors, amongst which the following:

- Lack of collective inter-governmental commitment to democracy, good governance and respect for human rights and freedoms;
- Pervasiveness of indifference to the suffering of civilian population in situations of conflict; there was no obligation on the part of governments to provide security and protection to civilians;
- Pervasive impunity, with political and military authorities dealing with the population anyhow and violating individual rights and freedoms;
- Restricted powers and mandate of continental institutions – no institution could intervene in a member State to protect life and property and to foster effective humanitarian mechanisms to assist the population;
- Insistence on the non-interference principle by member States, which prevented objective discussion of issues and problems facing the continent;
- Mass member States committees/organs on peace and security, which could not operate effectively to address conflicts;
- No criteria for selection of member States dealing with peace and security issues - it was just a free for all enterprise in which bad and good governments participated;
- Weak resource mobilization effort and little funding for peace activities;
- These constraints were largely responsible for undermining the operation of the central Organ of the OAU mechanism for conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, which was established in 1993. The Central Organ had the mandate to take decisions on peace and security issues in Africa but found itself incapacitated by the above-mentioned factors.

(6) See PSC Protocol, article 2.
Structural and operational aspects of APSA

The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union was adopted by the inaugural Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union in Durban, South Africa, on 9 July 2002, thereby giving birth to the PSC. As stated in article 2 of the Protocol, «the Peace and Security Council shall be a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.» (7) The PSC’s direct support structures, as provided for in article 2 (2) of the PSC Protocol, are the following:

i. The Commission, which provides overall support (analysis, reports, implementation, monitoring, logistics, etc) to the PSC;
ii. African Standby Force (ASF) and the Military Staff Committee (MSC), which are designed to provide an early action military capability to the AU for peace interventions and other emergencies, as authorized by the PSC;
iii. Panel of the Wise (PoW), whose task is largely preventive and quiet diplomacy-oriented within the APSA;
iv. Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), to assist in detecting causes and signs of emerging conflict towards preparation for a timely action;
v. Peace Fund – a pool of financial resources dedicated to AU peace efforts.

As for the PoW, which acts like a moral and quiet diplomatic back-up to the PSC and the Chairperson of the Commission, it was launched on 18 December 2007. It held its programme planning meetings in Addis Ababa in February 2008. The ASF is, by far, the most demanding structure to establish in its various aspects. A roadmap has been established to guide its operationalization in 2010, or thereafter. The Military Staff Committee, an advisory body of the PSC on military planning issues for peace support missions, also requires a lot of work to be done to make it functional. The Continental Early Warning System, which has the task to alert the UA on simmering crises, disputes and conflicts, has made significant headway towards becoming functional.

Other collaborative/support structures for the PSC include the African Regional Economic communities/Regional Mechanisms on peace and

(7) See conclusions of the PSC Retreat on Working Methods, Dakar, 5-6 July 2007.
security (ECOWAS, SADC, COMESA, etc.), which by virtue of proximity to conflict theaters, play a vital role in facilitating the search for solutions. Also contributed to the essence of the APSA, as provided for in Article 17 of the PSC Protocol, is the relationship/collaboration and partnership between the PSC and other non-African institutions.

i. United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which is a primary partner institution;

ii. European Union Political and Security Committee;

iii. Other International Organizations dealing with peace and security issues, as provided for in article 17.4 of the PSC Protocol (it was within this context that the PSC convened a meeting in Addis Ababa, on 21 January 2008, with some International Organizations, to exchange views on peace and security issues in Africa.)

A major point to make is that the APSA has some distinct functional characteristics that make it rather unique in Africa’s history of dealing with crises and conflicts, as well as with issues of political governance. These cardinal characteristics, as provided for in the Constitutive Act of the AU and the PSC Protocol, are as follows:

i. Right of the Union to intervene in a member State in respect of grave circumstances, namely, war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity;

ii. Member States acceptance that, in acting on peace and security matters and taking decisions, the PSC acts on their behalf, hence the obligation of member States to support and implement;

iii. Decline in objections based sovereignty with respect to peace and security issues;

iv. No AU member States can stop a peace and security situation from becoming an agenda item of the PSC;

v. Increasing intolerance of impunity – the African leaders are, at last, agreed to move even towards zero indifference to gravy crimes;

Openness to take on board newly emerging issues, for example, disputes and conflicts arising from controversial elections.

The period from 1963 to 1992 was characterized by inefficient, ineffective and malfunctioning arrangements then in place to address conflicts and crises. Accordingly, the PSC has been conceived and designed to overcome/avoid a repeat of the past structural and operational weaknesses vis-à-vis the structures, processes and methods devoted to ad-
dressing the scourge of conflicts. This effort within the PSC is seen in the following aspects:

- No member has veto power;
- No member can oppose the inclusion of any item in agenda of the PSC;
- Members are elected into the PSC based on a criteria as spelt out in the Modalities for the Election of Members of the Peace and Security Council;
- Interaction of the PSC with parties to conflict and concerned stakeholders, including civil society organizations;
- PSC members possess a representative authority and role, as provided for in article 7 of PSC Protocol;
- Attachment to national sovereignty is balanced with the responsibility to protect, as enshrined in article 4 (h) of the AU Constitutive Act, which empower the Union to intervene, if circumstances so require, in a member States.

**OPPORTUNITIES AND PROSPECTS OFFERED BY THE ASPA IN THE PROMOTION OF PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFRICA**

**Permanent session of the PSC**

The PSC is in permanent session, making it capable of convening at any time upon need emanating from a given or emerging situation. It has a high frequency of meetings at the level of ambassadorial/permanent representatives, given that the ambassadors work permanently at the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa. So far, as the practice has shown, ministerial or Head of State level PSC meetings, which are provided for in article of the PSC Protocol take place when the ambassadors so recommend that it be so to address a given situation at a higher political level. However, decisions of the PSC have the same legal and political weight whatever the level at which they are taken.

**PSC’s power of convening and initiative:**

i. convening meetings to respond to crisis and conflict situations as they emerge;

ii. taking decisions with a continental effect in terms of article 7 (2) of the PSC Protocol, which binds member States to the work and effects of the PSC;
iii. taking initiatives to improve or introduce new policies when so felt essential for the promotion of peace and security in Africa, as enabled by article 7 (q) of the PSC Protocol (the PSC submits reports on its activities and the state of peace and security in Africa to the Assembly of the Union at each AU Summit, which give higher importance and visibility to the work of the PSC).

iv. Closed/restricted nature of the meetings of the PSC

Unlike past OAU organs on peace and security, which were larger, open-ended unwieldy committees – which were politically and functionally susceptible to paralysis, the PSC is a closed committee of elected fifteen members. It can discuss issues in-depth and take decisions without interference from parties to conflict. Whilst the PSC Protocol provides for such parties to be invited to state their cases to the Council, they do not sit in the decision-making deliberations of the PSC. Thus, parties to a conflict are unable to influence the internal decision-taking course of the PSC, which helps to create an enabling environment for the PSC to take realistic decisions vis-à-vis given situations.

**Membership of the PSC is based on a competitive election**

Article 5 (2) of the PSC Protocol stipulates the attributes expected of member State candidates running for an election into the PSC. Both the 2-year and the 3-year mandated membership of the PSC are subject to a criteria-guided election. In short, candidates to a PSC election should be objectively capable of shouldering the heavy responsibilities that go with the membership of the PSC. The possession of sufficient capacity at the Embassy at the AU Headquarters and the ability to contribute effectively to AU-led peace support operations, as well as commitment to financial contributions, are critical requirements in this respect. Yet, at the same time, the election arrangement in the PSC embodies a democratic dispensation that makes the PSC accessible to any member State ready to serve on it.

**Ability to consider veto-freely any peace and security issue within Africa**

In terms of Rule 6 (on agenda of the PSC) of the Rules of Procedure of the PSC, no AU member State can oppose the PSC’s inclusion and consideration of any matter deemed to threaten peace and security or
to have consequences on human life and property. Prior to the advent of APSA, member States could cite the non-interference principle or other reasons to block discussion by OAU Organs of an issue of peace and security.

**Improved working methods of the PSC**

On 5-6 July 2007, the PSC held a Retreat in Dakar, Senegal, to consider its methods of work. This was desirable as the PSC Protocol does not, in some cases that come to the PSC, provide clear-cut approaches and modalities for dealing with such issues. Today, the PSC has well-articulated working methods as embodied in the «Conclusions on Working Methods of the PSC». The adopted methods of work have contributed significantly to the streamlining and smoothening of the proceedings of the PSC in all its activities. For instance, the items to be addressed by the PSC in its meetings each month are articulated by the Chairperson of the PSC for the month at hand in consultation with other PSC members and the Commission. Notably, within each monthly programme, there is provision for the concerned PSC Chairperson to brief the AU Permanent Representatives Committee (of all 53 member States) at the end of the month, on the activities carried out by the PSC during his/her month. This is an important activity which generates transparency in the work of the PSC and serves, at the same time, as one of the tools for soliciting cooperation from member States towards the implementation of decisions taken by the PSC.

**Interaction with civil society**

The tapping of the energies and inputs of civil society, through the PSC, towards the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa, is provided for in article 20 of the PSC Protocol. The Retreat of the PSC held in Livingstone, Zambia, on 4-5 December 2008, brought this article into activation by establishing a Mechanism of interaction between the PSC and Civil Society Organizations in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa. Within the Mechanism, there is provision for an annual consultative Session of the PSC with Civil Society Organizations to discuss peace and security issues. Also, when deemed necessary on any item on peace and security, CSOs may brief the PSC. To do so, a CSO has to seek the understanding of the Chairperson of the PSC for a given month and that of the Commission.
CONSTRAINTS FOR THE AFRICAN PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

About six years of implementation of APSA thus far has brought to surface several constraints:

Prevalence of conflict resolution workload

The PSC has, since it entered into operation in March 2004, mainly focused on conflict management and resolution almost at the expense of conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction and post-conflict peace building. This has been so due to the frequent outbreaks of disruptive crises and violent conflicts in the continent. In fact, the PSC was born amidst conflicts, making conflict resolution its inevitable first task. The PSC was, so thus, circumstantially compelled to act as a fire brigade. Conflict prevention has consequently not been pursued as it should be – essentially to detect and deactivate potential causes of crisis and conflicts.

Inadequate managerial and operational capacity

The AU Commission itself operates with a skeleton of manpower in many areas of its mandate. The shortage is more critical in the planning and management of peacekeeping operations. The African Mission in the Darfur – Sudan (2005-2007) and the African Mission in Somalia prove the point. Due to a shortage of competent personnel and contingents (troops), most of these missions do not operate up to the level required by their respective mandates. As a result, and also due to other contributory factors, the situations that are targeted to be put under control remain elusive and in deterioration in some cases.

Precarious funding for peace support operations

Since 2004, no PSC authorized peace support operation has escaped the problem of precarious funding in all aspects operations. In fact, the bulk of that funding, unpredictable as is, has come and continue to come from outside of Africa. The AU Peace Fund is too small a financial arrangement to face the enormous demands from peace support/peacekeeping operations in Africa. As for external funding, it has the risk of being unpredictable and also the political conditions under which it is often provided. The funds are often earmarked for certain activities and that does not provide fund utilization flexibility to the AU.
Shortage of logistical capability

AU PSC-authorized peace support operations face enormous limitations when it comes to moving troops, equipment and material to a theatre of operation within a set time. The same limitation intervenes, though with less gravity, with respect to returning troops, equipment and material back to the point of origin. More acutely, also, logistical limitations negatively affect the rotation of troops in the field.

Bridges-still-to-build between the AU PSC and the UN Security Council

The AU and its PSC face the dilemma that the UN Security Council, in some demanding situations, i.e., Rwanda in 1994; Burundi in 2002, and Somalia in 2006, tends to move too slowly to make an impact on the evolution of conflict situations. In such circumstances, as informed by past tragedies, the AU PSC get compelled to take the lead initiative. Due to exigencies of certain situations, there may not be enough time for the PSC to undertake, with the UNSC, joint analysis on a situation and jointly agreed options for action. Hence, the PSC may move ahead to deploy a mission to address a situation, only to be subsequently confronted by the need to have the support of the UN, in terms of having the Security Council to sanction an operation already. In other situations, the UNSC encounters obstacles to deploy its mission in a given African country, citing «lack of inexistence of peace to protect» (8). Ongoing initiatives of the PSC and the UNSC to hold periodic meetings/consultations to establish common perspectives on conflict situations and on options for action are aimed at providing working linkages between the two institutions to alleviate problems of this nature.

Early assessment of the impact of the peace and security architecture

It would be premature to judge now the performance of the African Peace and Security Architecture. Much is still at the learning stage, with no performance benchmarks as yet. The architecture has been conceived as a requirement of the United Nations that, for it to deploy a peacekeeping mission, there must be a peace to keep, for example, in form of a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement or Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The lack of peace to keep in Somalia has caused the UN to re think from time to time how to deal with the Somalia situation.

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almost from scratch. However, it is possible to indicate some positive elements which hold promise of further gains at a later stage, provided the current momentum of APSA establishment is sustained by, among others:

i. improvement of the capacity of PSC members to enable the PSC effectively discharge its mandate;

ii. commitment of the AU member States to support the peace and security architecture;

iii. readiness by some member states, especially those in the PSC, to provide lead action, especially in situations requiring the deployment of peace support operations;

iv. acceptance of the drive of humanitarian factors in emergence situations;

v. increasing coordination between the AU and the African Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms on peace and security;

vi. support from the African civil society, given the expanding AU-civil society cooperation;

vii. support from within and from AU external partners, taking account of the basic needs in terms of:

viii. equipping the AU and RECs with appropriate management capability for peace and security operations;

ix. establishing a reliable early warning capacity;

x. establishing appropriate structures (less bureaucratic) and mechanisms to manage the processes of dealing with crises and conflicts;

xi. effective mobilization of financial and logistical resources, with emphasis on internal resource mobilization;

xii. enhancing the role of civil society in advocacy and promotion of a culture of peace;

xiii. harmonizing the regional economic communities (streamlining of membership) to enable neat logistical arrangements of the ASF’s regional standby brigades;

xiv. creating enabling conditions for the private sector (a major player in socio-economic development and post-conflict reconstruction).

Finally, it should be stressed that the success of the AU in developing this peace and security architecture to its full potential is key for the continental Organization to provide opportunities for building a peace-
ful dispensation and for undertaking socio-economic development and integration in the continent. The full implementation of APSA is also a key factor in shaping the collaboration between the AU and the EU, and without organizations, in addressing security problems in Africa.

AU-EU PARTNERSHIP ON PEACE AND SECURITY ISSUES – EARLY LESSONS AND WAY FORWARD

Building on the Africa-EU Joint Strategy, as articulated in the Lisbon Treaty of December 2008, the AU-EU partnership in the peace and security domain is most evident in the process of the annual joint meeting between the AU Peace and Security Council and the EU Peace and Security Committee. It is quite a young consultative venture, but growing fast into real collaboration on peace and security challenges. The process of the AU PSC and EU PSC annual joint consultative meeting did not just emerge from nowhere. One has to go back to the case of Somalia to better understand the deep origins and also to the forging of relations between the AU PSC and UN Security Council and subsequently, between the AU and the EU.

«Somalia has been without a viable central political authority since 1991» (9). Tremendous efforts were deployed in Kenya, under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), with the mandate and support of the AU, from October 2004 to October 2004, to enable the Somalis negotiate and establish political and administrative institutions during the two year Somali National Reconciliation Conference. The negotiations culminated in the adoption of a Transitional Federal Charter, and the establishment of State institutions, including President, Prime Minister, Council of Ministers and Parliament. But immediately, the uphill task was how to take these institutions to Somalia and make them function. It was in this context, and quite after some time, that the AU, as decided by the PSC in May 2007, deployed its African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), a peace support mission. At the same time, Somalia was under a UN Security Council arms embargo imposed in 1992, which remains in force. This necessitated the AU to approach the UNSC to facilitate the deployment of AMISOM, through, among other aspects, the «granting of an exemption in the embargo for AMISOM to go

into Somalia carrying arms and other items prohibited under resolution SC/1992» (10). The fact that the AU moved forward to deploy a peace support mission in Somalia without prior consultations with the UNSC to get mutual understanding, but which consultations were called later to address relevant issues, brought to surface the need to put in place a formal consultation mechanism between the two organs. In concrete, the efforts towards such a mechanism were crowned by the inaugural joint meeting of the AU PSC and the UNSC in Ababa Ababa, on 16 June 2007. Following extensive deliberations, it was agreed at the meeting for the two organs to hold annual consultations alternatively in Addis Ababa and New York. The purpose of the annual joint meetings is to:

- bring peace and security issues into a common agenda for discussion;
- bring about shared analysis and understanding on the issues;
- reach, where possible, common parameters for addressing the issues, taking into account the comparative advantages of each side on given issues;
- Identify areas of necessary support where the AU takes leadership on peace efforts (Somalia being an example).

Thus, it was this AU PSC/UNSC process of consultation that inspired the Africans and the Europeans to establish a similar process in 2008. Given the wide involvement of the European Union as an organization, and that of its individual member States, in African peace and security situations and efforts to resolve them to address security problems in Africa, it was found necessary between the African and European sides to start a consultation process with a view to developing, to the extent possible, coordinated approaches and actions on peace and security issues. The EU gets involved, as a result of historical factors and emerging circumstances, in various areas in Africa, including election observation and monitoring, conflict prevention and resolution, humanitarian assistance, human rights advocacy, good governance advocacy, etc, leave aside economic issues.

To streamline European involvement and support in African peace and security situations in a manner that upholds the spirit of the Africa-AU partnership forms the cornerstone of the annual joint meeting between the AU PSC and the EU PSC. The first joint annual meeting took place in Brussels in September 2008, with the second one taking place

(10)See PSC Communiqué COM/PR.
in Addis Ababa on 12 October 2009. As agreed by both sides, the annual joint meeting will be held alternatively in Addis Ababa and Brussels.

SOME ISSUES TO ADDRESS IN DEVELOPING COLLABORATION IN THE AU-EU CONTEXT

Whilst the AU PSC/EU PSC annual joint consultation process is gaining momentum and creating more space for common vision and better coordinated actions in various areas, the process would bring more benefits for both sides, in the long-term, if the following issues are addressed in an honest manner:

On the African side:

- The African Peace and Security Architecture must become fully operational and AU member States must give it effective support; not all is about funding to enhance APSA, but much more has to do with political will and commitment of AU member States;
- There must be preparedness and political will to take timely action on peace and security situations that show signs of a negative evolution, before the situation gets out of hand. The fire should be extinguished at the very point that it starts. But the problem in many instances is that no action is taken on time by Africans themselves, thereby contributing to an increase in the magnitude of the situation and its multi-form consequences. Crises are let continue until they develop into a conflict;
- AU member States must sign, ratify and uphold the various AU instruments already put in place in areas of conflict prevention and resolution, democracy, elections, good governance, human rights, corruption, etc. This would help in creating the mass leverage (total support, commitment and involvement of African countries) needed in Africa to deal with the scourge of conflict and recurrent crises. That is, for example, the intention in article 4 (h) of the AU Constitutive Act, giving a right to the «Union to intervene in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity» (11);
- The notion of free, fair and transparent elections should be translated on the ground into a free, fair and transparent electoral land-

scape and process. There is no shortcut to free elections, if a country is committed to elections as a tool for conflict prevention and as an input into the process of socio-economic development;

– Africa countries should commit itself to zero-tolerance of unconstitutional changes of government, including swift action to reverse such situations whenever and wherever they occur. Drastic measures need to be put in place to punish perpetrators of coups d’état;

– Efforts to promote good governance in political, economic and cultural areas must be pursued in combination. This is the more important as mismanagement of political, economic and cultural areas of life in Africa continues to be a major contributory factor to the outbreak and recurrence of conflicts and crises. In a preventive effort, and to keep up the attention and resources devoted to socio-economic development, it is vital to have a sound management of multi-ethnic/multi-racial societies;

– The policy organs and other structures of the African Union should be made to function more effectively and coherently in pursuance and fulfillment of continental objectives in the political, social, cultural, economic and other fields. Adequate funding and good human power need to be invested in this process.

– Over-dependency on external funding for peace efforts is an issue that needs to be addressed, with an attitude that such funding should play a complementary, as opposed to a primary role. African self-funding should be the one to play a primary role on peace efforts. This would fulfill the sense of African ownership that underpins the emerging Africa-EU partnership on peace and security issues.

The AU and Regional Economic Communities should seek and utilize intelligence in the process of the prevention and management of conflicts and crises. There has been a deficit and it continues nowadays in the use of intelligence in African peace efforts. This is more visible in situations of unconstitutional change of government, especially in those cases where the AU PSC decides to impose sanctions. The sanctions are often difficult to implement effectively due to lack of timely and correct information about who is who and who does what in connection with the sanctions imposed. The Ezulwini PSC Retreat of 17-19 December 2009 made a contribution towards reducing the deficit of intelligence in African efforts to address security problems.

The PSC Retreat held in Ezulwini, Swaziland, from 17 to 19 December 2009, opened a way forward on this matter as inscribed in the «Ezulwini

European side:

- In supporting peace efforts in Africa, the EU should pay increasing attention should be paid to the socio-economic front so that the impact of efforts and the investment involved in pursuit of peace, are sustained in long-term. This is necessary as, whilst peace and security are essential for economic development, these two cannot become durable in an economic vacuum. Whist the provision of humanitarian assistance contributes significantly to revitalizing human lives, this effort should be underpinned by a real contribution to socio-economic development in which the local population should have a stake. Experience in post-War Western Europe does indicate clearly to us that where goodwill and commitment to support socio-economic recovery and development of countries and of their region exist, there are better chances of preventing turmoil and war among neighbors. There must be a careful and balanced view in order to avoid over-investing in peace but without investing in the cultivation of economic conditions necessary for the deepening and durability of peace. Most AU partners have tended to be more attracted to the peace and security sector of AU activities. However, the value of their investments in this sector depends on Africa make long strides in economic progress in the long-term. Short of this rapid and massive population growth and environmental degradation would undermine any previous games in the peace and security sector.

- Discouraging unilateral initiatives by individual EU member States with a view to putting in place one window of European support and involvement. This is crucial as, once the residue of historical colonial ties between Africa and Europe are manifested in a peace and security situation, it brings more, rather than decrease complications in the process of addressing the situation. There should be enough coordination of European efforts in order to canalize such efforts in a collective and coherent manner into AU peace efforts;

- Giving the African side enough time to put in place programmes so that funds invested by the EU in the programmes are used in man-

Efforts within, complementary processes and problems of collaboration in addressing...

...ner that adds value on the ground with respect to the resolution of security problems. Giving funds where there is no ready capacity to manage both such funds and the intended programme is one of the recipes for failure of collaboration efforts notwithstanding good intentions on either side;

- Getting a better understanding of peace and security situations in Africa is very essential. It is important to fathom the root causes, trigger off factors, crisis accelerating factors and other factors that go into play to keep a conflict raging. For instance, it should not be seen as mysterious that Somalia has been in conflict since 1991. In fact, the conflict has been there since 1998 with the rise of anti-Siad Barre movements in the north of the Country. The factors explaining why Somalia has plunged into a prolonged conflict should be identified as part of the efforts to contribute to a solution. Behind each conflict and crisis in Africa, there is a reason. It is that reason that should be exposed as part of finding a solution;

- Need to give precedence to African instruments in dealing with peace and security challenges. For example, the determination of Africa to combat and prevent unconstitutional changes of government, whilst requiring European and other support to add to the effectiveness of the measures taken, would see more implementation if the existing OAU/AU instruments are given precedence and prominence of application on the ground. The EU applies Article 96 under the Coutonou Agreement in circumstances of unconstitutional change of government or other gravy political situations, if certain conditions are not met by coup perpetrators within the set time frame. Now, the problem is that AU and EU instruments in this case do not have the same requirements and time frames for application. This situation tends to create space for coup perpetrators to buy time as they play around negotiating with different international organizations and initiatives. In any case, it is often bad news if the AU Peace and Security Council has to delay its decision-making course on a situation of unconstitutional change of government due to the fact that other organizations/institutions would still be pursuing negotiations with the coup perpetrators. Hence, there can be a problem of timing and coordination of efforts between the AU and the EU, as well as with other involved organizations. But the essential point is that priority and primacy of application in the field should be given to African instruments. Why? Because everyone in the continent need to see to what extent these instruments work to
achieve the set objective, without the dilution that could show up due to the incidence of non-African measures. Non-African instruments should come on board in a complimentary and supportive role.

The Lisbon Declaration of December 2007 has laid the basis on which the AU and EU can work together in the spirit of helping Africa to overcome its security problems, which problems could overspill to Europe, if they are not contained and neutralized on the ground in Africa. Both the AU and the EU recognize the fact that security problems will persist unless effective measures are taken to address them. In so doing, the principle of African ownership is of fundamental importance. In this regard, the following elements, among others, are essential;

- robust building of African capacities;
- providing support for the democratization process;
- Upholding of the rule of law and respect for human rights;
- support for socio-economic development, including job creation and income generation.

Thus, «peace and security are preconditions for political, economic and social development. Therefore, our two continents agreed in Lisbon in December 2007 to the need for a strengthened dialogue and institutional cooperation in this respect. Sharing information, perspectives and lessons learned, as well as to consult on issues of common concern, will help to enhance the ability of both continents to respond timely and appropriately to peace and security threats.» (13)

It has also been underlined that the joint strategy springing from the Lisbon Declaration has provided to the AU and EU a jointly agreed framework and clear priorities, opening new avenues of cooperation. The spirit of the AU and the EU working together to address Africa’s security problems has already been clearly stated.

The joint strategy offers opportunities for the following, among others:

- Enhancement of political dialogue on challenges to peace and security.
- Mobilization of support for the full operationalization of the APSA.
- Mobilization of resources for providing predictable funding for African-led peace support operations (PSO).

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CONCLUSION

Since Ghana’s independence in 1957, and the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963, Africa has embarked on the search for peace, security and stability. The now defunct OAU and its successor, the African Union (AU), established in July 2002, have deployed sustained efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts and crises in the continent. Across these past decades, the long search for peace, security and stability has not met with the fruits and rewards expected. Conflicts and crises continued to turn out in different parts of the continent. The occurrence of coups d’état has not spared the continent. The years 2006 and 2008 saw coups d’état visiting Mauritania and in 2009, the Republic of Guinea and Madagascar fell into situations of unconstitutional change of government.

Given the persistence and recurrence of conflicts and crises, the advent of the African Peace and Security Architecture in 2002, with the adoption of the PSC Protocol by the inaugural session of the Assembly of the African Union in Durban in July 2002, was good news for Africa and its people. With the progressive implementation of APSA, the efforts deployed towards peace, security and stability have seen better rewards in different parts of Africa.

The development of partnerships by the AU to boost its efforts for the promotion of peace, security and stability has brought up significant leverage to the process of trying to pacify Africa and to open more space for socio-economic development. The AU-EU partnership and the collaboration there upon, make a critical contribution of the AU’s endeavor. No partnership is perfect. But as long as there exists the will on both sides to learn about mistakes, look for success factors and build common approaches, partnership can render benefits for the AU and the EU.

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– Towards the collaboration of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa.
CHAPTER THREE

GOVERNANCE, PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA THE AFRICAN UNION AT THE CROSSROADS AND FACING CHALLENGES
INTRODUCTION

One of the strategic questions the African Union faces and has faced since the end of the Cold War is that of peace, security and stability in its Member States. Indeed, just after the fall of the Berlin Wall, as a new world order characterised by the establishment of democracy in favour of the third wave of democratization was setting in, the African continent suddenly experienced the emergence of disorder due to the proliferation and intensification of conflicts of a new kind. Many members of the pan-African organization underwent the ordeal of armed, violent conflicts, some of which profoundly concerned the conscience of the international community. This particular situation not only cast doubt on the governability of these countries, but also had a profound impact on the vision and agenda of the African Union. Seeking to replace a socio-political environment beset by conflicts with one more stable and more conducive to Africa’s economic and social development, the continental organization not only strove to create the conditions for restoring peace, but also for the emergence of a new form of government at the service of peace, security and stability, all considered a sine qua non for sustainable development. Conscious of the fact that the socio-political instability, of which the violent armed conflicts were great indicators and symptoms, had a negative impact on many development efforts since the early post-colonial period on the continent, the African Union set out to put in place two architectures which today seem complementary insofar as one can be viewed as the basis of the other: peace and security, on the one hand, and governance, on the other. Owing to its potential for prevention and for prescribing a new world order, the architecture of governance non
only helps to combat the root causes of conflicts but also to indicate the political path towards reconstruction to take and avoid any return to disorder.

This article will first recall the situation that the African Union faced at a certain moment in its past (I) and which prompted it to progressively put in place an architecture of peace and security, assessing the efficacy of which is indispensible today (II). It will then demonstrate that this architecture alone is not enough and that it must be propped up by another architecture complementary to it (III). Finally, we will indentify not only the points of synergy between the two architectures, but also the common areas of operational action which, if implemented, can only boost the efficacy of the Union’s endeavours and which are impossible in the absence of a reform of the internal governance of the pan-African organisation (IV).

THE EMERGENCE OF DISORDER IN A NEW ORDER: A CONTINENT BEING TESTED BY A NEW TYPE OF CONFLICTS

Any public policy drawn up by a national or international organization is always a response to a given social, economic and/or political situation (1). The same goes for the policy of a continental intergovernmental organization like the African Union concerning peace and security. This policy came into existence in a particular context. Between 1963 and the late 1990s, that is, under the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), African leaders gathered at a continental organization was little concerned about matters of peace within its Member States, doubtlessly because of the sacrosanct principles of sovereignty of the States and of non-interference in their internal affairs. To the contrary, they had even supported armed conflict in the name of fully liberating Africa from the yolk of colonialism and, in certain cases, racial domination. One must nevertheless recognize that the continental leadership was concerned about the consequences of instability and armed conflicts, as evidenced, for example, by the OAU Convention of 1969 on refugees. In reality, it was not until the transformation of the former OAU into the African Union in 2000 that the

questions of peace and security became important and, to some degree, central in the agenda and vision of the African continental organization.

Taking a look backward in time allows us to believe today that the transformation of the organisation created in 1963 was not only a change in a «institutional mode», but a real qualitative change in terms of vision, objectives and responsibilities as shown by the organisation's report on peace, security and stability. At the core of the new organisation’s vision, African leadership has decided to make promoting peace, security and stability a sine qua non of sustainable development. This change of attitude has also manifested itself in the form of innovative, forward-looking stances. The Constitutive Act adopted in Lomé in Togo in July 2000 went so far as to give the AU the right to intervene in a Member State by decision of the Assembly in extremely grave circumstances, such as crimes against humanity(2). It also gives Member States the possibility of requiring the Union’s intervention in view of restoring peace and security when the latter are under threat (3). The possibility to suspend a Member State the leadership of which has assumed power unconstitutionally also reflects the evolution observed in the OAU at the AU. These provisions did not remain mere declarations. The AU has applied them in countries such as the Comoro Islands, Mauritania, Guinea, Sudan and Somalia.

This global attitude shift can be explained by the situation which prevailed on the continent at the time of creation of the AU. With the end of the Cold War and the wave of democratisation which ensued, Africa witnessed an ambiguous evolution in the early 1990s. If the interlude during which the dictatorships in many countries ended through various means (constitutional reform, national sovereign conference, etc.) had raised great hopes among the African populations, namely that of living in peace, in a democratic space, and to see an improvement in socio-economic conditions, we must recognise that these hopes were quickly dashed. While they believed that free, fair and transparent elections would become the main mode of taking power, they instead saw the return of coups d’etat as the scenario for transfers of power. In particular, between 1990 and the early 2000s, Africa was considered the continent which had suffered the most intra- and inter-state conflicts, so much so that few hesitated to say that it «needed peace extremely urgently». The memory of the horrors of the Rwanda tragedy and the brutality of the civil

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(2) Cf. article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU.
(3) Ibid.
Wars in Angola, Somalia, Liberia and Sierra-Leone are stark reminders of this extremely troubled period for life on the continent.

While there were hopes that this wave of democratisation in the wake of the Cold War would lead to the advent of a new order by ending the conflicts and stabilising the continent definitively, we instead saw the emergence of a new disorder with the proliferation, intensification and increased complexity of the conflicts.

In the 1990s the African continent was beset by conflicts which not only put Member States and their regular armies in opposition, but also militias, demi-soldiers, and populations which were victims, actors and targets, making a mockery of the borders and basic rules set out by international accords, sometimes related to great informal international financial systems (4). These armed conflicts were mainly internal. As strictly inter-state wars became rare, peace and security were put to the test by internal armed conflicts.

These African conflicts, which can easily be considered civil wars, are not easily understood outside their regional framework. For the most part atypical due to their duration and discontinuous in time, these wars within the States are often scattered spatially and are supported through by war lords who exploit ethnic or religious ties. They have generated insecurity just about everywhere for populations and instability for institutions and societies. By ruining the State’s authority and destroying the very foundations of established institutions and societies, they have made entire countries ungovernable and have brought to light the governability crisis experienced in most regions of Africa. Governability, or the ability of societies and States to govern themselves, had become a problem and a challenge.

Then and now, the gravity of African armed conflicts and wars are measured by their elevated human cost, particularly the number of refugees and internally displaced persons. These armed so-called African conflicts or wars have led to what Roland Marchal characterises as the formation of «systems of conflict» (5). At their paroxysm, for example, the conflicts which shook the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia or the

countries along the Mano River clearly illustrated this systemic dimension of African conflicts. These conflicts, which proliferated throughout the 1990s and which had pushed heads of state and the AU government to forge a new vision for Africa and hammer out a political agenda with peace and security at its core, are far from being totally ended. Some of them are still active and continue to retain the attention of the continent’s leadership, as do new conflicts and crises which could transform into veritable conflicts if due care is not taken. All of these conflicts, which have for threatened peace and security in Africa for about twenty years, differ greatly from one another and stem from various, often contested causes. Although often evoked, colonization, the fanciful demarcation of borders and the end of the Cold War cannot explain everything. As aptly put by Jean du Bois de Gaudusson, «by any hypothesis, their unique characteristic is that they interweave internal and external factors; even if confined within a State, they are not always without risk of spreading internationally, which occurs often,» they compromise the chances of socio-economic development for the countries involved. The Heads of State and leaders of member governments in the continental organisation acknowledged this reality in 1993 by drawing attention to the fact that no internal factor had contributed as much to the socio-economic problems of the African continent as the scourge of intra- and inter-state conflicts (6), conflicts which have a certain devastating and destabilising effect. By compromising development efforts, these conflicts have further weakened African states. This is why many so many African states are fragile today. By spilling over the borders of fragile States, these conflicts have largely destabilised entire regions. Today, the examples of the Great Lakes, the Mano River and the Horn of Africa illustrate this reality quite well.

African States which have known conflicts have also suffered from the aftershocks of the disorder which prevailed internationally after the Cold War. The proliferation of small arms, the spread of mercenarism, the abandonment in the wilderness of veterans of poorly-resolved past conflicts – these have not been without impact on the duration and form of Africa’s new conflicts. It is without at doubt by becoming aware of the risks of spreading and the consequences of these conflicts on the development of the countries concerned, to begin with, and then on the entire continent’s security that the AU has chosen to pay increasing attention to the conflicts affecting its Member States -- and from a very short range.

(6) Cf. the Cairo Declaration of 1993.
Peace and security is one of the areas in which it has assumed its international responsibility in a noteworthy and significant manner. But how, specifically, has it assumed this international responsibility?

CONSERVING PEACE AND SECURITY THROUGH CONFLICT PREVENTION: EMERGENCE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A NEW POLITICAL PRIORITY

The transformation of OAU to AU was in response to the need to maintain the African continent and its peoples capable of facing the challenges of the 21st century, in particular those of reducing poverty, total, sustainable and fair development, good governance and the respect of human dignity through promoting and protecting human rights and strengthening Africa’s position in a globalised world. The realization that without peace, security and stability, not all of these objectives could be met clearly caused Africa’s Heads of State or Government to endow the new organization with an innovative, extended mandate and the powers and institutions needed to deal with the issues of peace and security on the continent. The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security of the African Union adopted in Durban, South Africa in July 2002 and which entered into force in 2003 after ratification by the required number of Member States, is the main instrument in this regard. But it must be recalled that in 1993 the Heads of State or Government of the OAU adopted the Cairo Declaration on the Establishment of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution within the OAU. This declaration paved the way for later developments which crystallised in the Protocol Relating to the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU.

This legal instrument obliges the States parties

To promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, the well-being of the African people and their environment, as well as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development (7).

This protocol also calls on States parties to «promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of hu-

two lines of force in AU’s vision of peace and security are clearly set out in this protocol: peace and security as a condition of sustainable development, on the one hand, and the respect of a certain number of principles relating to democracy, such as peace, on the other.

The protocol confers the mission of ensuring both peace and security on the AU Commission Chairperson and the Peace and Security Council. Among other functions, they must

Anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts, as well as policies that may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity; undertake peace-making and peace-building functions to resolve conflicts where they have occurred; authorize the mounting and deployment of peace support missions; recommend to the Assembly... intervention, on behalf of the Union, in a Member State; institute sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of Government takes place in a Member State; implement the common defence policy of the Union; ensure the implementation of the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and other... instruments..., and harmonize and coordinate efforts at regional and continental; follow-up, within the framework of its conflict prevention responsibilities, the progress towards the promotion of democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law by Member States (9).

The Protocol also clearly states that the AU Commission Chairperson «shall bring to the attention of the Peace and Security Council any matter, which, in his/her opinion, may threaten peace, security and stability in the Continent (10). He may also, at his/her own initiative or when so requested by the Peace and Security Council,

Use his/her good offices, either personally or through special envoys, special representatives, the Panel of the Wise or the Regional Mechanisms, to prevent potential conflicts, resolve actual conflicts and promote peace building and post-conflict reconstruction (11).

(8) Ibid, Article 3(f).
(9) Ibid, Article 7 (a, b, c, e, f, g, h, i, and m).
(10) Ibid, Article 10 (2.a).
(11) Ibid, Article 10 (2. b and c)
To assume its responsibilities with respect to peace and security on the continent, the AU relies essentially on two legal instruments, namely, the Constitutive Act of the African Union and the Protocol Relating to Peace and Security Council, which give it the power to put in place a certain number of institutions and processes. These institutions and processes primarily comprise the Peace and Security Council, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System the African Standby Force and the Special Fund. These institutions and processes are the pillars which together form the AU’s architecture of peace and security today. Within this architecture, each pillar has its own functions, which are defined not only in the protocol but also in three other key documents:

*Framework for the implementation of the Early Warning Mechanism, as adopted by the meeting of governmental experts on early warning and conflict prevention in Kempton Park, South Africa, in December 2006, the Modalities for the Functioning of the Panel of the Wise as Adopted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia by the Peace and Security Council in its 100th meeting in November 2007 and the Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security Between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities, and the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa in 2007.*

The first pillar of the AU’s architecture of peace and security launched in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in May 2004, the Peace and Security Council is comprised of fifteen members, ten of whom are elected for a mandate of two years and five of whom are elected for a mandate of three years. The election is conducted according to the principles of representation and equitable regional rotation and according to specific criteria. They all enjoy equal rights (12). The fifteen States which are currently members of this council are: Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Rwanda, Mauritania, Namibia, South Africa, Benin, Ivory Coast, Mali, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Libya, Zimbabwe, and Nigeria (13). As a collective organ, it performs the following functions: promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa; early warning and preventive diplomacy; peace-making, includ-

(12) Ibid, Article 5
(13) These countries have been elected by the Executive Council of the AU at the 14th Summit held in Addis Ababa from 25 January to 2 February 2010. They enter into office on 1 April 2010 and replace the following countries, which comprised the outgoing council: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Gabon, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Swaziland, Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia.
ing the use of good offices, mediation, conciliation and enquiry; peace support operations and intervention…; peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction; humanitarian action and disaster management, and any other function as may be decided by the Heads of State or Government (14). Functioning on an ongoing basis through the representatives of the States at the headquarters, it facilitates the quest for answers to conflicts and crises on the continent. It can convene at the permanent representative, minister or Head of State level. But while it can also convene as often as is necessary in the case of the permanent representatives, the ministers and Heads of State only convene once a year. These meetings are normally held at the headquarters of the Union (15). Since its launch, this council has played an important role in seeking peace, security and stability in Africa to the point that it has become a credible partner of the Peace and Security Council of the United Nations (16).

As the second pillar of the AU’s architecture, where peace and security are concerned, the Panel of the Wise was formed to «to support the efforts of the Peace and Security Council and those of the Chairperson of the Commission, particularly in the area of conflict prevention(17).» Currently composed of

Five highly respected African personalities from various segments of society who have made outstanding contribution to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent (18),

this organ essentially provides «consultative services…on all issues pertaining to the promotion, and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa(19).» But at its own initiative or at the request of the Council of Peace or the Commission Chairperson, it may «undertake such action deemed appropriate to support the efforts of the Peace and Security Council and those of the Chairperson of the Commission for the

(15) Ibid, Article 8
(18) Ibid, Article 11 (2)
(19) Ibid, Article 11 (3).
prevention of conflicts (20), and to pronounce itself on issues relating to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa (21).» Although the protocol setting out the organisation attributes and functioning of this group was adopted in 2004, it was only in early 2007 that the group’s first members were known. They were designated by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Union in January 2007 (22). The modes of functioning of the panel they constitute were only adopted by the Peace and Security Council in November 2007. An active group, it recently produced an important report on the conflicts related to the electoral processes in Africa for the attention of the Peace and Security Council.

As the third pillar of peace and security of the AU’s architecture, the Continental Early Warning System is an essential structure in the exercising of the AU’s responsibility relating to conflict prevention on the continent. Instituted by the Protocol Relating to the Peace and Security Council, it reflects importance that the AU Member States place on conflict prevention and early warnings. Consisting of «an observation and monitoring centre known as the ‘Situation Room’, located at the Conflict Management Directorate of the Union, and responsible for data collection and analysis on the basis of an appropriate early warning indicators module (23)», on the one hand, and «observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms to be linked directly through appropriate means of communications to the Situation Room, and which shall collect and process data at their level and transmit the same to the Situation Room (24),

on the other, its role shall be to facilitate the prediction and prevention of conflicts. It has come about as a result of the international community’s failure to manage and resolve large-scale violent conflicts, as made

(20)Ibid, Article 11 (4).
(21)Ibid, Article 11 (4).
(22)Salim Ahmed Salim, former Secretary General of the OAU (East Africa), Dr. Brigalia Hlophe BAM, Chairman of the Electoral Commission of South Africa (Southern Africa), Ahmed Ben Bella, former President of the Republic of Algeria (North Africa), Ms. Elizabeth K. PogNON, President of the Constitutional Court of Benin (West Africa), Mr. Miguel Trovoada, former President of the Republic of Sao Tome and Principe (Central Africa).
(24)Ibid, Article 12 (2)
evident by the case of the Somalia and Rwanda events. Starting with this failure, a consensus was reached on the need to draw up prevention strategies through early warning models. The AU Continental Early Warning System is therefore part of the efforts aiming to favour conflict prevention over management and resolution. As the main instrument for monitoring and analyzing situations and formulating responses and policies in the face of threats to peace and security on the continent, it is at the service of the Chairperson of the Commission’s actions related to his missions of maintaining peace and security (25).

Under the protocol, the Continental Early Warning System is responsible for anticipating and preventing the occurrence of conflicts by making information and analyses available to the Chairperson of the Commission to enable him to draw the attention of the Peace and Security Council to potential threats to peace and security in Africa in a timely manner. The information and analyses provided by the Continental Early Warning System are in response to the need to devise appropriate response strategies to be implemented by the AU and its institutions. The link between analysis and response is at the core of the methodological approach used by the AU Continental Early Warning System (26). With respect to identified threats, the Peace and Security Council may recommend the best actions to take in view of maintaining peace and security in a country or region. This is what the Member States are invited to commit to facilitate any action the Peace and Security Council undertakes related to preserving peace and security on the basis of information produced by the Continental Early Warning System. It should be noted here that the information gathering and analyses at the heart of the Continental Early Warning System are drawn from political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators. In addition to the support given to the action of the Chairperson of the Commission and the other AU institutions, this system plays a critical role in the ability of the AU’s key institutions and the other pillars of the peace and security architecture, notably the Peace and Security Council and the Panel of the Wise, to fulfil their responsibilities (27). Although still being finalized, this system still needs to be reinforced to become fully operational.

(25) Ibid, Article 12 (5).
(27) African Union, Meeting the Challenge of Conflict Prevention in Africa. Towards the Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System. Cf. the preface by Am-
The African Standby Force is the is the fourth pillar of the AU’s peace and security architecture. As the architecture’s least complete pillar, its formation is nonetheless moving forward steadily. A structure intended to permit the Peace and Security Council to fulfil its responsibilities related to deploying its peace support missions and intervention in Member States pursuant to article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act, it is a group of regional standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment when called upon (28). It has a mandate of performing observation and monitoring missions, peace support missions, the interventions in Member States as provided for in the Constitutive Act, the prevention and consolidation of peace, humanitarian assistance and any other functions as may be mandated by the Peace and Security Council or the Assembly (29). The establishment of the regional brigades is currently underway in all AU regions. Planning elements and the documents related to the policy of commitment are still in the drafting stages. If the force is deployed, the Peace and Security Council protocol calls for the appointment of a Force Commander, who reports to the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission, who in turn reports to the Chairperson (30).

The Peace Fund is the fifth and final pillar of the AU peace and security architecture. In order to provide «the necessary financial resources for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security, a Special Fund, to be known as the Peace Fund» was established by the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. Made up essentially

Financial appropriations from the regular budget of Union, including arrears of contributions, voluntary contributions from Member States and from other sources within Africa, including the private sector, civil society and individuals, as well as through appropriate fund raising activities (31),

this fund represents 6% of the Commission’s total budget. All operations related to peace are funded by this fund, which is governed by the finan-

(29) Ibid, Article 13 (3)
(30) Ibid, Article 13 (6 and 7)
(31) Ibid, Article 21 (par. 2)
cial rules of the AU. It not enough to cover all of the AU’s needs related to peace and security. To cover all of its needs in this area, the AU usually relies on funding from beyond the continent.

In keeping with the Peace and Security Council Protocol, the Peace Fund may also receive voluntary contributions from outside Africa. But accepting these voluntary contributions requires the approval of the Chairperson of the Commission. He may only accept them if it has been proven they comply with the objectives and principles of the AU (32). The AU Peace Fund also gets voluntary contributions from many non-African partners. These partners are mainly States or regional organisations in Europe or Asia. China, South Korea and Japan, are the primary Asian donors. Beside the European Commission, which is by far the biggest contributor to the Peace Fund, there are European countries such as Italy and Spain. Frameworks for the joint monitoring of these voluntary contributions have been put in place with some of these donors, generally to facilitate matters. Italy and Spain both have one. The African Peace Facility was founded by contribution of the European Commission in the 6th Meeting of the Joint Coordination Committee in Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia (33). As a framework for managing the financial support of the EU for the AU’s peace and security architecture, it has just allocated EUR 200 million to the peace keeping operations and EUR 35 million to strengthening the AU’s capacities. This fund is used, for example, to fund the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic (MICOPAX).

Here we must stress the importance placed by the Peace and Security Council Protocol on the close collaboration between the AU and other organizations. The AU is invited to collaborate with the regional economic communities through their regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution and by setting up regional brigades. The MoU of cooperation in the area of peace and security signed between the AU and the regional mechanisms in January 2008 in Addis-Ababa bears testimony to this willingness to cooperate. The AU is also invited to collaborate closely with the United Nations and other pertinent international organizations in maintaining peace and security. It has given and continues to give proof of its willingness to cooperate through recent

(32) Ibid, Article 21 (par. 3)
Governance, peace and security in Africa the African Union at the crossroads and...

experiences with the United Nations in Sudan and with the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) in Madagascar and Guinea within the International Contact Group (ICG). This willingness to cooperate is driven by the assumption that peace is a collective task which requires the commitment of all influential actors.

The AU Peace and Security Architecture described above has become stronger and is now fully operational in most of its components, as demonstrated, for example, by their respective involvement in the search for solution to the political crises in Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Guinea and armed conflict in Sudan and Somalia. But does being operational necessarily mean being effective? Such is the question one inevitably faces when examining the AU's response to threats to peace and security today. It must be acknowledged that even if the number of conflicts has been considerably reduced, as is easily observed when comparing African geopolitical maps of armed conflicts of the late 90s and the first decade of the 2000s, the condition of peace and security remains extremely worrying. Does this evolution, which is rather positive, reveal the impact the AU Peace and Security Architecture has on the situation on the continent? Two things must be said in all honestly. First of all, the AU's institutions and the new vision they have developed are not without their role in this significant improvement. Next, even if one can see that the number of conflicts has decreases considerably, one must also concede that new conflicts have nevertheless broken out. This mitigates this success, if you consider that the main objective and added value of the entire AU Peace and Security Architecture is after all the prevention of conflicts.

This impact or limited success has to do, in our view, with the marginalization of governance in conflict prevention and so, indirectly, the complementary nature of two architectures developed by the AU since its inception: peace and security, on the one hand, and governance, on the other. Moreover, the Peace and Security Council Protocol highlights this complementary nature in its preamble and in the conditions of its Article 7. The following can be read there: «Aware also of the fact that the development of strong democratic institutions and culture, observance of human rights and the rule of law, as well as the implementation of post-conflict recovery programmes and sustainable development policies, are essential for the promotion of collective security, durable peace and stability, as well as for the prevention of conflicts» (34). How should

one understand the mission it confers on the Peace and Security Council of following up, «within the framework of its conflict prevention responsibilities, the progress towards the promotion of democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law by Member States (35)» in addition to affirming the link between these two architectures?

INTEGRATE GOVERNANCE INTO THE PROMOTION OF PEACE AND SECURITY

Starting in the 90s, while a mechanism for preventing, managing and resolving conflicts was being put in place (36), the Heads of State and Government of OAU Member States, and then the AU, showed their willingness to promote and commit themselves to a new type of governance in Africa. This new form of governance implied for them greater participation by their people in the development and transformation (37) of African societies and a consolidation of emerging democratic institutions in their respective countries (38). This coincidence was not neutral. It reflected the new vision African leaders had for their continent: no development without peace and security, and no true, lasting peace and security without a new form of governance. The commitment of African leaders to this new form of government meant affirming the need to establish and consolidate democracy in African countries and refuse unconstitutional changes which could only result in disorder. This commitment was reaffirmed on several occasions in many documents in successive encounters from 1990 to 2007 (39).

T should be noted that the AU’s commitment to new governance in Africa quickly took on the form of the paths towards the establishment

(35) Ibid, Article 7.
(36) Cf. the Cairo Declaration of 1993.
(37) This desire has led to the adoption of an African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation Charter called Arusha.
(38) Declaration of Heads of State at the end of the 26th ordinary summit of the Organization of African Unity held in Addis Ababa in July 1990.
of specific institutions and the adoption of a number of founding legal instruments, the most important of which is the *African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance* adopted at the 8th ordinary session of the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the AU, on January 30, 2007. The Declaration on the political and socioeconomic situation in Africa and the fundamental changes in the world (1990), the Cairo Declaration establishing the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Conflict Resolution within the OAU (1993), the Cairo Agenda for Economic Recovery and Social Development in Africa (1995), the Algiers Decision on Unconstitutional Changes of Government (1999), the Declaration and Plan of Action on Human Rights in Africa adopted in Grand Baie, Mauritius (1999), the Lomé Declaration on the OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes Government (2000), the New Partnership for Africa Development of the African Union adopted in Lusaka, Zambia (2001), the OAU/AU Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa (2002), the Kigali Declaration on Human Rights in Africa (2003) and the AU Convention on the prevention of and fight against corruption (2003) have largely paved the way for the new integrated and comprehensive vision of governance contained in the Charter, including the GM African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), approved and adopted by African leaders in Abuja (Nigeria) in 2003, already lays the groundwork, to some degree, for assessment of its application. This set of legal and political instruments contains the values that all of the AU Member States share with the rest of the international community.

By going with the vision reflected in these instruments, the AU has put the promotion of a new form of governance at the core of its action. Governance which enshrines access to power through elections, the rule of law, which assumes the respect of the principles of democracy and human rights, the fight against corruption and the promotion of efficient public services. One can read, for example, in the strategic plan it established for 2009-2012 that

*The African Union Commission will work to achieve good governance, democracy, human rights and rights based approach to development including social, economic, cultural and environmental rights. In this regard, based on existing institutions and Organs, the Commission will promote and facilitate establishment of appropriate architecture for promotion of good governance (40).*

(40) See African Union, the Strategic Plan 2009-2012, § 97.
Based on the vision of governance promoted by the OAU / AU since the early 1990s until now through the legal and policy instruments adopted on the one hand, and the institutions it has put in place, on the other, it is possible to identify an architecture of governance. This architecture appears as an institutional and political framework for promoting governance and establishing the prevention of conflict at the continent level. Bi-dimensional in nature, it is firstly a vision and an agenda, and secondly institutions and processes established to fulfil the agenda. One can identify a structure based on the Member States and the regional economic communities and organized around at least three major pillars. The first pillar is formed by a vision and an agenda based on standards developed over the past two or three decades. As an agenda, the architecture of governance reflects the continent’s commitment to assess and deal with the challenges of governance. This commitment is reflected in the legal and policy instruments already mentioned in this section, as well as the Constitutive Act of the African Union and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights of 1981, with its various protocols adopted from 2000. These instruments are the cornerstone of the architecture of governance. They are the legal and political foundations of its reinforcement.

One could say that at the heart of this commitment is the idea that any Member State of the AU cannot and should not be indifferent to the state of governance in another state, and, in particular, that dealing with the challenges of governance today requires an approach that is both comprehensive and coordinated at both the regional and continental levels (41). But as a political vision and agenda, it is a set of principles, guidelines and actions for the consolidation of democracy and governance. These principles, guidelines and actions affirm democracy and governance not only as means to an end but as an end in itself. The first pillar, essentially regulatory, consists of fundamental standards that will be the source of inspiration and a road map to which the other two pillars should always refer.

The second pillar of this architecture of governance consists of institutions and actors whose work is oriented towards the promotion of one or more dimensions of governance. We can therefore say that it is an «institutional pillar». At the basis of the establishment of the institutions that comprise it, and the division of labour between multiple actors, we

find that the institutionalist prejudice that standards alone are not sufficient to give substance and life to a vision. The major actors and institutions of this architecture are the African Union Commission, the Committee of Permanent Representatives, the Pan African Parliament, the Peace and Security Council, the Continental Early Warning Mechanism, the Democracy and Electoral Assistance Unit, the African Peer Review Mechanism, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Economic and Social Regional Economic Communities, Member States, the Union of Cities and Local Governments in Africa, the Advisory Committee on Corruption. These institutions represent the institutional complement needed by the regulatory pillar. Considered necessary for the consolidation of democracy and governance, they are intended to facilitate the appropriation and domestication of the AU’s vision and agenda for the governance by Member States. They bring consistency in the regional and continental governance programmes. With this institutional dimension, the architecture of governance can be regarded as a set of structures and institutions which give an operational expression to the AU’s vision and agenda for the governance.

The third and final pillar of the architecture of governance consists mainly of processes and procedures. As such, it can be regarded as an operational pillar. This pillar actually attempts to fulfil the need to optimize the work of the institutions which make up the institutional pillar. The important thing here is to determine how these institutions can weigh in on the decision making and policy development process both at the continental, regional and national levels. From this point of view, the implementation of AU’s vision and agenda of governance necessarily requires the identification or determination of the channels and procedures needed to facilitate policy development and decision-making in matters of governance on the continent (42). In effect, without these channels and procedures, the institutions put in place are sure to be inefficient. The AU Commission is currently setting up an African Platform on Governance in close collaboration with actors of governance in Africa. Viewed as a framework for formalizing the cooperation and coordination between various the institutions of governance in Africa, it not only meets the requirement of the Charter on Elections, Democracy and Governance, which calls for the establishment of a framework of cooperation with the

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(42) Ibid, n° 11.
RECs on the implementation of its principles (43), but also a recommendation by the meeting held in March 2009 in Yaounde (Cameroon) on the architecture of governance (44).

Although the various governance actors in Africa meet at regular intervals, it must still be conceded that these meetings are still convened on an informal basis. Given the challenges of governance in the current context of integration, the need for an institutionalized mechanism on the continental and regional level aimed at systematically promoting the exchange of information on the activities and initiatives concerning governance are needed. The proposed African Platform on Governance should therefore be able to be used as a framework for dialogue and coordination between different actors involved in promoting governance in Africa. The main objective of this platform is to help these players definitively to find the best way to turn the African agenda of the governance from an ideal vision into a reality incarnate. As a mechanism or process of operationalization, it should facilitate a dialogue between regions and between regions and the continental level in view of exerting collective influence over decision making at the regional and continental levels. A meeting held in Nairobi (Kenya) in December 2009 on African governance architecture gave different governance actors in Africa the opportunity to comment on this platform. They wanted this platform to not simply be a framework for sharing information, but a basis for a greater impact in governance issues. They have also clearly indicated that this platform cannot be a decision making body, but simply a tool to facilitate dialogue and consultation. As an integral part of a process and an element of the architecture, this platform should enhance the architecture of governance and ensure the implementation of decisions by AU organs in the area of governance.

To talk about the AU governance architecture therefore is to refer to a structure over which there is a vision and agenda based on a regulatory pillar (standards), an institutional pillar (institutions) and an operational pillar (processes and procedures) on the regional and continental level and which aims to effectively embody, in the reality of the Member States, the shared values of the new vision of governance developed by the AU. This architecture affirms in one way or another that the promotion of democracy and good governance cannot be reduced to one-time

(43) Cf. Article 44, § B of said charter.
(44) See the final report of this meeting.
event. Rather, it is a process that requires follow-up, evaluation, maintenance and enhancement, taking into account the dynamics and capabilities of the different Member States (45). Reinforcing it is the best way to protect the progress and gains achieved in the field of democracy and good governance. But as regards promoting peace and security, this governance architecture is not without impact. It may indeed prevent the emergence of conflicts and indicate the way forward in rebuilding a country in post-conflict.

We know, for example, that the poorly organized elections, human rights violations, lack of transparency and corruption it generally causes, in addition to the non-observance of the rule of law, contribute to the de-legitimisation of governments and are often the cause of conflicts in Africa.

*How many of these conflicts, new or not, are rooted in the devastation caused by a dictatorial regime or in the tribulations due to a lack of democracy, that is to say the lack of tolerance and respect for others that it postulates and encourages?* (46)

pondered Jean du Bois. Given this awareness, the strategic objective for peace and conflict prevention to pursue is

*To make the States capable of eliminating the root causes of violence and war, which are economic misery, social injustice and political oppression. The safety in (and of) Africa will only be ensured in the long run if development accompanies the laying down of weapons; it is not being naïvely optimistic to add that it also depends on the fundamental principles of democracy -- and not only its forms and procedures and appearances -- as well as human rights and the most basic freedoms* (47).

It is therefore clear that observing the principles of democracy and good governance are powerful forces for peace, security and stability. By promoting the vision of governance developed by the AU, States are likely to guard against threats to human security. Serious analysis have shown that the countries shaken by conflict were at risk of sliding back if lasting solutions to conflicts were not sufficiently investigated. However, there is no better solution than to anchor a process of reconstruction in the

(45) Ibid, num. 6.
(47) Ibid.
values of democracy, respect for human rights and good governance. This is where we perceive the ties of complementarity between the two architectures of peace and security on the one hand, and that of governance on the other. Therefore, given the still very limited success of the architecture of peace and security in promoting peace, security and stability through conflict prevention, it is urgent that the full potential of governance architecture be used to achieve the expected goal: human security. But this security must be pursued by promoting the emergence of societies based on the principles of the rule of law and good governance.

**OPERATIONALIZE THE GOVERNANCE-PEACE LINK AND RETHINK INTERNAL GOVERNANCE**

The AU is now at intersection of paths and challenges in the area of peace and security. There is no doubt that the path to take today is the one tried and tested by the experiences of the international community in recent years in several regions of the world. These experiences all take into account the different dimensions of governance, both in prevention and in conflict resolution. For conflict prevention, for example, it has become commonplace that the best prevention method is promoting good governance in its broadest sense. The African Union has shown in many cases (Mauritania, Guinea, Madagascar...) its determination not to tolerate unconstitutional changes of government by sanctioning the perpetrators of these changes. These sanctions are part of a strategy to actively promote good governance. It is since we have tried to actively promote governance in all its dimensions that we can be so demanding the observance of the standards it prescribes. Strengthening governance architecture appears today to be the best guarantee of a peaceful Africa. There is no need to recall that only observing the principles of democracy and good governance can bring to Africa a real peace and true human security.

If governance understood as the management of a State in accordance with principles of the rule of law, democracy, human rights and transparency in the use of public property must be favoured above any effort to promote peace and security, it must never be forgotten at the time of conflict and downstream thereof. Forgetting the dimension of governance in the efforts of peacekeeping or post-conflict reconstruction is the surest way to prepare for tomorrow’s conflicts by sowing the seeds
today. Rebuilding Peace and security is basically to create the conditions for irreversibility to conflict and to give back to States and societies affected the chance to develop differently. This cannot be done without taking into account the different dimensions of governance. This is what recent experiences have shown us.

In fact, everywhere conflicts broke out,

*New methods are put in place, combining military and human rights specialists, humanitarian workers and technicians from various sectors; they aim not only to maintain order and peace, but also to reconstruct and equip the state, noting that today war in its various forms is born not of the power of States but of their weakness. They also focus on the restoration and promotion of democracy, including electoral assistance and human rights protection (48).*

It is our conviction that AU should pursue this path. Clearly, there is a need to exploit the complementarities that both architectures can provide to build operational synergies in the field.

AU’s vision of conflict management always gives way to what lies beyond conflict. Indeed, to achieve this, conflicts are not supposed to continue indefinitely, but rather to be resolved, and thus ultimately overcome. The political mediation and work of the Panel of the Wise are geared toward this resolution. Once the conflicts are resolved, often in favour of peace treaties, the victim communities must face new economic, social and political challenges. This means conditions must be created that will help them overcome such challenges. Therefore, the AU believes that peace agreements should always be accompanied by other actions in the way of reconstruction and consolidation of peace and stability. These actions should go so far as to attack the root causes of the conflicts. Far from being easy, the post-conflict period must be followed by the rehabilitation and reconstruction, which must at the same time make the persistence of the causes of the conflict and return to the conflict itself impossible. *Post-conflict reconstruction* is thus part of the sustainable resolution of conflicts. The AU attaches great importance to this. The proof is that it has developed a policy on post-conflict reconstruction and development that was adopted in July 2006 in Banjul by the Executive Council of the AU (49). The development of this policy was a participatory

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(48) Ibid
and inclusive step forward. In addition to issues such as demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants, the return and reintegration of displaced populations and reconciliation, the policy lays the foundation for good governance in both the political and economic spheres.

The configuration and the articulation of this policy are in themselves an affirmation of the importance of governance mainly through the issues of human rights, the restoration of the rule of law, the establishment and development of democratic institutions, the preparation, the organization and supervision of elections, transparency, accountability, the fight against corruption and promotion of public services in the processes of post-conflict reconstruction and the consolidation of peace. In the AU’s vision, governance must be at the core of any post-conflict reconstruction effort. It helps to consolidate peace in that it can prevent a return to situations that generate conflicts.

CONCLUSION

The AU has come forward in recent years as an actor that is increasingly listened to and considered for the preservation of peace and security in Africa and worldwide. If its architecture reflects a strong desire to play an important role in the field of peace and international security, it has not yet provided all the desired results due to the limited attention given, until recently, to the dimension of governance. Strongly oriented towards sustainability, the AU’s vision of peace and security is now at a time of crossroads and challenges. Confronted with two types of challenges, that of the nature of conflicts, which requires a new approach to building peace and security on the one hand, and that of internal governance, which requires the establishment of new forms of operational collaboration on the other, the AU must now choose between changing its operational strategy or retaining the one it has, hitherto, utilised. One route now lies before it if it is to achieve the full success of its policy of peace and security: to choose to integrate governance into the specifics of its actions related to peace and security, and to review its own governance. It will thus contribute more effectively to achieving sustainable peace, human security and stability based on the principles of the rule of law and good governance in Africa.

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To achieve this, and because of both the magnitude of resources and the complexity of expertise needed, the AU will still need the support of its traditional partners. An African with peace and security is the guarantor of a safer world for all as well. Therefore, the external partners of Africa need to continue their support to the AU in strengthening the architecture of peace and security and conducting its operations for the maintenance or restoration of peace and security. But they must do so not by focusing on actions that give them the good conscience of having participated in the restoration of peace by supporting operations without the chance of eradicating the causes of conflict at the risk of a resurgence of conflicts. They must support operations, the design and management of which can ensure the sustainability of results, that is to say, peace and security, so as to promote sustainable development. To be clear, it is not just important for the partners to support operations, but also to support a comprehensive approach. It seems to us that the most viable approach today is that of peace and security based on good governance.
CHAPTER FOUR

DEVELOPMENT AND THE RELATIONSHIP WITH PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA: OBSERVATIONS FROM THE JOINT AFRICA-EU STRATEGY
INTRODUCTION

Today Africa finds itself in a world that has undergone a considerable change. Globalization forces have infiltrated every corner resulting to an increasingly interdependent world. New opportunities and challenges have emerged. While the continent has managed to seize some of these opportunities as demonstrated by a number of new economic ‘partnerships’, representation in global governance institutions and participation in multi-lateral arrangements such G20 and South-South Cooperation, Africa is still grappling with tremendous challenges. It is readily acknowledged that, though to a very limited extent, post Cold War Africa has benefitted from the rewards of this new global political and economic order. For instance, Sub-Saharan Africa received almost $12 billion in remittances in 2007. Trade figures for the same year show that the EU accounted for 75% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s trade, with individual EU member states pledging to spend 0.7%, double the current average of 0.34% Official Development Assistance (ODA) to assist the continent reach the Millennium Development Goals by 2015 (1). However, many countries continue to be afflicted by underdevelopment. Compounding this underdevelopment is the fact that Africa continue to play a host to

the world’s most complex humanitarian emergencies in places like Darfur, DR Congo, Somalia, CHAD and CAR.

Although causality is not always clear between development, peace and security, there is a broad consensus that conflict destroys governance institutions, devastates livelihoods and arrests prospects for economic growth. In fact, «while there is no automatic link between poverty and civil conflict, violent outcomes are more likely in societies marked by deep polarization, weak institutions and chronic poverty» (2). According to the World Bank estimates, a civil war normally lasts seven years on average, with the economic growth rate reduced by 2.2% each year (3). In addition, the UNDP statistics indicate that of the 32 countries in the low human development category as measured by the Human Development Index (HDI), 22 have experienced conflict at some time in their history (4). And those that have experienced violent conflict are heavily overrepresented among the group of countries that are off track for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in projection for 2015 (5).

In this regard, a critical interrogation of the development-security nexus forms an immediate motivation for this paper. Any attempt to understand the current state of development, peace and security in Africa and the continent’s position in the global political economy must take into account the interface between development and security. This so because, as Africa is once again finding its place near the top of the international agenda, international actors all acknowledge that the convergence of security and development strategies, programming and policies is a necessity for holistic and sound conflict management strategies and at the end, durable peace and sustainable development.

With a particular focus on EU-Africa ‘partnership’ as propounded in the Joint Africa- EU Strategy (JAES) this paper agrees with the premise that renewed interest on development and security imperatives in the

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(2) Ibid


(5) Ibid
continent is informed by the following factors; firstly, increasing concern by international actors including EU member states about the scale of economic, governance and security challenges in Africa and the adverse impact these might have on their strategic national interests. Secondly, a recognition that security and development are inherently related and are an integral part of comprehensive response mechanisms including conflict prevention and management. Lastly, an honest attempt to build African capacities so as to find ‘African solutions to African Problems’.

There is however, another less altruistic reason that is of increased importance which is the role of China. Beyond its role as a source of raw materials and commodities to feed the European manufactures and global consumers Africa is also again an area of ideological competition between the social-market democratic values espoused by the West and the state-led development example presented by authoritarian China. Global growth and support for democracy, respect for human rights and individual liberties has stagnated. Consisting of more than a quarter of the world countries and shortly with population in excess of China and India, what happens to Africa will have global repercussions in the struggle for a rules-based future order.

Following this introduction the next section concern itself with the key concepts with an attempt not to only provide conceptual clarification but to also contribute to the ongoing intellectual debates on security and development. It is in section three of this paper where the development-security nexus is unpacked. Section four pays a particular attention on the EU-Africa relations, with the aim of exploring how development interventions have been propelled to the forefront of the security agenda (conflict prevention) in Africa. The subsequent section concludes the paper, followed by key recommendations.

SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT: PUTTING THE CONCEPTS INTO PERSPECTIVE

Concepts like security and development have become elastic due to changes in thinking, time and space on which they are used. As a result, the scope and conceptual tools of analysis used to dissect them also widens. Now, when talking of security, one can not only talk of state-centric conceptions of security, one needs to go beyond that microscopic view to include the people centred dimension of security (human security).
The same can be said about development. Before, this concept was largely limited to the results of economic growth. But today the focus of development policy is not only on economics, it covers a wide spectrum of thematic issues ranging from post-conflict reconstruction, peacebuilding to security sector reform. Development has resurfaced as a key concept in the governance of security in conflict prone, conflict torn and post conflict societies. What is of much interest here is that, of late, development policy has become much more «intrusive» in that, it seeks to re-shape and/or re-order key state institutions, to establish democracy and protect human rights, and, not least, to strengthen the capacity of civil society to take a lead in some state sponsored initiatives (6). In addition, this new development paradigm mainly focuses on how violent conflicts may destroy investments in development, and, by implication, how development-policy can be harnessed to prevent violent conflicts and help re-build peaceful societies in the aftermath of a war» (7).

Nonetheless, it is not our intention here to reconceptualise, redefine and compare numerous and different definitions of development and security. But since definitions are by their nature «contextual and contingent upon the ideological, epistemological or methodological orientation of their purveyors» (8), our aim here is to only put security and development into context by reflecting on the historical developments that have shaped their current understanding and dominant thinking.

In trying to trace and understand the recent history, conceptual development and current thinking on security and development, one needs to pay a particular attention to the Post-Cold War period. This is so because the bi-polar world played an important role in shaping today’s dominant thinking on these concepts. Traditionally security was understood as the state concern, relating to the protection of the territorial integrity and sovereignty, maintaining stability and protecting vital interests of state through the use of political, legal, or coercive instruments at the state disposal. On the other side development was


(7) Ibid

understood as all the processes and strategies through which societies, communities and modern nation states seek to achieve more prosperous and equitable standards of living. During the Cold War, security was about stability and the maintenance of the status quo, focused on the balance of power between the West (USA) and the East (Soviet Union) (9). The focus was on hard security imperatives such as generating and maintaining nuclear capabilities and building a strong defence sector through massive military spending. At the same time, during the Cold War development policy was provided for ideological and political reasons, not as an a-political and technical task that operate outside the realm of politics (10). It was used not only as a tool of responding to socio-economic challenges but also as a way of coping with the political climate of the time. In other words, development assistance was defined as separate to security and was «thus only indirectly tied to issues of security in the form of guaranteeing political support and preserving spheres of influence of the two super-powers» (11). Furthermore, «the policy tools of development were never employed specifically to reduce the potential for violent conflict, but was primarily focused on generating economic growth and on securing the political loyalty of developing countries» (12).

But with the fall of the Berlin Wall a paradigmatic shift happened in the discourse on and practice of security and development. This shift involved the broadening of the unit of analysis of security and development from the state to individuals and groups of people within states. It is during this period that the concepts of human security and human development came to dominate scholarly debates on security and development. These concepts only percolated into the public domain during the Post-Cold War period when they became the preoccupation of security scholars and development practitioners. As the concepts of human security and human development gained acceptance in international security, development and legal discourse, they also became instrumental in bringing into increasing focus the threats that the emerging global issues such as intrastate wars, terrorism, climate change, food insecurity, environment degrading, human trafficking and displacement pose not only to nation-states but also to the wellbeing of individuals and commu-

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(9) Den Haag, 2004
(10) Ibid
(11) Ibid
(12) Ibid
nities (13). Today, as new threats and risks have emerged, security and development have broadened to include such issues as environmental security, food security, sustainable development etc.

On closer observation, at the core of all these new concepts including human security and human development is the belief that people should always be the first priority in any development and security policy planning. For instance, centrally to human security is the idea that security of the individual should be prioritized, more especially, with respect to the satisfaction of the basic needs of life; the creation of the social, political, economic, military, environmental and cultural conditions necessary for the survival, livelihood, and dignity of the individual, including the protection of fundamental freedoms, the respect for human rights, good governance, access to education, healthcare, and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his/her own potential (14).

While national security focuses on the defence of the state from external attack, human security is about protecting individuals and communities from any form of violence. The traditional goal of national security has been the defence of the state from external threats. The focus of human security, by contrast, is the protection of individuals; it puts more emphasis on ‘soft’ security imperatives and less on ‘hard’ state-centric imperatives (15). The former UN Secretary General in his In Larger Freedom report suggests that human security also encapsulates this notion of ‘larger freedom’. According to him larger freedom implies that men and women everywhere have the right to be governed by their own consent, under law, in a society where all individuals can, without discrimination or retribution, speak, worship and associate freely.

Human development is also putting people at the centre of development. The previous Human Development Reports define it as a process of widening the range of people’s choices (16). It is about people realizing their potential, increasing their choices and enjoying the freedom to exer-

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(14) Human Security Brief 2007. ‘Dying to Lose: Explaining the Decline in Global Terrorism’. Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada


cise their urgency against societal structure so as to lead lives they value. Centrally to human development is the strong believe that development must enable all individuals to enlarge their human capabilities to the fullest and to put those capabilities to the best use in all fields-economic, social, cultural and political (17).

A lot has happened ever since the Cold War politics ended. Many developments, some, with a potential to reshape and inform the current thinking on security and development have taken place. New security threats have also emerged, with some challenging our conventional wisdom of the world around us. The war on terror has intensified amid rapid radicalization of political Islam in Africa and elsewhere in the world. At the same time seismic shifts in the global balance of power are becoming more evident, with the rise of China and India seen by others as posing a major threat to the hegemony of the US. To this end, it remains to be seen whether, like the Cold War politics, these new global developments will have a significant impact on our current understanding of security and development and whether they will result to modification and/or reconceptualization of these concepts.

DEVELOPMENT –SECURITY NEXUS IN AFRICA

The 2005 UN World Summit resolved, «Development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing» (18). The summit explicitly inter-linked development and security, citing human security principles such as freedom from fear and want. (19) The G8 picked up on this theme, most notably at the Gleneagles meeting in 2005 that sought to put Africa «back» on the international agenda and at the June 2007 Heiligendamm Summit (20). It is also argued here that there can be no security without development and no development without security, for security is a crucial prerequisite for development.

(19) Also see John Kotsopoulos. ‘The EU and Africa: coming together at last?’ European Policy Centre Policy Brief July 2007. Brussels, Belgium
(20) Ibid
This relationship becomes more evident in Africa where poverty and underdevelopment are seen as key contributing factors to the eruption of civil wars and internecine-armed conflicts. In Africa underdevelopment and poverty are closely linked to weak or limited state capacity. This correlation finds a clear expression in the 2005 Human Security Report where it states that «the greater the poverty and the lower the state capacity, the higher the risk of war» (21). Though many armed conflicts were fought worldwide between 1946 and 1991, most killings took place in poor countries in Africa and elsewhere in the world. At the turn of the 21st century more people were being killed in armed conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa than in the rest of the world combined (22). As demonstrated by the figure below, most of the world’s armed conflicts now take place in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is further evidenced by the fact that at the end of October in 2007 about 68.6% of all UN Military Personnel were deployed in Africa (23).

![Figure 2.1 Cases of armed conflict and one-sided violence, 2002–2003](source: Human Security Centre, 2005)

Between 2002 and 2003 there was a small decline in cases of political violence around the world.

Now, many countries in the region from Somalia in the east to Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea Bissau and Guinea Conakry in the west, from Sudan in the north, Central African Republic at the centre to Angola in the south—remain trapped in a volatile mix of poverty, crime, unstable and inequitable political institutions, ineffective rule of law institutions, limited state capacity—all factors associated with many years of internecine armed conflicts (24). The combination of these pervasive factors including declining GDP per capita, major decline in per capita foreign assistance, arrested development opportunities and repeated collapse

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(22) Ibid
(24) Human Security Centre, 2005
of peace agreements intended to end internal conflicts in places like Somalia and Darfur- mean that armed conflicts in the region will continue to be more difficult to avoid, contain or end (25). What is more worrying is that continuing insecurities in some African countries and the interaction between poverty and violent conflict not only destroy lives on enormous scale- but also distort domestic interests and priorities and disrupt developmental efforts and delay progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The 2009 Human Development Index indicates that the last 22 countries on the list are African countries, with Chad on number 175, DR Congo on number 176 and Central African Republic (CAR) on number 179. These countries are all also off track for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) targets for 2015.

This link between underdevelopment and insecurity in the continent, therefore, provides an opportunity for the international community not only to multiply their efforts to reduce conflicts and promote sustainable peace-but also to harmonize their development interventions and conflict prevention strategies. This is so because, for so long, development actors operating in the continent minimized and avoided conflict related risks to their programming, preferring to work ‘around conflict’ (treating it as a negative externality to be avoided) or shifting from development assistance to humanitarian assistance (26). They developed their policies in such a way that they worked on the sidelines of conflicts, avoiding any direct involvement. For instance, when a war erupted in a country, development agencies generally withdrew and left the arena for humanitarian agencies, or waited for a peace agreement to be established before projects could be re-established (27). Seldom have they came to work on conflict and acknowledged the links between conflict and development (28).

It is only now that the international community is starting to understand and address the nexus between development and security in Africa. Development actors are starting to recognize the importance of linking their development efforts/initiatives with security considerations. They are now realizing that since internal conflicts are often cyclical in nature, they require simultaneous development and security responses. There is an increasing acknowledgement that «contemporary intra-state conflicts cannot be prevented, resolved,
or managed exclusively through preventive diplomacy, political negotiations, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and the use of force». These conflicts have complex causes (social inequality, ethnicity, state failure, human rights violations, resource predation, etc) that require correlated international assistance in areas including sustainable economic growth, good governance, human rights protection, and environmental preservation (29).

The result is an increasing convergence in the strategies and activities of security and development actors working in conflict prone, conflict torn and post-conflict localities, on the understanding that the challenges facing an unstable country need to be addressed in a holistic and integrated manner in order to achieve expected peace dividends and sustainable development. It is now generally acknowledged that building strong rule of law institutions and strengthening human rights respecting state institutions and enhancing their capacity to provide security and development based on principles of good governance are essential for sound conflict management (30).

This is why EU and OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) member countries and international development agencies from the North are now incorporating to their planning, budgeting and programming issues like democracy and human rights promotion programmes, infrastructure development, institutional reform and capacity building, conflict prevention and management and women’s rights and empowerment. Two examples of bilateral assistance can be quoted here. In 2008 the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) set aside an amount totaling DKK 15.3 billion, equivalent to 0.82 per cent of GNI, for development assistance; increased to DKK 250 million per year the strategic economic grant for stabilization and conflict prevention in developing countries; doubled development assistance to gender equality and women’s rights and opportunities from DKK 200 million in 2008 to DKK 400 million in 2010; launched a special initiative for women’s rights and opportunities in Liberia worth DKK 100 million and budgeted DKK 170 million per year for democracy and human rights programs, with support given to the construction of effective democratic state-institutions, to the improvement of the state of the law and the promotion of respect for human rights in developing countries (31).

(29) Ibid
(30) Ibid
In the case of the UK DFID (Department for International Development) has also come to also play an increasingly vital role in conflict prevention, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction programs such as security sector reform (SSR), disarmament-demobilization and rehabilitation-reintegration (DD-RR). The UK Government has been championing Security and Justice Reform (SJSR) and Safety Security and Access to Justice (SSAJ) since the beginning of the 21st century. According to the evaluation done in 2007 on DFID activities, the SJSR activities have been carried out in some 20 countries in sub-Saharan Africa since 2000 and the UK government spent over £250m on Security and Justice Sector Reform (SJSR) programming since 2001, primarily through the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) (32). As illustrated by the two figures below, between 2001 and 2005, the ACPP allocated at least £90.6 million to SJSR and DFID spent some £149.8 million of its programme resources on SJSR- with Sierra Leone accounting for 96 percent of ACPP SJSR outlays and 61 percent of DFID (33).

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(33) The two figures are extracts from Ball et al 2007
To some of these agencies conflict prevention and peacebuilding means that development assistance, whatever its focus (health, gender, education, economic growth) should be aimed at conflict prevention because it addressed the root causes of conflicts (35). This multidimensional approach is seen as a value adding approach since it helps to minimize the potential for violent conflict. As demonstrated by the aid flows statistics from the OECD DAC (36), the international community is increasingly viewing investment and resource allocation on peacebuilding and post-conflict programs as an integral part of the solution to the multifaceted challenges facing these countries. As a result, in the past few years donors have responded to the challenges of fragile and conflict-affected states with more aid- total net ODA reached USD 103.5 billion in 2007 with an amount of about USD 37.2 billion of ODA (Official Development Assistance) going to fragile and conflict-affected states, or 38.4 percent of total ODA (37). What is also more important to note is that, as illus-

(34) Figures 1 and 2 are extracts from the DFID Evaluation Report 2007.
(35) Den Haag, 2005
(36) In 2004 the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) developed a document called Security System Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice in order to emphasize the need for OECD member countries to apply ‘whole-of-government approaches’ in responding to the challenges of fragile and conflict-affected states. In 2006 OECD member countries spent about $6 billion on peace work, through official development assistance and the funding of UN peacekeeping missions.
(37) See the 2008 OECD Annual Report on Resource Flows to Fragile and Conflict-Affected States. According to the report, to date the Netherlands Stability Fund (estab-
traeted by the two figures below «ODA directed to governance and secu-

rity activities has grown almost fourfold between 2000 and 2007 and for
security system reform it has greatly increased from 2004 to 2007 (38).

In 2008, total ODA from members of the OECD DAC rose to USD
119.8 billion (39).

All these developments by international community and international
development agencies are very encouraging and are taking us to the
right direction. A task now for international actors is to find a way of map-
ning out how their security and development assistance is interlinked
conceptually as well as practically in concrete contexts and at particular
conflict stages (40). In particular, they need to ask themselves a ques-

lished in 2004 to improve the provision of rapid and flexible financing for activities that
are required to promote peace, security and development in situations of conflict and
fragility) has committed almost €400 million in support of key policy areas such as
conflict prevention, mediation, peacekeeping and peacebuilding and Financing has
almost doubled, from about €58 million in 2004 to more than €100 million in 2008.
(38) Ibid
(39) See the press release statement of preliminary figures for 2008 ODA by Eckhard
Deutscher, Chair, Development Assistance Committee. London, 30 March 2009
(40) Den Haag, 2004
tion as to what kinds of institutional reforms are required to address the relationship between development and security in Africa? In rethinking the relationship between development and security in Africa, the international community and development agencies need to take into account the importance of supporting negotiated peace settlements, for the presence and experience of peace are the prerequisite for both development and security. It is argued here that the Joint EU-Africa strategy remains, for now, one of the institutionalized and clear framework on how to deal with the development-security nexus in Africa and other international actors can learn some few lessons from the strategy.

JOINT AFRICA-EU STRATEGY: IN PURSUIT OF AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY AGENDA

The African continent and Europe have a strong relationship. This relationship harks back to the colonial times when many European countries were colonial powers with long paternal relationships with individual African countries. Even today, as the largest trading and development cooperation partner, the EU and its member states play an important economic, political and diplomatic role in Africa. (41) However, as Islam rightfully argues, «although the EU-Africa relationship stems back to the very beginnings of the European Community, it has changed over time, reflecting changes in the geo-political climate, the emergence of independence movements on the African continent, and advances in European integration» (42).

In recent years, a combination of internal and external factors, both in Africa and Europe, have influenced and reshaped the current form of the EU-Africa relations, putting Africa back on the European Agenda. These factors include but are not limited to; concerns about global security threats in the form of political terror; increasing radicalization of political Islam in Africa and the fear that it might spread to Europe; illegal migration; piracy in the Horn of Africa; concerns about continuing underdevelopment and insecurity in Africa; changes within both the EU and AU; an attempt to position EU as the ‘responsible’ and key global actor and increasing com-

(41) Shada Islam. ‘Strategic Partnerships’: The European Union’s Quest for Global Clout. South African Institute of International Affairs Occasional Paper No 33. Also see Commission of the European Communities, 2005.
petition from growing economies and new African partners like China. In addition, Africa has much to offer than other regions like the volatile Middle East – it is the source of energy and raw materials, making the cooperation between the EU and Africa even more urgent for EU, especially given the rise of China as a major player on the continent (43). Since one of its pillars for external engagement is ‘effective’ multilateralism, the EU is also using its relations with Africa to pursue ‘effective’ multilateralism, while at the same time trying to dispel the ‘myth’ that the EU is an economic giant, but a political dwarf. All these factors have made the EU to revisit the scope of its engagement and its external policies towards Africa. After realizing that the geo-political landscape is changing in Africa, the EU has come to prioritize both development assistance and African security agenda.

Before the European Commission’s bilateral and multilateral engagements in Africa were only limited on economic considerations, directed in areas such as aid and trade, with no particular consideration paid on security imperatives. These engagements culminated in a series of trade ‘partnership’ agreements such as the Yaoundé Conventions (1964-1975) and the Lomé Convention (1976-2000). Although trade and aid agreements have been in place since the mid-1960s, peace and security issues became more important in the discussions between the EU and African countries in the mid 1990s. It was the EU-Africa Summit in Cairo in April 2000 that brought issues like peacebuilding, conflict prevention, management and resolution, terrorism and post-conflict reconstruction to the forefront. Others see the Cairo Meeting as a symbolic point of departure for the renewed and present EU-Africa relations, more especially in the field of peace and security. Peace and Security issues that were discussed in Cairo were also incorporated to the Cotonou Agreement of June 2000 that entered into force in 2003.

The Cotonou Agreement set up an expanded framework for co-operation between the European Community, and its Member States, with the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP)-striking a good balance between development and security priorities. It also sought to promote the economic, social and cultural development of the ACP States, contribute to peace and security and promote a stable and democratic

(43) According to a 2003 European Security Strategy titled ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, energy dependence is a special concern for Europe and Europe is the world’s largest importer of oil and gas (accounts for about 50% and will rise to 70% in 2030). Also see John Kotsopoulos and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos. ‘Continental shift? Redefining EU-Africa relations’. Policy Brief, European Policy Centre, November 2007. Madrid
political environment in ACP states. The peace and security aspects are covered under the political dimension of the agreement. In particular, Article 11 of the Agreement on ‘Peace-building policies, conflict prevention and resolution’ states: «The Parties shall pursue an active, comprehensive and integrated policy of peace-building and conflict prevention and resolution within the framework of the Partnership» (44).

In addition to the Cotonou Agreement, the EU in its 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) also identified the need to address the challenges of regional conflict and failed states, as well as the link between economic problems and violent conflict. The European Security Strategy marked an important step towards achieving greater doctrinal coherence and recognized that development is a precondition for security and should be simultaneously pursued with the African Security Agenda (45).

However, although the Cairo Meeting, the Cotonou Agreement, EU Strategy for Africa, the European Security Strategy (ESS), the Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP), the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the European Consensus on Development and other partnership arrangements were equally important in shaping the EU-Africa relations, it is argued here that the EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon in 2007 had a major impact on the current EU-Africa relations. This is so not only because the Joint EU-Africa Strategy was adopted in that Summit but also because the summit acknowledged the need of inter-linking developmental interventions and security considerations and provided a more comprehensive framework through which the development-security nexus was to be pursued in Africa. In addition, it is also in the Summit that the EU saw an opportunity to re-evaluate the content, nature and structure of its past bilateral and multilateral partnerships with Africa-with the aim of building African capacities in order to find African solutions to African developmental and security challenges.

**Joint Africa- EU Strategy (JAES)**

In 2005, the EU started conceptualizing its comprehensive EU Strategy for Africa. Centrally to the December 2005 EU Strategy for Africa is

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the idea of giving people in developing and least developed countries a certain degree of control over their own development by focusing on four main pillars: peace and security, human rights and good governance, health and education, and economic growth (46). The peace and security aspect focused on a number of issues including; enhanced dialogue on challenges to peace & security, full operationalisation of the Africa P&S Architecture (APSA), predictable funding for Africa-led peace support operations, further development of APSA and establishment of APSA structures at the continental and regional levels (AU Peace and Security Council, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) (47).

In December 2007, the EU and Africa agreed to further deepen its relations by adopting the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, building on the EU Strategy for Africa and other existing frameworks. According to the European Centre for Development Policy Management «this strategy is the latest expression of the new ambitious position taken by the EU towards Africa, and it is the latest document guiding the relationship between the two continents» (48). The JAES symbolizes a renewed assurance that Africa’s development and security are still EU’s top political priority. It Is also one of the most comprehensive and large-scale project taking place between Africa and EU up until now, covering eight different policy areas with ambitions at a strategic and an operational level (49). The Joint Strategy builds on four pillars and they are:

a) Peace and Security  
b) Democratic Governance and Human Rights  
c) Trade and Regional Integration  
d) Key Development Issues


(49) Ibid
Within the peace and security pillar, the following issues are elaborated on: 1) Conflict prevention (institutional capacity support to early warning systems, support to address structural causes of conflict etc), 2) Common security threats (work to ensure full compliance with international obligations concerning terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and illegal arms export etc), 3) African peace-support operations (the setting up of a comprehensive approach complementing the restricted African Peace Facility, developing organizational capacities of African institutions, including the AU etc), 4) Disarmament (support to regional and national strategies for DDRR, support of non-proliferation of small arms and light weapons etc), 5) Post-conflict situations (development of transition strategies – for instance through the Stability Instrument - and development of capacities to foster SSR etc), and 6) Conflict resources (promoting and carrying out implementation of various schemes protecting natural resources) (50). In addition, these four pillars are further elaborated by an Action Plan, which translates the pillar commitments into eight priority areas/partnerships:

a) Peace and Security  
b) Democratic Governance and Human Rights  
c) Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure  
d) Millennium Development Goals  
e) Energy  
f) Climate Change  
g) Migration, Mobility and Employment  
h) Science, Information Society and Space.

The Action Plan is structured around three Priority Actions: 1) Enhancing dialogue on challenges to peace and security, 2) Full operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and 3) Predictable funding for African-led PSOs (51). Apart from the Action Plan, a number of other EU mechanisms to enhance peace and security in Africa are also worth mentioning: the EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts, the EU Delegation to the AU and the Special Adviser for African Peace-Keeping Capabilities are part of the context in which the Peace and Security partnership takes place (52).

(50) See the Joint Africa-EU Strategy  
(52) Ibid
In terms of financing the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy the existing EU financial instruments will be utilized and these financial instruments are European Development Fund (EDF), the DCI and the African Peace Facility (APF) (53). These financial instruments will be used to provide financial support to the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in their work for peace and security in the continent, with a focus on AU peacekeeping capacities. The first APF worth Euro 440 M covered the 2004-2007 period and was intended to support African led Peace Support Operations (PSO) and capacity building programmes for the evolving African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The second APF is worth Euro 300 M and covers the 2008-1010 period. Today, some of the funds from the APF are supporting African PSOs such as the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS, over Euro 300M), the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM, Euro 15,5M), the FOMUC mission in the CAR (Euro 23,4M) and the AU Mission in the Comoros (AMISEC, Euro 5M) (54).

As demonstrated by the JAES development, «peace and security are considered a top priority in EU-Africa relations reflecting the increasing convergence of thinking in these areas» (55). The EU is acknowledging that by broadening the sectors in which it is involved in Africa (from development to security and governance support), it can help Africa to find solutions to its problems. By supporting developmental efforts and security initiatives in Africa, EU can help to address the root causes of conflicts resulting to a stable and prosperous Africa.

CONCLUSION

Development and Security are closely related and theirs is an inseparable and mutually reinforcing relationship. This relationship becomes more evident in Africa where underdevelopment and poverty are associated with the eruption of conflicts. Today, international development agencies and international actors like EU have come to recognize the need to link their developmental interventions with security considera-

(53) Also see FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, Stockholm Report, March 2009
(54) Ibid. Also see ECDP, 'European Centre for development policy management: towards EU-Africa Strategy Peace and security'. 2007, Brussels
This is why there is an increasing convergence on development and conflict prevention programs in Africa today.

Indeed, convergence of security and development strategies, programming and policies is a necessity for holistic and sound conflict management strategies and at the end, durable peace and sustainable development in Africa. The EU, the broader international community and the international must not only embrace and recognize linkages between development and security—but they must also holistically and practically deal with this relationship so as to confront factors associated with underdevelopment, which in turn result to insecurity in Africa.

In the context of conflict prone, conflict torn and post conflict societies in Africa, both development and security should be crucial considerations in the pursuit of Millennium Development Goals and in the efforts of building African capacities and assisting Africa to find solutions to its problems building African capacities. In this regard, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy remains, for now, one of the institutionalized and clear framework on how to deal with the development-security nexus in Africa and other international actors can learn some few lessons from the strategy.

The AU and Africa make the most of the opportunities provided by the EU partnership—more especially in developing the continent’s evolving African Peace and Security Architecture. On the other side the EU need to also capitalize on the development and security opportunities that are now opening up in Africa if it wants pursue its ‘effective multilateralism and to be a ‘responsible’ and powerful actor in the region.

The Joint Africa-EU Strategy has leveled the ground and has provided the continent with appropriate tools of taking its development and security agenda forward. It is up to Africa—under the auspices of its own evolving multilateral institutions (particularly the African Union and RECs) and with leadership from regional hegemons such as Nigeria in the West and South Africa in the South—to ensure its relationship with the EU yields the expected dividends.

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CHAPTER FIVE

CHALLENGES FOR DEVELOPING THE ESDP IN AFRICA
The African continent has a very defined, unique personality that, on one hand, generates fascination, and on another, brings about important questions. If it is easy to recognise its great potential, it is equally true that this continent presents countless obstacles that complicate its modernisation and oppose its stabilisation, accentuating the factors of conflictive situations and waste a significant portion of the efforts dedicated towards promoting and developing the continent. The wars that have punished significant portions of Africa since the end of the Cold War have been, without a doubt, the most serious of all the setbacks that have held back the continent’s progress. In places like Somalia, Rwanda, Congo, Sudan, and conflictive countries along the Gulf of Guinea, the international community has either acted mistakenly or late, and Europe as a whole has remained far too passive.

To this, it must be added that when the African reality is examined, it is not easy to identify whether the continent as a whole is moving forwards or backwards. If we consider the arguments in favour of the continent’s progress, we find data and reasons for optimism, but if we compare them to progress in the real and specific terms of the men and women that live in that part of the world, we may also reach the opposite conclusion—that the living conditions of most Africans are deteriorating instead of improving, or at least there is no improvement. The Spanish Government’s 2009 Africa Plan makes this observation by confirming that «the high levels of economic growth, in some cases, do not produce clear dividends in the fight against poverty and in reaching the Millennium Development Goals,» and the factor that most contributes to the continent’s economic growth happens to be the increase in petroleum exports. As is known, the wealth from petroleum—«the devil’s
excrement»--is resulting in large corruption spirals, and the population hardly receives any benefit.

Michèle Alliot-Marie, the French Minister of the Interior and the former Minister of Defence from 2002 to 2007, reflects these contradictions in her article titled *Europe’s New Mission in Africa* in the following manner: «It is true that currently many African countries are experiencing instability, failure of the State, regional conflicts, violent internal political competition, and another series of problems, including massacres and acts of brutality on a large scale, civil war, the massive flow of refugees, economic disorder and environmental damage. However, the overall situation in Africa is not uniformly grim. Some African countries are relatively stable and prosperous, and the continent has a young population that will soon exceed one billion people, abundant mineral reserves, and an inherent dynamism. «

On another hand, as Michèle Alliot-Marie points out, there are very large differences between the various countries, and any generalisation should be accepted with the corresponding reservations. However, there are a series of recognisable problems that, to a greater or lesser extent, affect these countries and characterise them.

The speed with which changes have taken place in the African continent since the beginning of decolonisation and their circumstances have generated incredibly fragile structures in the African state, and a series of structural obstacles. These circumstances have not allowed the new societies to create the necessary mechanisms so that the complex state machinery may adjust its structures and models of operation, and for the society to acquire the use of a model of co-existence that is completely different from that of colonial and pre-colonial eras.

**THE NEED FOR A GREATER INTEGRATION OF EUROPEAN EFFORTS.**

If we begin with the Europeans, we may affirm that the EU member countries dedicate significant efforts and resources towards promoting peace and stability in the African continent, both in the heart of the EU in an independent manner, or by forming part of other international organisations such as the UN and NATO. Additionally, the EU is an essential partner for Africa because it is the top aid donor, the leading investor, and the recipient of more than half of African exports.
The lack of unified actions in the area of the ESDP’s objectives in Africa by the various European agents, including the EU, significantly reduces the results of the overall effort. Many European nations, and especially France and Great Britain, have a permanent, first-rate diplomatic and military presence there. Others, such as the Netherlands, Germany, Portugal or Denmark, continue to strengthen their role in Africa. As a result of the initiative of this last country, the Scandinavian nations are also in the process of consolidating an important cooperation commitment in the sub-regional organisations of the IGAD.

All of these coordinated efforts, which are especially integrated—coordination is a necessary and not very ambitious activity, that sometimes does not go beyond being a declaration of good intentions—and aimed at a common goal, would result in a very important synergy towards the objectives proposed by the ESDP. In fact, the EU Strategy for Africa, approved by the European Council in December of 2005, consists of a «global and integrated framework, focused on the long term.» for the relations between both continents. However, there is still a long distance between affirming that the framework should be integrated, and this being a reality.

Additionally, the panorama of international efforts towards Africa’s stabilisation and pacification is not limited, as is well known, to that of the ESDP and European nations. It is combined with the growing North American commitment, the omnipresent advance of China’s participation, and the increasing concurrence of other countries from a variety of regions, such as Brazil, India, Japan and Turkey. In the area of economic aid, aside from the funds dedicated by the EU in the «African Peace Facility,» the United Nations agencies, the G8, and International Financial Institutions (primarily the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), are also present.

Viewed from an African perspective, the number of parties involved is excessive and unmanageable, leads to confusing messages, uncoordinated lines of action, and could produce a false and counter-productive sense of searching for hidden interests from those that believe that if everyone participates, then there must be a feast. This may also lead to a situation where, in their relations with the countries providing aid, the African part may take advantage of the rivalry between these countries in order to obtain the best price advantages with the fewest requirements, which does not benefit the African continent at all. It is rather obvious to
affirm that achieving the ESDP’s objectives in Africa largely depends on improving the self-demanding levels of the African nations.

Given that the relation between the countries that collaborate with the African continent and the African nations themselves is unequal, and this inevitably makes the second group uncomfortable, it may result, and does in fact occur, that the non-African partners use these African sentiments in order to gain their preference at the cost of another or other partners. As a result, the countries or organisations with the weakest profiles and those that are least committed may appear to be the ones that best understand the problem and that address matters from a more constructive relation, given that what the continent needs are not kind words and diluted approaches, but rather a loyal commitment and ambitious objectives.

In this complex setting, with a large number of national and multinational initiatives, what is truly significant is that the greatest number of relevant agents in Africa is precisely that of European representatives. By simplifying the panorama of European participation, the overall panorama would be significantly improved, and a constructive model and synergy would be established in favour of a better coordination and convergence of international efforts in general.

Europe, as a large community of nations, human and cultural, and the EU as the only realistic instance from which a greater integration of European efforts towards the African continent may be fostered, have an enormous responsibility in regards to an international action that is able to obtain meaningful and tangible results for the pacification and stabilisation of the African continent. This would undoubtedly have an impact on the African continent, and on the world in general.

One of the characteristics of this day and age is the disproportion between the international efforts committed in regards to international security, the number of initiatives of all types, and the scarce performance in terms of specific results. Overlapping missions from the UN, NATO, and the EU, the presence of agents outside of these organisations, and the need for a multidisciplinary focus result in that if everything seems somewhat confusing on paper, the actual reality is rather worrisome. If this trend of dispersal is not eliminated, it will be very difficult for the world to undertake the great challenges of this era.

The complex war in Afghanistan has made popular the concept of integrating efforts of different natures (in English referred to as a «com-
prehensive approach). Integrated efforts and unified action are the two essential conditions for being able to undertake the ESDP’s objectives in Africa.

The EU and its member states are present in most international initiatives, and they carry a heavy responsibility in the world’s inability to simplify the response mechanisms. What is referred to as an integration of European efforts in the area of the ESDP in Africa is only one part and a symptom of an overall problem that is more serious. Regardless, this document aims to be a call for optimism. We must begin somewhere! Africa could be transformed from the problem to the solution.

Africa is geographically very close to the European continent, and the immediate impact of the serious African problems on the life of Europeans is just as nearby; it is not something abstract or distant. We are referring to the European insecurity for living or travelling through this continent, piracy, terrorism, organised crime, illegal trafficking. If the most idealistic motivations are not enough, at least the actual interests and the practical questions should encourage Europeans to take this matter very seriously.

Only a EU that is different from the current one, and more integrated in the subject of the ESDP, would provide real hope to Africans and Europeans regarding their ability to be a true factor for change. As Europeans, we should not congratulate ourselves so much for everything achieved, but rather remind ourselves of everything that remains to be done. Otherwise, Europe will continue to be a social and economic giant, and a political dwarf, unable (in regards to this matter) to address with guaranteed success the problems of a continent, Africa, that continues to overwhelm Europe.

Certainly the new powers and instruments granted to the ESDP by the Lisbon Treaty are an opportunity for moving in the desired direction. The recently created position of the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs holds tremendous potential, which must be made reality in the context of the natural power games between the States, in order for it to pass from paper into reality. As long as the reality of an ESDP that is significantly more integrated does not materialise, the ESDP’s general level of ambition in Africa will be nothing more than a small contribution from a large continent--Europe--without maintaining any proportion between what Europe is in reality and what it represents. Similarly, only an ESDP that is reinforced in its level of ambition and ability to materialise will have the authority to integrate, or at least effectively coordinate, the efforts of member countries in supporting the stabilisation and pacification of Africa.
A perfect example regarding the importance of the ESDP in Africa for Europe is the fight against terrorism and the multiple connections of this problem throughout the world, and especially with the expansion of the Jihad radicalism phenomenon in the Sahel. As international forces have taken action in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Al Qaeda terrorist organisation has been forced to leave these countries, finding a new home in Sub-Saharan nations. According to a Pentagon report, this is the region where Al Qaeda has recently grown the most. Additionally, according to María Amparo Tortosa Garrigós, since 2003, one of the founders of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, Al Bara, began to promote training camps beyond the southern border of Algeria, attracting fighters from neighbouring countries. This initiative, which initially emerged with the support of Al Qaeda in the Maghreb, was joined by the assignment of Al Mokhtar as the Al Qaeda representative in West Africa. Since then, the presence of Al Qaeda has grown in such a way that it is no longer appropriate to refer to it as Al Qaeda in the Maghreb, but rather in the Sahel, since the ramifications of Wahhabi influence are already established from northern Senegal to Somalia, drawing a regular line as far as the Islamic nature of these groups and their international connections.

As is known, in recent years, the EU has focused on fighting the phenomenon of Jihad radicalism in Europe, controlling the immigration phenomenon, fostering the exchange of information between its member States, improving cooperation in border control, and transferring information between Europol and Eurojust. The European Coordinator of the Antiterrorism Fight is beginning to promote a global plan in the Sahel region, which indicates that the EU is aware of the dimension that the problem is reaching, and is ready to undertake the phenomenon in the territory of the African nations in the region, and advance towards the development of a more operational framework. Implementing a European plan to fight against terrorism in the Sahel will centre the European agenda, and Spain will have a good opportunity to foster proposals in this matter during the presidency of the Union, that it will obtain in the first half of 2010.

Spain, France and Italy, to name a few of the European nations that are most involved in this matter, have made it a priority to focus the attention of their intelligence agencies towards monitoring the development of Jihad terrorism in northern Africa. Although there are mechanisms for cooperation and the exchange of information, the world of intelligence is secretive by nature, and a lot of energy, knowledge, and opportunities
for action are lost as a result of the multiple actors present in the same stage. With the current perspective, it is obvious that a greater integration of past efforts, and an ESDP that is more robust and committed to the African continent, would have made it possible to now enjoy greater security in our countries.

It is evident that the phenomenon of international terrorism may no longer be addressed from the State-nation level, and requires comprehensive strategies led by international institutions. Regardless of the effectiveness of the initiative to train and provide tactical and operational support for the the armed forces of these nations, the antiterrorism fight must also be carried out through civilian programmes as well. Pursuing these networks requires knowledge of what occurs in Asia, passing through Europe to northern Africa, and of all the connections between them.

What has been been said about terrorism may be argued similarly with regard to piracy, controlling illegal trafficking, organised crime, etc.

A key area for reaching the ESDP’s objectives in Africa is the empowerment of African capacities (Capacity Building), for which the funds of the African Peace Facility dedicate 100 million euros. It is clear that the solution for the continent’s problems should come from the hand of Africans themselves, and only those ESDP activities that reinforce this aspect are going to provide a long term solution. Additionally, these are types of efforts and projects that especially require the coordination and integration of activities, including activities for building African capacities that are developed in the African continent, as well as those that may be developed in European countries.

There are at least two realistic methods for addressing the matter of integrating European efforts related to building African capacities. The most appealing, although it still appears somewhat distant, is a greater integration of the ESDP itself, which as has already been stated, would favour many other aspects. The other model, which makes it possible to undertake the integration of European efforts in Africa, is the specialisation and distribution of activities and functions between the various European agents, both the EU as well as its member states. This would entail an effective and pragmatic way of coordinating, and would avoid the duplication of efforts in the same direction. In order to avoid the excess of purely state policies that would be generated by specialisation, there is a highly recommended procedure that is already in use by the French and the British in their African headquarters: the exchange of officers.
Through the exchange of officers, domestic missions obtain the necessary colour and credibility derived from multiple flags, without renouncing the greater efficacy of domestic organisations. It is true that if the exchange is only testimonial, then the effect does not result; but as of certain proportions (for example a third of the personnel), the exchange of officers begins to have an effect on the organisation’s nature. By carrying out these types of personnel exchange relations between all the European countries with a presence and commitment in the African continent, it would be possible to focus on a specialisation of efforts, which would avoid duplicated and wasted resources, without losing the feeling of plurality and the presence of the various European agents, while significantly improving the problem of the enormous number of speakers and the variety of messages.

The ESDP could be the ideal forum for addressing this need, promoting its implementation, and designing and coordinating its execution. Its aim should be focused on simplifying what already exists, instead of adding more initiatives. Additionally, it should not be omitted that the EU will expect from the ESDP a greater degree of coordination of European initiatives with that of other countries present, especially the United States. Only through specific events and by achieving the coordination of European States will the EU have sufficient credibility to be a coordinating agent for the other entities in the international stage.

The AU has focused a large amount of efforts towards the construction of the African Peace and Security Architecture, from the creation in 2002 of the organisation’s Peace and Security Council, with the adoption of the Declaration on Common African Policies for Defence and Security in 2005, and the creation of the «African Standby Force» (ASF), the Early Warning system and the Panel of Experts. European countries and the EU have actively supported this process. Since 2004, and until it was dissolved in the summer of 2009, SHIRBRIG also participated in this effort. The activities carried out in conjunction with ECOWAS (western sub-region) and IGAD (eastern sub-region) deserve special attention. The experience acquired during that time leads to a hopeful conclusion as a result of everything achieved to date, but there should be prudence in light of how far the AU is from reaching the established objectives. The Capacity Building activities have been key for the ASF to be able to reach the current level of development, and they will continue to be important.

The initial time frames and the designed route for implementing the ASF are unattainable. However, it must be pointed out that at least ob-
jectives for the REC have been established, and whether or not these objectives are reached, the necessary mechanisms have been put into place so that the African continent may begin to assume its responsibility in the matter. More realistic and longer time frames would have had a counter-productive effect by relaxing intentions and the need to take action. The emergency is precisely what has generated the impulse for setting the process into motion, without forgetting that the presence of the nations and international organisations, including the EU, throughout the entire process, and the yearly activities of the ASFs, have motivated African countries to live up to the enormous challenge.

It is not only the structures that must be developed, the ASFs, and the Early Warning system that experience shortages and difficulties. The AU itself lacks personnel, both in quantity and training, as well as the necessary resources for completing its functions. Of the ASFs that correspond to the five Regional Economic Communities (REC), only three –those of the south (SADC), the east (IGAD), and west (ECOWAS)– have a real existence beyond paper. The EU does not collaborate with the SADC because of the problems related to cooperating with Zimbabwe. The northern and central Regional Economic Communities have not evolved beyond being a declaration of intent.

The African Peace and Security Architecture still shows weaknesses, marked, on one hand, by its limitations as far as abilities and training –the EU, among others, has created the African Peace Facility in order to support the AU in this area, and with the launch at the end of 2008 of the «Amani Africa» series, the aim is to contribute towards training for planning and managing the crisis on a continental level– and on another hand, due to the situation of poverty and instability that many of the member countries find themselves in.

Here, it is important to highlight the growing role that is being played by the United States Africa Command, AFRICOM. In the 2007 yearly activities of the ASFs in the eastern and western regions, there was hardly a presence of North American officers, but in 2008, they had a significant presence in the role of observers, and in 2009, their presence surpassed in importance that of all the other combined non-African representatives that were there. Any EU effort for the Capacity Building of the ASFs should take into consideration this circumstance.

In summary: the main challenge to develop the ESDP in Africa is to strengthen the ESDP itself, and as this is achieved, that the EU promote
the integration and specialisation of European efforts—and as much as possible, also that of the other non-African entities that are there with similar objectives of promoting and developing peace and stability in the continent—in order to obtain the simplification, coordination, and synergy of all the European strategies that favour the ESDP in Africa.

THE IMPORTANCE OF PROMOTING WOMEN

The ESDP’s top challenge is that of promoting women. Not only for reasons related to the human rights and well being of women—which in itself is reason enough—but fundamentally for the good of the continent. It is not an exaggeration to say that the future of Africa depends in large part on its women! Women there are a top economic factor, and more importantly, they are an economic factor with a direct repercussion on social development and well-being. In general, African women are more responsible and reliable than men, and one could even add that, in the current state of the continent, the achievements of African women are admirable.

The ESDP’s objectives in Africa can only be reached in the long term by promoting the development and stability of African societies, and in order to achieve this, the role of women is fundamental. African women are the cement that holds together that society.

For a long time, commerce in Sub-Saharan Africa, with a few exceptions, has not been limited to men, and traditionally, women have been responsible for small and large businesses. This can be seen in person at large international commercial circuits, both in Africa as well as Europe. There is clearly a feminine tradition in African businesspeople. The problem lies in the fact that they lack aid. Currently, they are being negatively affected by worldwide competition, by a lack of education, and by insufficient aid structures for creating projects. Politicians and the elite focus more on consumerism and waste, rather than investments. To this, the problem of the population’s purchasing power must be added. The context of crisis (economic standstill) and the irregular salaries in several countries reduce the purchasing power index and are unfavourable towards developing women’s creative energy in economic matters, condemning them to having to «make due» in any way they can.

There is an enormous potential of work in African women, which deserves to be valued. Aside from their specialisation in creating and
managing companies, other types of training and practices should be fostered, such as accounting, using new technologies, etc. For now, the states are not very present, and only some non-profit organisations make the effort to improve the situation by granting microcredits to women. And this works. With more financial means, more technical and intellectual resources, they will, without a doubt, be able to reach the same level as men in the business world. What is certain is that they could do great things.

It has been proven that the promotion of more and better jobs for women is essential in the fight against poverty. The report titled «Decent work for the development of Africa» argues that the appearance and promotion of small businesses generates more and more significant and sustainable employment opportunities, especially for women. The creation of institutions for microfinancing (IMF) also provides a very necessary access to credit and savings, aside from traditional banking systems. However, job markets continue to be characterised by a notable segregation, and a very high number of women are restricted to jobs that very few men would undertake due to their low status and insecurity. Even in the case of similar positions, women tend to earn 20 to 30% less than men.

Aside from the economical dimension, African women are very active and have a multi-faceted role. The model in which women are confined to domestic tasks does not work in the context of Africa. Traditionally, women are in the fields or in the markets. Practically all of them are merchants, regardless of their social status. It is not uncommon to see those who work as public officials to also work as merchants in order to strengthen the family’s economy. And while they do all of this, they are also the ones who carry the weight of sustaining the family, a task in which the majority receive little support from their husbands.

Women are fundamental in the African culture. They are the ones who work, take care of the children, and contribute actively towards the needs of the community. However, in order for women to improve their role on a social and family level, it is essential for there to be significant improvements in making men aware of their responsibilities towards women and children, and in the fight against AIDS and overcoming polygamy. These three factors are closely linked, and they are the keystone in order for there to be a qualitative change in the overall situation of women in this continent.
The solution cannot come only from beyond the continent or from women themselves. African men must be the ones who take the actual step forward, renouncing polygamy, being more faithful and respectful towards their women, being responsible fathers and sharing the weight of family life with their wives. All of this is perfectly compatible with the best African traditions. Some of the worst evils that affect African women are those of the current disorder, the result of the contemporary «cock-tail» of values that the entire society is subject to, and and are completely opposite of traditional African customs and uses. In many instances, Africans have copied the vices of western societies, without assimilating their virtues. A society that brings together the best of African traditions with the real values of modernness would be an ideal place, and a society that combines the worst of each of these two worlds, as occurs in many cases, results to be a nightmare. Consider the case of the aberrations that result from the combination of polygamy, female genital mutilation, etc., inherited from African tradition, combined with sexual tourism and generalised male sexual promiscuity imported from the West!

In traditional African life—with notable differences between one region and another, one ethnicity and another—men and women distributed the responsibilities and commitments of social and family life. Although many ancient customs clash with the uses, customs and values of modern societies, those societies did not cease to have great values, an enormous sense of collective and family solidarity, and all the members of society—men, women, the elderly and children—fulfilled their role for the survival and development of the family, the town, and the ethnicity. With the significant transformations that African societies have been subject to as a result of colonisation, decolonisation, and the burdens from the Cold War, men have found themselves, to a large degree, liberated from their prior commitments and responsibilities, while women, bound to caring for their children and sustaining the family, continue to be weighed down by the past while facing the challenges of the present. This is why, for example, polygamy continues to be practised without men having to maintain and protect their multiple families in accordance with customs from the past.

While there are many Africans that consider polygamy to be something related to their culture, and thus something that should be respected, and it is justified by economic, social and sexual reasons, it is also true that in modern African societies, it is practically impossible to improve the overall living conditions of women and having them be respected by
men and society while there is a prevalence of polygamy, which in some countries continues to be rather common. For example, 32% of Ugandan women live in polygamous unions.

There also continues to be a gender inequality that undermines women’s rights to those of men in sexual relations. Many women are socially and economically dependent on men, and some are not able to say «no» to an unfaithful husband. Infidelity is a problem that reaches very alarming levels in the continent, and it has a direct effect on the scarce responsibility of many men towards their families.

Unfortunately, sexual exploitation is very widespread throughout Africa. Many women are affected by it in some way or another, and poverty is very responsible for it. Some adolescents begin having sexual relations in exchange for being able to purchase certain items or to feel accepted in activities that allow them to form part of a group of friends. There is also the case of parents that give their daughters away for marriage in order to obtain a dowry that will enable them to pay for certain family needs. It is common for unmarried or widowed women, or those who have lost their jobs, to find themselves obligated to exchange sex for money in order to buy clothing and food, or to pay for their children’s education. Male infidelity has also incited many married women, who due to a combination of spite and necessity, agree to have sexual relations in exchange for some sort of benefit.

In regards to AIDS, the problem is very well known--two thirds of the people infected with it live in Africa. A progressive increase in HIV cases among women, who represent 58% of the people affected, has been confirmed. It is worth highlighting the success obtained in Uganda with the ABC campaign, not only because of the results, but primarily because it was an African initiative without a doubt. Around 1990, the estimated prevalence of AIDS in that country reached a maximum level of 20% of the population. It is now between 6% and 7%. First of all, it relied on the courage and determination of the president, Yoweri Museveni, whose candidness in the debate about AIDS and sexual behaviour contributed to having the population understand the magnitude of the problem. Afterwards, it was decided to focus on having the population change its behaviour in order to avoid the risk, instead of simply reducing it. The message about the change in behaviour was very clear and practical: A (abstain), B (be faithful) and, if you do otherwise, C (use a condom). The fact is that the ABC campaign resulted in a change of behaviour: sexually active people decided to be faithful to a single partner, and oth-
ers agreed to delay starting sexual relations. According to the report titled «Uganda’s Demographic and Health Survey 2000-2004», 93% of Ugandans changed their sexual behaviour in order to avoid AIDS.

The ABC campaign created a benefit for African society that transcended AIDS and benefited the overall living conditions for women, families, and as a result, society as well. Without being faithful, it is very difficult for African men to have a responsible attitude towards their wives, and without the change of mentality and behaviour on behalf of men, any policy for the promotion of women is an illusion.

It is important to highlight that policies for the empowerment of women in Africa should be implemented by Africans themselves, because if the message is conveyed by Europeans, it could create a feeling that something foreign is being imposed on them, and the danger always exists of a damaging attitude from typical Western arrogance. Action should be taken by providing the necessary support and considering that the majority of educated Africans share the beliefs pointed out here and are fully aware of the benefits.

Thus, African women are a very important human capital that must be promoted and taken into consideration. In order to carry out its objectives, the ESDP must have trained African speakers, as we will see in later sections. Women are a capital that should play a relevant role in this area, because the virtues of African women are largely the key that the continent needs in order to emerge from the serious lag it experiences and to resolve its urgent security problems.

In summary: Female human capital is calling out to play a key role in Africa’s future. The promotion of African women and the aftermath, making African men more aware so that they are more fair, equal, and responsible with their women and daughters, as well as fostering a change in sexual conduct, should be an essential element for promoting the ESDP’s objectives in Africa.

THE FACT THAT MANY AFRICANS HAVE LOST FAITH IN THEIR LEADERS

One of the most serious problems affecting the modernisation and stabilisation of Africa is intrinsic to the continent’s circumstances. It is derived from the fact that Africans have lost, to a great degree, faith in their
leaders, and they have concluded that little can be expected from those who hold positions of responsibility. Unfortunately, it is a generalised belief that African leaders, once they are in power, are far too concerned with their own ambitions and not enough with their responsibilities. The statement: «African leaders only think about their own stomachs,» is commonly used and reflects this belief.

The important aspect of this matter is not only the reality of the problem and the resulting consequences from a lack of commitment that may exist in the African elite, but the perception of Africans about this, which is equally important. Distrust towards their leaders results in that the middle and educated classes, those that must carry the weight of the continent’s development, show strong individualism, ignoring the large inheritance of solidarity and collective feeling that belongs to ancient African culture. This is the case because they have lost hope that together, Africans are able to carry out a large collective project, because they think that those who reach positions of power take ownership of a large portion of the resources for their own benefit, and forget the ideals that drove them to strive for the best for the African continent. The lack of trust is like a dog chasing its tail—without trust, collective action does not occur, and in an environment of exacerbated individualism, trust is lost.

It is important for the initiatives carried out by the EU regarding the ESDP in Africa to avoid having their logic and resources contribute towards increasing the African population’s distrust of its leaders. It is ideal for these projects to be aimed at a wide array of beneficiaries, and focused on different sectors other than where leaders flaunt power. This approach is advisable because of reasons related to the African population’s perception, as well as for the better use of resources.

This focus has its difficulties, precisely because the natural flow for the ESDP’s development in this continent is through legitimate representatives, and without a doubt, it should continue this way. However, there are creative formulas so that, with the agreement of the leaders themselves, and based on the benefit for African societies, it is possible to move in the desired direction. To a certain degree, this is already being done in many initiatives aimed at promoting peace and stability in the African continent.

In summary: the ESDP’s activities in Africa should take into consideration the serious problem of Africans’ distrust of their leaders, so as to not aggravate this situation and to improve it as much as possible, and it must be avoided to focus efforts on the leadership structures.
THE DIFFICULTY IN TRANSFORMING DIALOGUE AND THE AGREEMENTS REACHED INTO A PRACTICAL REALITY

Another cooperation lesson learned regarding security and foreign policy in the African continent is the difficulty in transforming discussions and the agreements reached into a practical reality. Africans are very aware of their continent’s reality, and they have a fairly clear image of the world abroad as well as the enormous development that the most advanced societies have achieved. It doesn’t make much sense to waste time and money reflecting repeatedly on this reality. Africa’s problem is not derived from not understanding what the continent needs for its development. Instead, it resides in the difficulty in carrying out the measures that are recognised to be necessary.

The only thing that makes real sense speculatively is to reflect on the formulas that are successful and the ones that are not, and the discussion of how to adapt the circumstances of the continent and of each specific African society to the projects that are currently on the table. The large conferences, the declarations of intent, the exchange of information at a high level, the design of coherent strategies, etc., all of these types of activities between developed nations are sometimes useless, other times lead to limited results, and in some cases they are the starting point for important initiatives; but in most instances in Africa, they are a resounding failure. Africans themselves are aware of this, but their sense of hospitality and cordiality leads them to kindly welcome and show interest in those who wish to maintain this focus. All of this, assuming that the non-African part covers all of the costs.

It has been repeatedly confirmed that after analysing any of the problems in question, proposing a solution, creating a plan of action and finding the resources for completing that project, in the majority of cases, the subsequent reality does not meet expectations, at least, if these expectations are evaluated with the criteria that would be used to judge the more developed world. The key is not in understanding the problem or in the plan’s coherence. What is truly the determining factor is breaking the barrier of intent and moving on to action.

Taking action refers not only to immediate action, but also fundamentally an action that is sustainable and provides continuity for present efforts. The success of the sustainability and continuity of a cooperation activity or project on behalf of a foreign agent depends largely on how
it is accepted by the recipients, and their participation and progressive involvement in the activity. Otherwise, regardless of the project’s excellence, when the foreign agent is no longer present, the work completed will dissolve by itself. This reality has occurred in so many instances, that it is important to be very aware of this.

As a result, it is deduced that any ESDP project in Africa should have an eminently practical focus from the beginning, and it should be designed so that it may be evaluated in terms of quantifiable benefits. When implementing these projects, the goal is to have the participation of the actual beneficiaries, in other words, the Africans, and to maintain a proactive and continuous attitude. It is essential for the projects undertaken to be sustainable, as well as for the progressive transfer of ownership from the Europeans to the Africans, without creating gaps.

It is much easier to say this than to actually do it. Only people and organisations that are experienced and knowledgeable of the African continent are able to decipher this and carry it out effectively.

In summary: The ESDP’s activities in Africa should have a very practical focus from the beginning, based on real African experiences and fully avoiding large declarations and endless forums of reflection.

THE DIFFERENT CONCEPT THAT AFRICANS HAVE ABOUT THE USE OF TIME

A Rwandan colonel stated, with complete confidence and naturalness, that «stress does not exist in Africa.» This is, without a doubt, good news for the health of Africans, but very bad news for the continent’s progress. Stress also did not exist in the life of Europeans before the 20th century. The degree of stress has increased in the Western world as the 20th century progressed along with the generalised industrialisation and «technification» of productive activities, and their growing impact on everyday life. It is easy to recognise that stress is the result of an acceleration of human activities in the most developed societies, and it is equally evident that this stress is a necessary condition for attaining the required dynamism that is essential for modernisation. Without stress, there is no progress!

There is no doubt that it is impossible to avoid stress, and as the African continent is modernised, stress will also appear. However, when
cooperating with the African society, the different perspectives of both worlds regarding the use of time and the concept of urgency must be taken into consideration. It cannot be expected for Africans to change their everyday pace, from the continent’s calm life to the Western frenzy. When cooperating with African partners, strong doses of patience, respect, and understanding are necessary, but it is also important to convey the clear message about the importance of the rational use of time and to foster a dynamic and entrepreneurial attitude. Results in short periods of time should not be expected, and instead, they should be adapted to the African pace of life.

A clear indicator that the ESDP’s activities in Africa obtain results is precisely that they be able to change the attitudes of African speakers regarding the use of time and the importance of life pressures. Similarly, in order to evaluate whether a project is able to be successful or not, it is necessary to evaluate the dynamism of the specific African society when it is implemented.

The project’s degree of ambition or the type of activity to be carried out for promoting the ESDP in Africa will largely be determined by the level of dynamism in the African societies it is aimed at. This is very different from one country to another, and within a same country, between certain segments of African society. To make an error in this area is to place the entire effort at risk.

This is an equally important criteria in selecting the people to work with.

In summary: The ESDP’s efforts in Africa must also take into consideration the large differences that exist between Europe and Africa regarding the use of time, stress, and haste, without being a victim of this and promoting as much as possible a more dynamic and rational attitude in the use of time.

**THE SMALL AMOUNT OF FOCUS ON THE MID AND LONG TERM BY AFRICAN CULTURES, AND THE SUBSEQUENT LACK OF PREDISPOSITION FOR PLANNING**

Another characteristic of African temperament, very related to the previous item, that contrasts with that of its northern neighbours and is crucial for the development and modernisation of societies, is the Afri-
can sense of short term compared to the western culture, which is much more inclined to focus on the mid and long term.

It is common to link the culture of foresightedness with nature’s pace, in such a way that harsh winters result in humans that are more disciplined and have a sense of long term planning that is more developed. On the other hand, in places with a tropical climate, where nature is continuously blooming and as a result, offers humans resources as they are needed, societies tend to live more focused on the present. This is paradoxical, since nature’s generosity and exuberance discourages a society’s desire for transformation, a concept that is closely tied to the psychological projection towards the future.

Changing these life attitudes, which ultimately take over the cultural personality of societies that live in warm climates, is much more difficult than what it may appear. Although it is not difficult to understand its logic and practical benefit, the attitude of foresightedness and planning is acquired primarily through use and habit, in such a way that what allows a person to relax is knowing that everything that should have been done beforehand has been completed. On the other hand, where there is a prevalence of life attitudes that are tied to the present, what brings people out of the state of relaxation and drives them to take action is the stimulus of need. A lot of willpower is necessary in order to modify these short-term logics when the opposite attitudes have not been acquired naturally.

In all of the ESDP’s activities in Africa, it is advisable to place great emphasis on the planning and the discipline necessary for integrating mid and long term aspects into routines. As a result, the European partner must not systematically assume the planning function, as tends to happen, and instead, it is recommended to work as a team and make the necessary effort in order for the African participants to be properly prepared and trained in matters related to planning.

When comparing the professional abilities of European and African officials, it is surprising that with similar educations and levels of responsibilities, the major difference resides in the experience and professional ability to carry out planning activities. Comparatively, African officials have significantly less experience, training and disposition for the specific planning activities, a phenomenon that becomes more apparent with longer term activities. It is necessary to insist that this is not a problem of understanding, nor is it an abstract problem; it is essentially a matter
of motivation. The lack of motivation leads to less practice, and a lack of practice leads to less professional preparedness.

In order to foster this ability, it is much more productive for African personnel to join and participate in European training activities and upper management and general staff work, than for Europeans to attempt to instil that mentality in Africans and provide them with the necessary training in Africa, because the mentality in the mid and long term and the planning work are not sufficient with simply being understood; they should be experienced in a context where planning and action are also coherent.

In summary: one of the greatest contributions that the ESDP’s projects and activities may provide Africa is to foster a culture of planning and a vision of the mid and long term. The possibilities in this field are enormous.

THE POOR MANAGEMENT OF BUDGETS GRANTED TO AFRICAN ORGANISATIONS DUE TO A LACK OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT TRAINING FOR THE AFRICAN PERSONNEL RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS MATTER

A specific case of the previously mentioned problem, which has a peculiar and distinctive characteristic that is important, is the matter of financial management. All of the ESDP’s activities in Africa are logically associated to a budget, and in many cases, this budget is generated by European funds and administered by personnel from the African organisations. One of the obstacles in making good use of these financial resources is the poor administration of the budgets.

It is also known that there have been numerous irregularities in the management of funds donated by the AU and the RECs, some due to a lack of technical knowledge, others from the desire to simultaneously resolve other problems, without omitting the possibility of some cases of corruption, and in general, an abusive trend in distributing money in a «per diem» manner, which does not contribute at all to achieving the objectives marked by the ESDP. In fact, the phenomenon has appeared in which money that is easily obtained is also spent with even more ease. This must be corrected, because it creates counter-productive effects.

Very strong efforts are made in order to provide significant quantities to African organisations, and so a logical solution would be for the
necessary efforts to also be made so that the people who will manage and carry out the advance planning be adequately selected and receive the necessary training, with the implementation of rigorous control procedures.

In summary: training the African personnel responsible for planning and managing the EU budgets made available to the African organisations and their rigorous control should be priority items for the ESDP in Africa.

THE LACK OF THE CRITICAL MASS OF QUALIFIED PERSONNEL NECESSARY FOR UNDERTAKING THE COUNTLESS CHALLENGES OF MODERNNESS

One of the characteristics of the African continent’s recent history since the start of decolonisation has been a lack of qualified professionals to undertake the enormous tasks that await the new states. This problem, although obviously to a lesser degree, continues to occur, while the AU leads the project for providing the continent with an autonomous capacity to address its problems related to security.

As a result, Africa unfortunately lacks the critical mass of professionals necessary to face the challenges of modernness. The demand for personnel with adequate education and training grows faster than the availability of personnel. The objectives set, the structures created and the process itself would be correct if African countries had enough qualified and motivated personnel for addressing its own needs and those of the multinational African organisations.

Although it may not be initially apparent, the aspect of motivation is even more important than that of preparation, because due to the reduced salaries and the tight living conditions for most professionals who work for the African states, these sometimes lack incentives for carrying out their professional activities.

On another hand, those individuals who are able to take the leap and obtain a job working for the multinational African organisations, subsidised from abroad, or with the international organisations that collaborate in the autonomous African skills development projects, obtain salaries and living conditions that are so much better than those of others, that the individuals who do not obtain these advantages are very unmo-
tivated. Obtaining a position in these organisations is much more than a professional aspiration; it is an objective with an important financial component and a certain degree of privilege.

There are serious problems associated to this circumstance, such as the fact that the selection process of the personnel is not always the most appropriate, and the qualification criteria do not carry the appropriate weight.

This problem is not easily resolved, but it is important that it be taken into consideration when designing policies in the heart of the ESDP for adequately measuring the levels of ambition, as well as making efforts to diminish, even in part, this important weakness.

There is no doubt that the various initiatives for personnel training that are being carried out by the various agents concerned with this problem are a reason for hope, but it is also true that the result of all of these efforts will be seen in the mid to long term. However, there are urgent needs for qualified personnel in the short term, given that the process for developing African abilities is in progress, and many current efforts are fruitless precisely because of the lack of a prepared entity for making an effective use of the material and intellectual resources that are made available.

In summary: in the design of its policies for Africa, the ESDP should take into consideration that this continent lacks the critical mass of conveniently prepared and motivated professionals for covering all of its modernisation needs. As a result, the objectives should be more limited and the activities should be adapted to a reality in which the projects and activities have a scarce degree of performance in relation to the effort that is dedicated.

**THE GREATEST DIFFICULTY IS BUILDING EFFECTIVE MULTINATIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE AFRICAN CONTINENT**

In general, the multinational structures, whether they are European (such as the European Union), Western (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation), or global (such as the United Nations), always have a lower degree of effectiveness and efficiency than those of state organisations. For several reasons, and fundamentally due to the transfer of personnel to foreign countries, multinational structures require greater expenditures for the same results, duplicated structures appear that are similar to those
that already exist in the countries, the integration of various professional cultures leads to difficulties in coordination, the bonds of loyalty between the members of a multinational organisation are more lax than between compatriots, from which disciplinary problems in military structures and those of a weaker union and sense of service in general are derived.

This problem is more apparent in multinational organisations that give life to the African Peace and Security Architecture, such as the African Union, the RECs and the ASFs, due to the weaker economic solidity of the nations in this continent, the heterogeneity of regional organisations and their institutional weakness, the complexity of the conflicts faced by some of these countries, and the previously mentioned lack of a critical mass of professionals to supply these organisations. If to this we add that the multinational African organisations that we refer to are of recent creation, then we find ourselves in a complex setting with enormous difficulties for the correct development and for meeting the established deadlines of its implementation.

In summary: the ESDP, in promoting the development of the African Peace and Security Architecture, should take into consideration the structural problems faced by the multinational African organisations for the correct operation.

**IMPROVING THE SELECTION OF AFRICAN PERSONNEL THAT THE ESDP’S ACTIVITIES ARE AIMED AT, AND THOSE WHO WILL ACT AS SPEAKERS**

A challenge that is strongly tied to the previous points, and which is key for successfully reaching the ESDP’s objectives in Africa, is to improve the selection of personnel in the African continent who are involved in the activities and projects promoted or subsidised by the ESDP.

Frequently, one may find African personnel in multinational headquarters that have been sent by African nations and do not have adequate skills or training, although this obviously varies from one country to another. For example, Kenya, where the EASBRICOM (one of the IGAD military structures) headquarters are located, selects officials that are prepared and competent for covering the corresponding positions. However, countries that are less committed to these headquarters do not do the same. Nations that contribute funds to sustain EABRICOM’s activities place a great emphasis for the personnel destined there to have ad-
equate professional qualifications. Despite certain improvements, there have been little results so far.

The fact that some of the personnel are not appropriately selected has a double negative consequence: the personnel in question do not perform their work, and they overload the better qualified personnel. In some cases, and due to excessive proportions between those that are not qualified and qualified, competent professionals find themselves so overwhelmed with responsibilities and work that they are hardly able to complete their own tasks. Beyond certain tolerable limits, a certain proportion of inadequate personnel cancels out the effectiveness of an entire team of professionals.

Aside from the selection process, in some cases of personnel deficiency, in general, personnel remain at their destination for a period of time that is too short—two years and sometimes less. Given the initial phase in the development process of all these structures and the problems previously described, it is advisable for personnel with good professional qualifications to remain longer, and for continuance criteria in the multinational African organisations to be tied to professional performance. If this were obtained, professionalism at work would be stimulated, countries would be required to make a better selection of their personnel, and African skills, which are key to the ESDP’s success in Africa, would be significantly improved.

Although these policies may not be imposed, with a serious and consolidated cooperation, it would be possible to make significant progress, especially if the ESDP acts as a consolidator of all the agents present that contribute towards subsidising these activities. If a global agreement does not exist regarding this matter, the chain will always break at the weakest link.

A similar criteria must be used in activities related to educational courses and training exercises. In order to participate in these exercises of subsidised funds, adequate training should be previously accredited. The educational courses should require reaching the necessary levels of knowledge, and not just participation. In this way, the economic benefit derived from participating in an exercise, which in African terms is very significant, would always be conditioned by rigour, professional ability and effort.

Additionally, the current development status of African abilities and their structures require this focus. As has been previously stated, it is necessary to know how to assess all of the progress that has been made,
but the time has come, by making the most of the milestones achieved, for Africans to assume greater responsibilities and to be the real drivers of the process. This is not possible without taking advantage of the continent’s adequate human resources, despite there being less than what is desired, and without eliminating the policies of distributing resources that seem to fall from the sky (in other words, which have been obtained through little effort on behalf of the beneficiary and with few requirements on behalf of the donor).

In summary: the ESDP’s success in Africa depends largely on having the African countries make an adequate selection of the personnel for the activities and projects in which the ESDP is involved. Without linking the ESDP’s subsidies and efforts to a rigorous policy for the use of human resources, the capital and employee efforts run the risk of being useless.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTEGRATED PROJECTS BETWEEN THE EU AND THE AU IN ORDER TO ADDRESS PROBLEMS OF COMMON INTEREST

In summary, there are various problems related to security, piracy, Jihad terrorism, uncontrolled immigration, organised crime associated to this activity, the security of sea traffic and of energy resources, in which there is a clear convergence of interests between the ESDP and those of the AU and its members. Here, an enormous field of action is available for integrating efforts, from which a dual benefit is derived: the convergence of efforts for resolving important problems, which is and should be the primary objective of the ESDP in Africa, and a good opportunity for developing African abilities, given that the function ultimately creates the organisation, which will contribute towards reaching the ESDP’s objectives in the long term.

This is probably the greatest challenge faced by the ESDP in Africa, but it is also a great opportunity, because by undertaking these matters, it is possible to address all of the previous challenges. Since it also consists of a series of matters of common interest, it is possible to establish a relationship framework that is more balanced and convenient for the African part.

The ESDP faces many challenges in Africa, a continent that is calling out to play a key role in areas such as security, stability, natural resources, population movements, etc. Never again should the world forget Af-
Africa, or not react until the seriousness of the problems pour out beyond the continent itself. It is very apparent that the continent’s development is universally good, especially for Europe, the northern neighbour and the continent that until a few generations ago, held the reins of history. Africa must now take control of its own future, but for this to occur, it still needs some support from abroad—aid and cooperation that should be focused on having Africans be the protagonists of the regeneration process.
CHAPTER SIX

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM, A EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE FOREIGN POLICY TOOL FOR AFRICA
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM. THEORY OF A STABILISATION TOOL

Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to make the reader aware of an experience that may be considered pioneer in the EU’s ESDP policy, from what I consider to be a realistic perspective of someone that has had the privilege of directly participating in the project. It is not just a simple account of more than twenty months of work, but rather an attempt to display, always with an intent of critique and even of constructive self-criticism, the differences between the manual and the field, between the plans and reality. Like any human work, SSR is a perfectible project, which is why it is important to extract the corresponding lessons to be learned so that future actions in the area of SSR may benefit from this experience and avoid making the same errors.

Perhaps there are excessive details about the mission’s life and of Guinea-Bissau, but it would difficult to understand the problems and the development of the reform process in this country without understanding the social political environment.

Generalisations about Security Sector Reform

Two large trends group the academics and experts of development—those who believe that development appears after stability, and those who defend the opposite, that stability appears after development. It is possible that everyone is correct and that both theories are true, and there are examples of each in every continent and era, but the matter that
should be analysed is: Which of the two has a lower cost in terms of time and resources? This is where the reasons are possibly not as balanced, and it is the author’s belief that the scale leans towards first obtaining stability, in order to quickly give way to human and social development in an effective and sustainable manner, resulting to be more profitable. Examples such as Botswana and the Mauritius Islands could be used as a reference, since the success is evident through the long term establishment of the «virtuous circle» of creating democratic stability that attracts and reinforces economic growth, which in turn promotes the previous stability.

Africa is an immense, complex and heterogeneous continent, where applying standards of conduct and laboratory solutions or those that have been imported inevitably lead to failure. Focusing on what has been historically known as Black Africa, now called Sub-Saharan Africa, it may be assumed that the rushed decolonisation that was forced by the East-West clash that resulted from the Cold War, which in most cases led to authoritarian communist or single-party regimes, upset the weak foundations of the States that were entering the world of independence. In most cases, the Institutions of Authority (Armed Forces, Security Forces and the Justice System) that should have consolidated the new States became their biggest problem with systematic human rights abuses, comfortably settled on a rampant impunity and weakening to unsuspecting extremes the State’s ability to fulfil its internal and external institutional obligations. This occurred with the consent of a first world that was interested, in a way, in maintaining weak States and a permanent crisis that favoured low cost access to the great natural wealth held by this part of the world, and was also somewhat voluntarily isolated from the problem by feeling condemned from their colonial past.

In most cases, the concept of «democracy» only appeared in the name of nations, and in fact, the inclusion of «democratic» made one suspect that the nation was precisely the polar opposite of its title. The half century that has passed since the first independences until today has been marked by small, medium, and large scale conflicts (the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, formerly Zaire, is considered to be the First Great War of Africa and involved nine countries). These conflicts, which have been influenced by ethnic, territorial and economic problems, with the influence of bloody and cruel civil conflicts, have created an unstable situation that has finally attracted the attention of the First World in light of the negative consequences that this instability has
generated for it. Uncontrolled immigration towards Europe, legal insecurity for companies of a globalised world that attempt to operate in this region, the exploitation of a lack of control in failed states on behalf of organised crime networks, especially narcotics traffic and other threats, as well as a decreased traditional rejection and mistrust of the ancient metropolises, have resulted in an international mobilisation of resources and actions searching for the solution to the problem at its source. The Spanish Africa Plan, despite having followed other international actions, could be considered an example of this initiative.

The common factor of post-conflict situations and of the countries affected by the «Failed State Syndrome,» in other words, the disappearance of a legitimate authority or the ability to exercise it, is the dominating need for creating new Armed Forces and for re-organising, re-training, and strengthening Police Forces in such a way that they cease to be the source of the conflict and become a basic pillar for the State’s consolidation. These actions, which have been executed by even the most advanced and stable nations throughout their history, are known as Security Sector Reform, or as the OECD now proposes, Security System Reform. In any case, SSR should not be viewed only as an effort to demilitarise society, reducing the sizes of the police and armed forces, but fundamentally as a change in the relations between armed institutions and the political power, establishing its clear democratic control over the security sector.

The big difference between reforms carried out in stable countries and those in failed states or those that are emerging from a conflict, is that the first group carries them out on their own, and the second group invariably needs foreign assistance for assuming not only the financial costs of the reform, but also, and probably with greater urgency, the political costs.

There are several possible definitions of SSR, but I believe that the one proposed by the OECD in its SSR manual (OECD/DAC 2001, pp. II-35) may be used as an example:

Security sector reform is the transformation of the security system – which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – in such a way that they are managed and executed in a manner that is consistent with democratic norms, following the principles of good governance, and contributing towards the correct operation of the combined security forces. With security forces that are
responsible and held accountable, the risk of conflict is reduced, security is provided to the population, and an adequate environment is created for sustainable development. The overall objective of security sector reform is to contribute towards a secure social environment that will lead to its development.

**Principles and characteristics**

Security Sector Reform has four aspects to take into consideration: Political, economic, social and institutional (Brozska 2000, Wulf 2000). They should all be considered, and neglecting any of them will result in the project’s failure.

The political aspect consists of having the political power obtain a real and efficient control of the police and armed forces, including society’s real ability to discuss priorities of the matters related to security, and the control of the forces that should serve the country and its citizens.

The economic aspect should aim to find a balance between the financial and human resources needs destined towards security, with the State’s real ability to sustain them. It should be avoided to fall into the temptation of reducing this support to such an extreme that leads to inefficiency, resulting in a lack of protection for society.

The social aspect is the true guarantee for the population’s security, both in terms of foreign security, normally provided by the armed forces, as well as of their own lives, liberty or health, which falls under the responsibility of security forces (police, civil protection, fire-fighters, etc.).

The institutional aspect is fundamental for clearly establishing the responsibilities and limits of action between the various security entities. The different forces can only be effective and accountable for their actions if their missions and fields of action are perfectly defined. The existence of overlapping responsibilities between the actions of internal security and those of defence exponentially increase the threat of having the armed forces intervene in internal matters. Security should not be an excuse for militarising police forces or to accept, under normal circumstances, internal security functions by the armed forces.

Thus, the reform directly affects the armed forces, police forces (including the coast guard and border control), State intelligence services, and when applicable, armed militias. However, other actors should not be
forgotten, whether they are directly or indirectly related to security, such as the legislative power, the Ministries of Defence, Interior, Justice and Foreign Affairs, the Presidency itself, and those responsible for budgetary and economic management, such as the Ministry of the Economy, the Accounts Tribune, etc.

Other institutions tied to security should also be included, such as the Penitentiary, Customs, and any other uniformed public services.

In some cases, especially those in an immediate post-conflict situation, the following are important actors: the liberation armies, militias, guerilla forces in their military and political aspects (if applicable), and even private security companies.

Is any environment favourable for carrying out a security sector reform? Evidently, the answer is no. The possibilities of success are directly proportional to length of time since the origin conflict, if there has been one, as well as the Government’s capacity of residual control over its security forces. Nations in a more or less declared war, and those that are referred to as «failed countries,» are impossible scenarios for a reform with the same guarantee of success. However, nations that peacefully emerge from authoritarian regimes or those that reach social agreements for overcoming their internal conflicts are potentially suitable for reaching the planned objectives in the security sector reform process.

By definition, the Security Sector Reform is a voluntary act, or one that is accepted, by the nation that sets it into motion, with a clear and direct involvement of its society. Limited progress is possible in security sector reform without a parallel society transformation process, and vice versa--it is difficult to advance in a society’s reform without an adequate security sector reform. This wilfulness in the project is not incompatible with the participation of international organisations or bilateral projects from other nations. However, the presence of external actors in supporting the reform may never omit the most basic principle in the process: its ownership on behalf of the national authorities and the society represented (Local Ownership).

Historically, there have been examples of State reforms imposed by armed forces or as a result of military defeats, such as the events in Germany and Japan after their defeat in World War II. These should be considered more of a state reconstruction rather than a security sector reform, although it is evident that the second item was an essential ele-
ment for achieving the first one. Today, we may also consider specific cases, such as those in which the international presence strongly mentors the development of basic State institutions, such as in Bosnia Herzegovina, or more clearly, in Kosovo. Additionally, the reasons for which a country undertakes the SSR process are extremely varied, and can range from budgetary adjustment needs that aim to reduce military and security expenses, to the political evolution from a single party situation towards a multi-party system, or transitions from military regimes towards democracies, finally reaching those that upon being integrated in supranational security organisations, must adjust to them or take advantage of the increased security provided in order to adjust their police and armed forces to the new situation.

As a summary of this section, it can be said that the Security Sector Reform process is a project that is specific to the country carrying it out, and in very few exceptions does it allow for generic solutions to be applied without their correct adaptation to the environment and its specific circumstances.

Difficulties and risks

As has just been stated, security sector reform has a customised fit for each country that undertakes it, the difficulties and risks are primarily the common denominator in most cases, although it is also true that some difficulties are specific and result from the special circumstances of each process and the country where they are carried out. In any case, the existence of a plan that has been previously prepared by the country, with or without international assistance, that is widely accepted by the political range and is sufficiently established and accepted by society, is a sine qua non condition for being able to undertake such a complex and delicate project as that of security sector reform. It cannot be forgotten that the pillars of the State are going to be affected, and so there is a serious risk of breaking a delicate balance in most cases.

Although it is possible for nations to undertake these reforms on their own (and in fact, as mentioned earlier, developed nations have done so in some way or another throughout their history), the objective of this document is to analyse this process in those countries that need foreign assistance, normally due to a lack of economic capacity, and in most cases, accompanied by a lack of technical ability.
The main difficulty is normally to establish the limit between «local ownership» and the intervention capacity of international organisations or bilateral collaborations. It is very common for the lack of technical ability on behalf of the organisations to be reformed to prompt foreign advisors to impose certain solutions that are passively accepted by local authorities but are condemned to failure, even in the short term, due to a lack of adaptation to the environment, and especially because of scarce local enthusiasm towards measures that originate outside of their decision capacity. Sadly, an expectant attitude on behalf of foreign technicians who await local initiatives also has devastating effects on the process, because with time, this creates what is called «donor fatigue,» given that the lack of visible results systematically discourages the international institutions and the nations that provide their bilateral support.

Many times we face praetorian situations that are more or less disguised. In other words, with military institutions or militarised police that exercise inappropriate influence on the civil powers, who subject their decisions to a prior or tacit agreement with military authorities. This circumstance tends to be linked to the existence of undisciplined armed forces that maintain society in a permanent state of alarm. One must also not forget the fact that this circumstance of abuse of power on behalf of military institution tends to be taken advantage of by the politicians themselves, who attempt to use military influence for their own benefit or that of their party through promises or benefits that end up being a burden for the state. As a result, the solution does not consist only of obtaining new and modern armed forces that are subject to civil power. In most cases, it is necessary to improve the government’s professionalism and capacity so that it is able to control and effectively lead the police and armed forces that report to the legally established power.

It is also not uncommon to find conflicts between the international organisations, the non-profit organisations, and the diplomatic representations of the countries that bilaterally support the host nation. These «Turf Wars,» as they are known in the international setting, are especially damaging to projects that require a high degree of collaboration and coordination. This problem does not have a simple solution, but a clear and accepted mechanism for coordinated governance by the country receiving aid would avoid many of the existing problems.
GUINEA-BISSAU, THE REALITY OF THE APPLICATION OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

The creation of the EUSSR Guinea-Bissau mission

Guinea-Bissau is a small African country with 1.5 million residents, approximately the size of Belgium, located on the western coast of Africa between Senegal and Guinea-Conakry. It obtained its independence after a long and hard war (1961-1974) against Portugal, the colonising power. The independence led to a single party, pro-communist regime that automatically integrated all the former militants from the liberation war, who had dominated the ins and outs of power for twenty years, until 1994, when it opened up to a multi-party system, commencing a timid path towards the democratisation of the political system. However, the asphyxiating presence of the former militants from the liberation war in all of the country’s administrative and bodies of authority, who did not always have adequate technical and/or political training for the position they held, and with a power recognised in the Constitution and Laws subsequently written in the heat of Independence, granting them rights and benefits that were impossible to fulfil by a State with limited financial resources, has become one of the characteristics that affect not only the nation’s political life, but also the efforts to reform the police and armed forces, as will be seen further on.

This timid, multi-party system democratisation process was abruptly affected by the civil war that began on June 7, 1998, and lasted eleven months, deeply affecting the country’s scarce infrastructures, and more seriously, the relations between the various political currents and the cohesion of the police and armed forces, divided between the two clashing factions. President Bernardo (Nino) Vieira, who had governed the nation with an iron fist during twenty years, ceded his power to the military junta that won the conflict and was exiled to Portugal.

The stormy term of office of the president-elect following the civil war, Kumba Yala, ended with another military coup by the armed forces, leading to new elections in 2005. Against all odds and with the support of the armed forces who made possible his return from exile, these were won by the former president, Bernardo Vieira, who announced a national reconciliation policy and began the preliminary work, the foundation for the future reform, with the preparation in 2006 of a document in which the National Strategy for Security Sector Reform was defined. This docu-
ment was written by a team of Guinean technicians and politicians with the support of British experts. It was presented at the Geneva Round Table in November of 2006, and despite not obtaining a response in terms of economic resources, it made the international community aware of the country’s incipient reform process.

Throughout the mission’s work, this document has been defined by all of those who have worked with it as an excellent paper that includes a good analysis of the country’s situation, the structural problems, and most importantly, designs solutions of which the majority are perfectly adapted to the Guinean reality. The document, considered to be the «Bible of Reform in Guinea-Bissau,» defines the reform’s managing bodies, which are designed on three levels:

- The technical work level in the Technical Coordination Committee, where all of the sectors involved in the reform are represented. On this level, the mission advisors will work directly with local technicians in the various sectors. This committee has a Permanent Secretariat, an authentic working body for the reform.

- The steering level in the Steering Committee, presided by the Minister of Defence, where the three sectors as well as the ministry of Former Militants (now part of the Defence Ministry) are represented on a minister level, and the remaining ministries, as well as the entire international community that directly or indirectly works on or supports the reform, are represented on a technical level.

- The Head of Mission is integrated at this level, with the right to speak and vote in the committee. The executive level in the Inter-Ministry Committee, which is presided by the President and brings together all of the ministers involved in the reform, including the Minister of Finance.

It was during the Portuguese presidency of the European Council, in the second half of 2007, when the possibility is envisioned of commencing an action in Guinea-Bissau as part of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), in such a way that the objectives stated in the document prepared about security sector reform strategies may result in specific plans. This initiative by the Portuguese Presidency was backed by Spain (due to the growing immigration problems towards the Canary Islands, originating from Western Africa), as well as France and Great Britain (both nations have interests in the region). Another influence in the mission’s start-up was the suspicion, which was relatively exaggerated by journalistic articles that were not excessively rigorous but received ex-
tensive circulation and media impact, that the country was being used by Colombian drug trafficking networks as a logistical platform for bringing cocaine into Europe due to the complete incapacity of the Guinea-Bissau authorities (also secretly accused of being involved in the matter) to control the territory, and the proven judicial and police inabilities, mined by rampant impunity and a total lack of resources and training in order to face the threat of organised crime networks.

On January 10, 2008, President Bernardo Vieira signs a letter to the High Representative / General Secretary of the European Council, Dr. Javier Solana, inviting the European Union to establish and deploy a civil mission as part of the ESDP, with the aim of supporting the reform process.

On February 12 of that same year, the European Council adopts the Joint Action 2008/112/CFSP (JA), creating the EUSSR Guinea-Bissau mission with the aim of immediately deploying the mission in the region (it was initially planned for the beginning of March), and a term of office until May 31, 2009. Three months of preparatory work, that included the writing of the Operations Plan (OPLAN) by the Head of Mission (HoM), who would present it for approval before the Political and Security Committee (PSC or COPS) in a period of a month, followed by twelve months of executing the already approved OPLAN.

This term covered the following main objectives:

- Assisting and advising local authorities to establish the conditions for starting-up the National Strategy for the SSR, comprising the plans for the reduction and reorganisation of the Police and Armed Forces.
- Supporting the creation of the necessary legal framework to define the existence and the working conditions of the reformed institutions.
- Creating the projects and establishing the conditions to attract possible donors to fund the process.
- Advising about the possibility of the EU’s future involvement in the country within the framework of the ESDP, upon completing the mission’s term.
- These general objectives have different specific objectives in the reform’s target institutions, which will be analysed further on.

Translated into more practical aspects, the aim is to create new Armed Forces of 3,440 men with two immediate effects--reducing personnel and
costs by resorting to recruitment in order to cover 70% of the positions, and demilitarisation of the Bissau capital, where 90% of the military soldiers are concentrated. Rationalising the police bodies, which will report to four different ministries instead of five, including the State Information Service that remains beyond the reform scope due to a political decision made by Guinea-Bissau authorities, with the creation of a National Guard that will encompass most police and their missions which were controlled by another four ministries unrelated to the Ministry of Interior, and reorganising the existing Public Order Police (POP) and Judicial Police (JP). Finally, in the justice sector, taking into consideration that the EU had already been working for some time with the magistracy through its PAOSED programme that was managed by the European Commission, it would be focused on the public prosecutor’s office, aimed at improving working conditions and its relation with the Judicial Police, both which report to the Ministry of Justice (Portuguese model).

An experience was commenced that could be considered as a pilot given that for the first time in the ESDP’s operation, a security sector reform was being carried out in the three classic sectors: Defence, Security and Justice, in a setting that given its dimensions and characteristics, could be considered ideal for testing a tool that up until then had only been partially used in other missions and settings. The commitment made is significant, since the EU cannot allow itself to fail, both because of its own prestige as well as for the future of this stabilisation tool that would be difficult to use in other settings.

Creation of the Mission and deployment of the advanced team. The origin

It was quickly apparent that the desire to deploy the advanced team, comprised by the Head of Mission (HoM), administrative personnel and two advisors (military for the three armies and police), before March would be difficult to achieve, since the administrative reality would impose on the operational needs.

With the existing regulations, which were never designed to sustain this type of activity, the mission is not considered a legal entity, and the HoM must personally assume the mission’s entire economic and accounting responsibilities, as well as the operational ones. In fact, until signing the contract as a special advisor of the HR/GS, no actions tied to
a financial cost (personnel contracts or purchasing goods) are possible given that the mission’s budget will be placed in a «personal» account of the HoM three weeks after the signing of his contract as a «Special Advisor,» and all of the subsequent contracts will be personally signed by the HoM: technically, the mission’s «legal owner.» This situation, which its modification is being studied, should be corrected with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty that allows the necessary modifications to the administrative regulations. This would radically change the situation, since aside from removing an economic and financial responsibility from the Head of Mission that is clearly disproportional with the real possibilities of command and control, it would be possible to begin actions simultaneously instead of what currently occurs (they are executed «successively» with the resulting lengthening of the administrative periods and thus, creating operational problems).

Taking into consideration that the HoM selection process begins in February and is not resolved until March 4, when the PSC (COPS) approves the proposal made by the HR/GS, it is clear that the March deployment plans established in the Joint Action will be impossible to fulfil. The actual contract signing takes place the last week of March, recruiting the personnel of the advanced team is done that same week, and after a small introductory course in Brussels, on April 14, the HoM, accompanied by part of the planned initial team, arrives in Bissau. By this time, half of the time established in the Joint Action for the work prior to the mission’s installation has already passed, because June 1 is the date established for the operational status declaration.

Shortly after reaching Bissau, the mission announces not only that it has been overly optimistic in preparing the Joint Action and setting the deadlines for completing the work, but that the preparatory missions carried out in 2007, undoubtedly because of their limited stay in the country, have not had sufficient contact with the logistical, social and political reality in order to provide the exact consulting in order to complete the mission.

In the logistical aspect, the country’s situation is deficient, with a limited supply possibility in the local market, especially as far as technical aspects, but also those related to everyday life. A good example of this problem is apparent in light of the problems encountered for the location of the mission’s headquarters, which is very important as is tied to visibility and solvency that are hard to obtain with the precari-
ous working conditions that the mission had to assume. The reconnaiss-
sance mission had made an agreement with local authorities for the use
of the building that France occupied at the time as the regional offices
of its Embassy for the mission’s future Headquarters. This building,
which had excellent characteristics in terms of location and representa-
tiveness, would be available in February of 2008 when the Embassy
transferred to its final location upon recovering its former facility, which
had been destroyed during the civil war. It was estimated, with certain
optimism, that after two months of renovation work, the building would
be ready to house the mission headquarters before June 1. The reality
could not be more different. France was unable to leave the building
until the end of April due to delays in the completion of their definitive
headquarters. The building was then claimed by Guinea’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in order to establish their State Department, and so it
was necessary to enter into a lawsuit with the Government, and thanks
to the French Embassy’s strong abilities that the Local EU Presidency
had at that time, the building was made available to the Mission at
the end of May. The process of hiring out the rehabilitation work and
the items related to providing security measures in accordance with
the standards required by the EU were not completed until September
because of the difficulty in finding a company in the region that was
able to assume the work with guarantees, as well as the complicated
administrative process (European Commission regulations) that led to
not having the Commission’s authorisation to sign the contract until
September. The work that had been planned for two months (a time
period that was likely optimistic, even in a European setting) lasted six
months due to the limitations of the company that had been hired (the
only one from Bissau to participate in the bid offering certain guaran-
tees). As a result, it was not possible for the Mission to occupy the
building until February 2009, and even then, the renovation work was
not fully completed until April, one month before the end of the initial
term. During this time, the mission worked out of two meeting rooms
rented at the Hotel 24 Setembro. This is in no way an attempt to justify
the operational problems with the logistical and administrative difficul-
ties, because since the beginning of the mission, the HoM announced
in various forums, including the PSC, that the mission had a very low
dependence on logistical resources since it was essentially an «intellec-
tual and relationship» mission, and so if the mission’s work was carried
out in more precarious conditions, the results should not have been
seriously affected by this precariousness of resources.
The problem is that the optimistic calculations and plans of the preparatory mission did not encompass the logistical area, but were in fact much more serious in political and institutional aspects.

At the time of the reconnaissance mission’s visits to Bissau (in the spring and fall of 2007), the political panorama announced legislative elections for the spring of 2008 with an acceptance on behalf of all the parties in the reform process, and so it was to be expected that when the mission’s operational phase would begin, the elections would have already taken place and the mission would have a government with four years of operation ahead of it as an intermediary. Despite the reluctance of the FAS Chief of Staff, the reform’s target institutions appeared to perceive the reform as something positive, and an overall environment of euphoria that was conveyed by the national and international representatives in the region contributed towards creating an image of a «window of opportunity» worth taking advantage of.

As soon as the mission sets foot on land, the differences between hopes and reality area clearly apparent. The planned legislative elections have been postponed, initially until November, with a possible line of action supported by President Vieira to delay them additionally so that they coincide with the presidential elections planned for 2010, which as a result, would be moved up to 2009. Upon completing its legal term of office, the Popular National Assembly should have been dissolved. This does not occur because the President has decreed its extension until the new elections. This decree is denounced by the opposing parties before the Constitutional Tribune. In the meantime, the Government enters an interim situation because it depends on the justice system’s decision regarding the National Assembly. However, the most serious matter is the clear lack of knowledge on behalf of the society and its leaders regarding the reform project, even detecting that the national Reform Strategies document is vaguely familiar to them and few of the ministers interviewed seem to have read it thoroughly. Some are not even aware of its existence.

In the first contacts with the Police and Armed Forces, the clear difference of positions regarding the reform are immediately detected. The police, especially the Public Order Police and the Judicial police, view the reform as the great opportunity to step out of their stagnant positions and clearly value it as the way to improve their personal and working conditions. The Armed Forces, on the other hand, under the strong
leadership of their leader, General Tagme, openly distrust the reform by considering it a threat for their privileged status. Although he does not maintain a position that directly opposes the reform, General Tagme delays any attempt to create working conditions with a dilatory game, when a negative response allows the mission to be aware of the armed forces’ view towards the reform. Direct contact is not authorised, and interviews with General Tagme are useless in terms of producing tangible results, although to a certain degree, the environment in most of them is considered cordial.

In the meantime, the OPLAN is presented at the PSC, and advisors are recruited facing a difficult reality: the lack of candidates. As had already occurred for the advanced team, the number of candidates for advisor positions was low. This lack of response from the Member States leads to a false selection process, since in the best scenario, when there is more than one candidate for the position, it is because the candidates have applied to several positions, and so finally they are all accepted. Some positions remain vacant, specifically the Air Force advisor, the National Guard advisor, and one in the justice area. Of the mission’s 19 international members, 12 are Portuguese (of the 12 advisors, only two are not Portuguese). However, the imbalance of Portuguese personnel is translated into an operational advantage due to their perfect communication with Guinean intermediaries, and makes it possible to naturally integrate the Portuguese personnel into the common effort that has been working there for some time in the bilateral collaboration, which enormously facilitated the adaptation of the new arrivals to the complex Guinean world.

From this phase of initial deployment and preparation of the operational phase, the following conclusions may be extracted:

The preliminary missions did not have exact prior knowledge of the situation, or enough time to obtain it, so as to develop a concept of operations (CONOPS) that fit the complex Guinean reality. As a result, overly ambitious objectives were established for such a short term of office. Evidently, they did not have the time or the possibility to perceive that the society was not truly aware of the reform process, and in many cases, not even the politicians themselves, who were never completely honest in the interviews held with the preparatory missions. The arrival of a future EU mission was always perceived by local authorities as the arrival of aid that was more than welcome and with positive economic implications.
for the country, without anyone or hardly anyone having an exact idea of the mission’s scope. These interpretation errors will mark the mission’s life in two fundamental aspects: First, the public information component was clearly omitted and minimised, giving the task of Official Public Information to the Political Advisor of the HoM, who was also overloaded with the Official Protocol work and preparing reports, leaving the mission with few possibilities to correct the situation. Second, no one proposed or at least materialised, neither in the national or international arena, the need to prepare an informative campaign to prepare the mission’s arrival, explain the content of the Strategies document and the scope of the reform, or as stated earlier, provide the mission with the necessary personnel in order to correct this serious shortfall. Second, because the information failed in terms of explaining that the mission’s action was to transform the defined strategies into viable plans and to produce the corresponding legal framework and codes, and the subsequent manuals, in other words, «papers,» false expectations were created at all levels that have constantly pursued the mission, which has been unable to convince the intermediaries that the visible effects would correspond to an implementation phase that evidently followed that of preparing the agreement with the mission’s mandate.

A very small mission was designed in terms of personnel, and this has been the smallest mission to date of the ESDP civil missions. This «minimalist» design will have negative consequences in the mission’s operation and effectiveness, especially in the administrative aspects, where the possibilities of establishing redundancies and substituting personnel absent because of illness or holidays will turn out to be impossible in some cases.

All of the scheduling calculations have resulted impossible to fulfil. As has already been noted, a distorted evaluation of the country’s disposition towards assuming the reform and the problems derived from the lack of real experience in the reform field on behalf of its components have placed the mission on an excessively optimistic road map. The systematic failure to meet deadlines, although justified and accepted in all of the cases, has a negative impact on the resulting perception of effectiveness, despite all the excuses regarding the mission’s reputation and its morality.

Perhaps as a summary of everything that has been stated, it could be said that in a certain way, the mission was prematurely launched because
the Guinean society and the institutions to be reformed, especially the Armed Forces, were not truly willing to assume the political cost and the consequences in terms of the personnel affected. However, this value judgement is made two years after starting the mission, and so it is clearly not an attempt to criticise the decisions that have been made in the initial context of 2008, but rather to extract the lesson to be learned that in future missions, more focus be placed on the preparatory missions in order to obtain the highest possible degree of knowledge regarding the situation in order to reduce to a minimum the differences between what has been planned and what is truly possible.

Additionally, a generous organisational design of the mission would allow a subsequent adjustment that would assume the vacancies available and adapt to the real work load, which can only be correctly evaluated after a period of six months.

**The operational phase. History of a project**

Although the logistical conditions that had been planned in terms of resources (vehicles, computers, communications, etc.) were far from being fulfilled, with only a two week delay in the planned calendar, the initial operational capacity (IOC) is declared to be reached in June because most of the advisors that have been contemplated in the OPLAN have already joined the team by that date.

Given that during the initial phase the corresponding contacts had been made in order to define the local technicians through the Technical Coordination Committee, the work to analyse the existing legislation and determine the legal and regulatory gaps was commenced. The overall precariousness of all official types, where even the lack of electrical power (endemic in the country) is a common situation, makes the work difficult through the «placement» procedure, recurring to joint meetings, local Mission-technicians at the mission facilities, which although they are precarious due to the temporary situation, met the minimum conditions necessary for moving ahead with the work. The work carried out by advisor to the public prosecutor’s office, who works directly with the Attorney General’s office, may be considered an exception.

Only one month after commencing the operational phase, the first political crisis appeared--the unconstitutionality appeal submitted for the Parliament’s extension decree, leading to a Supreme Court sentence
that orders the dissolution of the Parliament. In parallel, the Government crumbles, and in August, a dark coup d’état sends the Navy Chief of Staff into exile after it is considered, without being proved in court, that he was an inducer of the coup and involved in the drug trafficking world. In this tense environment, a provisional Prime Minister is named with the aim of carrying out the legislative elections planned for November. New ministers are named, with the subsequent impact on the mission’s work, which must start over in most cases. The problem is worsened when it is affirmed that the attention of political intermediaries is centred on the electoral process, creating a void of political support for the reform that is assumed with resignation, awaiting the results of the November elections.

In the meantime, in the technical aspect, great advances have been achieved in the police sector through the preparation of the first drafts of the Law for the Ministry of Interior, and the Organic Laws for the Public Order Police and future National Guard, with the corresponding regulations for personnel, codes of conduct, and other legal documents necessary for the proper operation of the future police forces. In order highlight the difficulty faced by workers, it is sufficient to say that since the country’s independence, there had been no legal coverage for the operation of police forces. Only the operation of the Judicial Police (under the control of the Ministry of Justice) was protected by an Organic Law.

The same cannot be said for the defence sector, where there is a clear separation between the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Chief of Staff. There is no progress, since the Head of EMAD outright refuses to discuss the future FAS structure by using all types of subterfuges. Without access for even discussing the final FAS structure, any training work pending to be carried out by the mission’s military advisors is paralysed in light of the fear of confirming one of the Guinean military personnel’s main fears: «the EU has come to reorganise (in other words, destruct) the FAS.» On another hand, the existing legal body related to the FAS is relatively complete, although scarcely applied since its possibility of adapting to the real situation of the Armed Forces is very remote, despite having been written and approved upon the completion of the 1998 civil conflict.

However, in the public prosecutor’s office, there is evidence of the advantages of working with a placement method, and the process of eliminating relationship problems between the public prosecutors and
the judicial police has begun. Most of these are caused by a more than inadequate regulation and are clearly influenced by the personality of the corresponding authorities who systematically accuse one another of being the obstacle for the justice system’s correct operation.

In this situation of asymmetrical advances, the legislative elections arrive (with the subsequent slow down of work in the police area, since they are directly involved in campaign’s electoral security presence), which to no surprise, is a landslide victory for the PAIGC (African Party For the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde, resulting from the war of independence and it was the only party during 20 years). Although the victory was predicted by all the political analysts, it is surprising that the qualified majority is obtained with 70 of the 100 seats in the National Popular Assembly. The elections were considered by all the international observers and even by the second party that was strongly defeated, the PRS (Party for Social Renewal), to be clean, fair and transparent, with a participation of more than 80% of the electoral body. It is worth highlighting that for the first time in the nation’s history, the SSR process enters the campaign, particularly in the electoral programme of the party that would later win the landslide victory.

From the mission’s point of view, the situation has improved significantly. First of all, the SSR has gained political and social visibility, with a clear commitment on behalf of who will foreseeably be the future Prime Minister (Carlos Gómez Junior), and the support of a strong, one-party government backed by a parliamentary majority that is able to assume constitutional reforms with a qualified majority in the Assembly. This governmental solidity could in turn open the door to a progressive decrease of military involvement in political matters, and as a result, an acceptance of the reform process in the area of defence.

Not a week has passed since the elections when the political euphoria is thrown into confusion by an attack at the private residence of President Vieira on November 23, apparently carried out by FAS dissident members. This attack added more shadows than lights to the situation, due to the strange outcome (the attackers fled without any resistance from the presidential security, who also fled in the attack), as well as its subsequent use as an argument for recruiting a form of praetorian Presidential Guard made up of «Agüentas,» from the Portuguese word «aguentar» (resisting), the name that veteran soldiers from the governmental side gave to young recruits of Papel ethnicity (the same as President Vieira) that took part in
the 1998 civil war in support of the then also President Vieira, and after losing the war, they were either exiled to Guinea-Conakry or they were demobilised by force. This aim to have a praetorian guard considered to be loyal and secure (consisting of 300 men), alleging the strange event from November 23 as a pretext, was reluctantly accepted by the Defence Chief of Staff who was aware of the danger entailed in the immediate future by this force directly controlled by the President. It must be pointed out that up until then, presidential security was provided by the Armed Forces, and thus, directly controlled by the Defence Chief of Staff who was considered to be a historic enemy of the President after being tortured during his detention in the 1980s after a military movement against the, at that time, all-embracing and powerful President Vieira. In the same manner, the November 23 incident could be considered as a performance to subsequently be exploited. In early January, General Tagme is the target of another dark incident, in which the new presidential security is accused of attempting to take the life of the Defence Chief of Staff, and the Agüentas security force are immediately disarmed and dissolved. Surprisingly, this event is executed without strong opposition from the President’s supporters, and the presidential initiative is apparently settled without greater repercussions.

In the meantime, an idea has been brewing, and as it comes together, it is considered to be one of the possible keys for the reform’s success. During conversations in Bissau between the European Commission Delegation and the Mission, which maintains an excellent partnership in the region, the idea arises of creating a pension fund under the control of possible donors. This will allow a large number of military personnel and police to be removed from the situation, who due to their advanced age or from great difficulty in recycling their training, are an obstacle in the operation of the institutions and for the State’s coffers by creating a financial burden impossible to assume by the country’s limited finances. This idea gains shape and momentum by being presented and discussed at the 3rd Meeting of Friends of Guinea-Bissau (Brussels, January 2009), and proceeds to appear on the agendas of all the international and bilateral organisations involved in the process. In fact, upon returning from this meeting, when this possible solution is presented to the Defence Chief of Staff to address his obsession of avoiding that his soldiers be sent into retirement in precarious conditions, the Defence Chief of Staff clearly changes his perception of the Mission and of the reform process, opening (or perhaps leaving slightly ajar would be more precise) the doors to the armed institution, which had been closed up to that point.
It is in this scenario that the mission’s first six-month report is presented to the PSC (Brussels, February 2009), and as stated in the OP-LAN, it was necessary to present a vision or project of the future of the ESDP’s involvement in the country.

Based on the work already completed in the police sector, with some tangible success such as the recovery of the Interpol office in Bissau, advances in the recovery of the Judicial Police, the incipient hope for change in the Defence Chief of Staff’s position, the Mission’s new location in its finally available Headquarters, and fundamentally, in light of a stable political scenario that is very favourable for the Reform project, a six month extension is requested to the PSC at no cost (there was a sufficient surplus of the generous initial budget), so that it would be possible to consolidate the advances obtained and complete the work in the military sector. In parallel, it is proposed to increase the number of personnel in the Mission so as to create a project preparation body with experts in areas such as infrastructure and budgets in order to solidly prepare projects related to reform in the military and police field. Around June, the announcement of a Round Table to obtain the necessary funding in order to pass from the preparation phase to a subsequent practical project execution phase (which under no circumstances would be executed by the Mission that was deployed in the region at that time) was awaited. The PSC accepts this proposal and the technical work begins for approving a new Joint Action complementary to the one that founded the Mission in February of 2008.

A few days later, during a period of nine hours in Bissau, the Defence Chief of Staff, General Tagme, dies as a result of a bomb attack at his own Headquarters, as well as President Vieira, who is brutally assassinated in his residence at the hands of attackers who are supposedly from the Army as a possible retaliation for the death of General Tagme. The causes of these assassinations and their coded interpretation by the national police are so varied and dark, that an entire chapter would be necessary to analyse them. These events dramatically lead the nation to a new and uncertain political situation, in which behavioural patterns that should have been avoided are once again repeated. It is not possible to legally formalise the successor to the Defence Chief of Staff position without a president-elect, a condition marked in the Constitution for the appointment. The military personnel meet in a new deliberative meeting and unilaterally propose the Navy Captain Zamora Induta as the FAS leader and representative, who is appointed as the new Defence Chief of
Staff by the new interim president, also in a temporary capacity. This military initiative clearly shows that the corporate and independence ticks of the political power continue to be well established among military personnel, with little or no opposition from the political class.

Surprisingly, the Guinean society assumes these assassinations with certain resignation and passivity, with the generalised belief that the nation has once again experienced a matter of settling «old scores,» outside of society as a whole.

Like the rest of the country, the Mission faces a new situation that in some ways presents positive aspects, although the inevitable presidential electoral process will slow down the tasks that are pending and planned for the new term that has been extended until November 30.

As of the assassinations, Security Sector Reform becomes the big political topic that will already be highlighted in the political programmes and speeches of the leaders and candidates, indirectly resolving (partly because society as a whole continues to be outside of the project) the greatest initial shortage of the project: the lack of ownership and awareness on behalf of the national authorities. However, at the same time, there is an almost excessive reaction from the multinational organisations: Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), African Union (AU), Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLC) and the UN, which up until then had hardly played a relevant practical role in the reform, having centred their efforts almost exclusively on its undoubtedly also important related political aspect.

With a surprising, and in a certain way inadmissible, oversight of the role played during the last year by the EU, with a mission deployed in the region that is exclusively dedicated to support the reform project, an international meeting is called in Praia (Cape Verde) with the intent of «re-launching» the SSR that, in the eyes of these new «active» actors, was not producing the expected results. Once again, terms were confused by apparently not being aware that the SSR was in the planning phase, as opposed to the operational execution phase. In light of the displeasure shown by the EU, at the last minute timid references to the EU paper in support of the reform are included in the meeting’s documents, allowing it to attend Praia, but not without great reservations in light of the clear undervaluation of the effort already carried out by the largest provider of external funds to Guinea-Bissau, and of the results achieved up to that point by the Mission, which had already been deployed for a year.
The result of the meeting is important in terms of the participation of more than one hundred delegates from twenty countries and ten international organisations. As a positive aspect, it must be highlighted that as a result, the SSR in Guinea-Bissau is now an international matter, and after a day of work, conclusions are reached that obviously cannot respond to an in-depth analysis, but rather are the result of superficial criteria that in a certain way, are evident and well-known much before the meeting is held. As a significant innovation, it is proposed to create a Plan of Action covering projects and actions, some which already appeared in the Mission’s OPLAN, and adding others that are more of a «shopping list» rather than a systematised reform plan.

The greatest problem of this initiative is that the Plan of Action does not result from a clear leadership mechanism and from the follow-up and action in the region, and so the impulse is diluted with the passing of time. However, a very pernicious indirect effect is detected for the efforts that have been carried out in the area of reform up until then. A portion of the local authorities and some international organisations change their criteria regarding the primary reform objectives (which are clearly defined in the Strategies Document), specifically in the police model, and so an undesired and unexpected interference is produced. Without a doubt, one of the worst situations already defined in the general comments of the SSR has appeared in the region--the «Turf War.» The Mission continues its work in a strained environment, ignoring unrelated projects that little by little show their lack of consistency, and overcoming as much as possible the negative «distracting» effects of local authorities.

However, it is necessary to face one of the real problems presented in Praia--the clear failure of the so-called «fast impact» projects that offer fast and visible solutions on paper, but cause deep discontent in the field with the passing of time by not meeting deadlines or expectations. None of these projects is initiated by the ESDP Mission or under its responsibility, but the shadow of discontent and frustration that the lack of visible results creates does not understand acronyms, and the mission is involved in the negative effects of external problems or failures.

Due to its clear and dangerous historical precedent, an alarming idea appears: the possibility of deploying an international police-military force with the objective of allowing the peaceful development of the presidential electoral process and to provide the physical security necessary for
the state authorities and the members of the commission investigating the assassinations of the President and the Defence Chief of Staff.

In the nation’s historical memory, and although evidently in a very simplistic manner given that the real situation was much more complex, the arrival of troops from Senegal and Guinea-Conakry in 1998 to support the then president-elect Nino Vieira triggered a difficult civil war with disastrous effects on the nation’s already impoverished economy and socio-political structure. Spoken clearly: the arrival of a foreign force, regardless of the scarce enthusiasm in favour of the idea on behalf of Guinean politicians, is like «adding insult to injury.»

It should also not be forgotten that the ECOWAS has undertaken the responsibility of organising a Round Table in Abuja (Nigeria) in order to obtain the necessary funds from the international community so as to implement the objectives defined in the Plan of Action. Once again, the reform schedule is complicated by this initiative because it creates confusion regarding the real objective of this round table. As time passes, the announcement of the future meeting is not accompanied by any specific action. This announcement is received with scepticism by the possible fund donors that are most likely to attend a round table with clear objectives, especially with certain consolidated projects such as the new Pension Fund in particular, which is being developed by the European Commission Delegation in Bissau without pause, but with certain difficulties due to a lack of political decisions on behalf of the government.

The passing of time and the mistrust of the Guinean government regarding the result of a donor round table in Abuja modifies the situation with the transformation of the mentioned round table into a technical follow-up meeting of the Plan of Action, leaving the path open to organise a donor round table elsewhere in Europe that will not only address the necessary funds for carrying out the reform process, but will also cover the country’s development aspects.

As a result, the scenario of the mission’s work is complicated: the commotion of the international community that presents more intentions than actions, a relief in June of most of the advisors that have already spent a year on the mission, complicated by a subsequent lack of candidates for specialised positions (creating the projects), with the Mission’s increased workforce, the country’s involvement in a two-round electoral process to select the new President, and the expected governmental restructuring after the elections, which will respond to a new political
equilibrium of the governing party in the «post Nino» era. These complications are hardly compensated by the undoubtedly improved relations between the political power and military authorities, and the interim Defence Chief of Staff’s clear position in favour of the reform.

The political situation continues to darken in June with the death of two top Guinean politicians in cloudy circumstances. One of them, Baciro Dabó, was a presidential candidate and government minister in functions (although his functions were suspended due to his candidature in the elections), and the other was Helder Proenza, a powerful man in the PAIGC and the former Minister of Defence. These deaths occurred during the detention process carried out by Military Police forces (under the control of the Ministry of the Interior for these arrests) of the presumed leaders and collaborators of an attempted coup d’état. The inconsistency in the explanations and the official communications throws a veil of confusion over the events and over the possibilities of reaching political and institutional stability. The exaggerated resulting accusations about the remaining detainees who are finally dismissed by the justice system is diluted in an already proven ability of the political and social system in Guinea-Bissau to assume this type of situation. A popular phrase in Guinea-Bissau is that: «here, what is normal becomes impossible, and what is impossible becomes normal.» Even the funeral rites of the two deceased, who in theory were leaders of a movement that aimed to physically remove the State’s top civil and military authorities, are accompanied by most of the politicians that had been their «targets.» However, one must not forget the close ties of camaraderie that had been created during the many years of fighting for independence and in the political arena that followed. These deaths are added, along with the ones that took place in March, to the justice system’s list of «pending matters,» and the political life follows its course as if nothing had happened.

Once again, the presidential elections show the world one of the special characteristics of this African nation--its ability and tradition of organising electoral confrontations in an exquisite environment of liberty, transparency, and a complete lack of conflict, while making clear the lack of opportunity and awareness of the country’s reality by those who encouraged the presence of a «stabilisation» force to ensure the normal development of the elections.

The electoral results again bring a glimmer of hope for the country’s future, the President-elect Malam Bacai Sanha clearly wins, and what is
even more positive, the loser of the elections and the country’s former president (2000-2003), Kumba Yala, who had been overthrown by a military coup on September 14, 2003, immediately acknowledges the results and promises his political support to the new president as the president of all Guineans.

September arrives with the clear gap between African and European «watches.» The Mission faces a new six-month report in a situation of uncertainty before the distorting effect of diverging positions that, as has already been mentioned, some international actors have introduced into the political stage regarding the objectives established by the Strategies Document. As a result, the Mission’s work is compromised since they have dragged, or at least disoriented, certain political actors of national importance. On another hand, there are renewed possibilities for success due to the favourable evolution of the military class towards the reform and the indications of their subordination to the civil power. However, the calendar is evidently a drawback due to the proximity of the term’s end (November 30). There will not even be sufficient time to materialise the possibility of a new ESDP mission on December 1, in the context of progressing to the start-up phase of the projects, that in any case would be premature due to the lack of conditions. Additionally, the other international actors do not have a consolidated presence in the region for handing over the projects to them for their subsequent execution. The option of closing the EU presence without achieving the visible reform objectives is not considered either because of its catastrophic effects on the credibility of the ESDP instrument. As a result, the Mission appears before the PSC (September, 2009) with a new extension proposal to try to prevent a void in the reform action.

However, this time, the extension presents a clear connotation of conditionality, opening the mission’s future working space to a new scenario of defined «red lines,» and with the unique circumstance in the country’s history of having a President, a Prime Minister, a Government, and military authorities that do not represent clashing sectors and who directly believe that the country does not have a viable future without the SSR. The more than positive behaviour of the main opposition party’s leader must also be pointed out. In summary, and using the words of a government minister: «it’s now or never.»

The six month extension is requested with the official petition from the Bissau Government through a letter signed by its Prime Minister (after
being debated in the Council of Ministers), establishing its commitment with the three factors that are considered to be key for the reform’s immediate future:

- Commitment towards respecting the national Strategies Document, origin and base of the ESDP action’s presence in Guinea-Bissau that should put an end to the last minute initiatives that are creating clear interferences with the Mission’s work.
- Commitment of moving ahead without delays in approving the legal framework prepared by the various local technicians with the Mission’s support and that will enable a subsequent development of the legal body that depends on the organic laws, and the corresponding start-up plans for the reform actions.
- Clear commitment towards insisting on clarifying the assassinations committed in March and June with political and institutional support for the investigation commissions in progress.

The letter that expressly contains these commitments is signed by the Prime Minister on October 9, and the efforts in Brussels for granting a new mission extension are accelerated, resulting in a new Joint Action that extends the mission until May 31, 2010, in order to achieve the following objectives:

- To consolidate the Government’s unequivocal decision regarding the SSR base document (Strategies Document), as well as its involvement in it.
- To monitor and support the adoption of the legal framework that has already been prepared.
- To support local authorities and the international community in non-legislative matters related to SSR.
- To provide continuity for the reform process through the coordination and link with the international community that enables its follow-up, and making the most of the work completed by the mission.
- To actively contribute in the consultancy and start-up of any future ESDP action in the country.

Finally, on October 28, the lengthily announced, and thus unsettling because of its negative paralysing effects on the «insecure» ministers, ministerial reorganisation takes place. In regards to the ministers related to the reform, only the Minister of Justice remains in his position, with the appearance of new intermediaries and actors in the Ministries of Interior
and Defence, which also assumes the portfolio of the no longer existing Ministry of Former Militants. It is not a new start, but evidently the scenario has changed once again, although it can’t be said that there have been no positive consequences.

We are implicitly before a «bridge» period that may lead to two scenarios: relieving the ESDP effort with another mission in the same ESDP area with a term to implement the finalised SSR plans, or handing over the responsibility of executing the projects to other international organisations, specifically the UN, which is in the process of transforming the UNOGBIS mission into that of UNIOGBIS (United Nations Integrated Office for Guinea-Bissau), that shows a strong focus on the area of reform through the creation of a strong SSR division (40 members) that although is almost exclusively centred on the police sector, also presents abilities in the military and judicial fields, although testimonial, and a possible ECOWAS action in the military area (the organisation’s traditional field of action), leaving the Justice sector under the control of the European Union Delegation that already works actively in this field through its new PROJUST programme.

Once the mission’s second extension is approved and in progress, the various departments related to the Council and the European Commission, with the support of the Mission, begin the Strategic Review that presents the two previously mentioned alternatives before the PSC in January: Departure or new action, now called CSDP, with the entry into force of the new Lisbon Treaty.

On February 5, with counsel from the Civil Committee, the COAFR and the Military Committee, the PSC approves to begin the work to launch the new mission with the objective of commencing the reform’s implementation phase in order to support the country in the process of starting-up the education and training system for its police and armed forces, and the institutional backing necessary for carrying out the structure transformation process. All of this was conditioned to that before its launch in June, the most relevant contents of the legal package prepared to provide the reform with legislative solidity be approved and sanctioned, and that an in-depth coordination and distribution of the tasks be carried out with the international organisations in the region. Especially with the recently reformed UNIOGBIS.

In a way, with this decision, the result of the initial mission may be validated in a positive manner. It must not be forgotten that the main ob-
jective assigned to it consisted in transforming an idea, the one outlined in the Strategies Document, into specific plans and especially to prepare the region so that the necessary conditions for the reform’s start-up would be present.

Have these objectives been reached? Without being overly optimist, it can be said that those that were within the mission’s possibilities and responsibilities have been reached. In other words, the legal framework and the reform’s acceptance on behalf of the structures affected are ready, and their approval is now exclusively a responsibility of the Guinean Government, Assembly and Presidency. It must be acknowledged that it has been possible for the SSR to undoubtedly have the highest priority and relevance in all of the political and social sectors, and to be considered the nation’s greatest hope for achieving the very much desired and needed political stability and that will result in a much stronger social and economic development than what currently exists. However, a threat looms over the project’s immediate future: its funding.

The extremely necessary donor round table is systematically postponed. There are essentially two reasons for this: a lack of serious initiatives for its organisation and inadequate technical and practical training for preparing a well-structured dossier of attractive projects for possible donors.

Work does not begin on preparing this dossier until January 2010 with the participation of Guinean authorities, international technicians hired by the UNPD for this purpose, and fundamentally the EU Mission with its advisors in the three sectors. It will be a long and complicated process and a consolidated result is not expected before the first half of the year, so the new mission would enter the situation without having a clear horizon in the reform’s financial aspect.

Unexpectedly, after the January 2010 meeting between the ECOWAS Chiefs of State, there is a communication that surprises everyone. The communication «positively welcomes» the EU initiative of organising the future Donor Round Table, with the ECOWAS (which had self-assigned the responsibility for organising it since Praia) removing itself from the matter. The European Union, although surprised by the communication because it had never discussed the matter, reacts in a positive manner and assumes this task. June is considered as the first date available, with certain reservations, and October as the best scenario.
In the meantime, the High Representative of the General Secretary for the United Nations announces the agreement for holding a meeting in New York. Although it initially seems to be confused with a donor round table to analyse and support the new Pension Fund and other financial aspects of the reform, it is transformed into an international meeting to analyse the situation in Guinea-Bissau and to make donors aware of the process’ need for funding and the importance of their presence at the Donor Round Table that will most likely take place in the fall.

As a result, although it is still up in the air, the terrible funding aspect should be resolved once these two initiatives have taken place: the high level technical meeting in New York, and the donor round table in Europe.

**Analysis of a project in progress and a solution for the future**

One of the greatest difficulties presented by a project like the one we are analysing is precisely its correct and dispassionate evaluation and analysis. The political and social advances reached throughout the project are sometimes slight indications that are only appreciated by those who experience everyday life in the country, and after much time learning to understand and address the cryptic messages from a very complex society. In the case of Guinea-Bissau, the fact that it is a small country not only does not facilitate its understanding, but it is also a great hindrance due to the interference at all the levels of personal, professional and historic relations of its citizens, that like a large family, produce events that may only be explained by those who understand the family keys that are primarily only understood by the family clan itself.

It is not feasible to count the mines removed, the weapons collected, and the regular armies demobilised or re-dimensioned. Considering that the necessary conditions which have been created for progressing to the phase of applying the preparatory work falls more into the category of desires or even an exercise of faith, rather than something truly measurable.

However, and always assuming a certain risk, it can be said that in June of 2010, the minimum conditions necessary will exist in the country for moving ahead and beginning the work towards implementing the Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau, in such a way that their visibility will produce a beneficial snowball effect that will give the project the necessary inertia for reaching its final objectives. Without a doubt, the main
one is: the desire of all the sectors involved and the Guinean society to reach these objectives in the end.

If the necessary resources are generated at the future donor round table, and the problems that will undoubtedly arise in the various sectors during the implementation of the new structures are overcome with patience and skill, the possibility of reaching the desired objectives is very high. What may not be as clear is the time frame for reaching these objectives. Being optimistic, it would be at least three years, and taking into consideration the preparation phase’s precedent, it could easily be as long as five years.

It is clear to the reader that the analysis we are making does not cover the entire reform process, but only the beginning. Paraphrasing Churchill after the Battle of El Alamein, this is not the beginning of the end, but rather the end of the beginning, or perhaps if we are realistic, it is simply the beginning. However, and taking into consideration that the EU and the rest of the international actors present in the Guinean scenario will continue promoting this process, alongside national authorities that are extremely aware, it can be said that this time, and against the well-known popular saying, good beginnings are welcome.

However, there are four aspects that must be highlighted with a critical perspective and that have significantly held back progress in this first phase:

- The incredible difference between the planning data with which the mission is prepared and launched, and reality. Especially with regard to the awareness and as a result, the local ownership of the project.
- A reduced workforce and a scarce redundancy capacity between the various positions in order to cover advisor absences, either for not having filled the position or simply because of leave or illness.
- The incompatibility between European and Guinean scheduling paces. The requirement of results in order to close the balance of the rotating Presidencies every six months, combined with the terms of office for this type of ESDP action, which are very limited, generate a feeling of temporariness and «expiry» that are incompatible with a mid and even long term project, as is any security sector reform.
- Finally, and probably the most important: the host nation’s real capacity for assuming the «local ownership» of the process should
be correctly gauged. It is precisely this ownership capacity, when exercised with the proper authority (the process belongs to Guinea and it is for Guinea), that will make it possible for the country to clearly exercise the extremely necessary coordination of actors in the field that will avoid the ever so dreaded and damaging dispute between international actors (Turf War). This analysis is very complex and may require flexibility throughout the action. In other words, it should be adjustable as problems are detected. The institutions or structures created to track the reform must have a real capacity for carrying out their work and assuming their responsibilities. Otherwise, they should be properly reinforced or assisted, but never replaced by the international community. For a former helicopter flight instructor at the CEFAMET (Centro de Enseñanza de las Fuerzas Aeromóviles del Ejército de Tierra, or Spanish Army Airmobile Force Training Centre), as is the author’s case, this problem addresses the same dilemma he faced many years ago: if the instructor corrects student errors before the problems appear, the students will never learn because they will never be aware of what they do wrong; if the instructor exceeds the threshold of appropriate reaction, the error will result in an accident. The limit between cooperation and «usurpation» of functions is sometimes very subtle.

It is not the intent of the author of this document to convey a negative vision of SSR as a stabilisation tool. Perhaps the appropriate question would be: Is the framework for the actions of the ESDP, now the CSDP, appropriate for carrying out a security sector reform? The answer, and always taking into consideration the author’s subjectiveness, is no more ambiguous than: neither yes or no.

Any reader that has knowledge about the subject understands that any security sector reform is a project for the mid term, and more plausibly, for the long term, in which, as in the case of Guinea-Bissau, we are applying a tool designed for crisis management (for example, the 2008 Georgia intervention) that once «stabilised,» leads to other types of actions or even to no additional actions if the problem has been resolved. As a result, because a tool is always used that has not been specifically designed for the work that it will perform, the results, although they may be acceptable, tend to have a damaging collateral effect towards the tool, the target, or in most cases, both, and always exerting an effort that is greater than what is strictly necessary.
Thus, focusing once again on SSR in Guinea-Bissau, it is very possible that despite having produced unquestionable positive results, the maladjustments detected have resulted from «tool’s» lack of suitability. The constant feeling of temporariness experienced in the Mission, produced by very short terms or extensions for a problem that requires a mid or even long term treatment, has caused negative reactions, or at least those of scepticism or doubt, in the country as well as in Brussels, which have affected the mission´s operation.

The same «latent threat» of abandoning the situation as a result of these terms that are limited in time damages the stabilisation process because it conveys a very negative message of removing the institutional support from the country’s normally fragile political structures.

Therefore, and in conclusion, I believe that the positive aspects must be highlighted, and it is essential to outline a possible line of action for similar situations in the future.

If it is decided to launch a CSDP action in the area of security sector reform, this decision should address a need of «opportunity» that may be compared to a «crisis,» because delays in starting the action may lead to a degraded scenario, resulting in lost «momentum.»

In any case, the CSDP action (limited in time because of its own characteristics) should be associated to an exit strategy that does not compromise the European Union’s credibility or place at risk the fragile stabilisation process that has been commenced. Is there another mechanism in the EU that may replace, or better said, relieve that of crisis management? Of course it exists, and the Lisbon Treaty will, without a doubt, make it possible, as part of the new EU Foreign Action, to develop mechanisms that may begin to operate once the CSDP Action has concluded, and maintaining the EU flag in the scenario will avoid the disastrous effect on the government and society being supported that may be caused by the EU’s departure.

In those situations where it is deemed necessary, future EU «Embassies» could be reinforced with relatively small follow-up and support units, in this case of the Security Sector Reform, in such a way that it would be possible to synchronise the receptor and donor watches. These units would track the long reform processes (normally associated to generational changes), ensuring that the EU investments, which will undoubtedly be significant, adjust to the project’s real needs, without ceasing to politically support the real actors in the process: the nation´s institutions.
This relief of actions must be «announced without leaving room for ambiguous interpretations» when the CSDP action is commenced, clearly marking red decision lines that also avoid having the receiver assume that once the process has begun, the support will be maintained, with the pertinent highs and lows, but that it will never have to face its departure. If this guideline is not followed, the EU will become a hostage to the country and it will lose credibility in light of future situations.

In a certain way, the new CSDP mission that is being created in order to begin the implementation phase of the Guinea-Bissau reform may be an intermediate step in this line of «evolution» that has been described. In the CONOPS Concept of Operations, which has been recently approved for this mission, it is clearly pointed out, and with no room for alternative interpretations, that the action will be of one year and that it should result in a new formula with the participation of other international actors who will relieve the operational part, UNIOGBIS or the ECOWAS and the EU Delegation, which could be supported by a SSR office and transform a «crisis management» project into a long term support project that is more suitable to the foreseeable situation.

_Bissau, March 28, 2010_

Author’s note: all of the document contents reflect the author’s criteria, and in no way do they reflect or aim to reflect the position of the EU institutions that are mentioned in it.

It is a spoken reflection after two years of working exclusively on the security sector reform project, and although it is perfectly arguable, should receive the benefit of the doubt expected by someone who has attempted, with all of their effort, to undertake the difficult task of combining what is desired with what is possible.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In the previous pages of this publication, the various authors have completed an interesting journey through the main issues that determine the current situation of security in the African continent. Some of the responses that are being prepared by Europe and Africa in order to address the challenges described have also been included. In my role as coordinator, I would like to conclude this work by extracting some of the issues described which I believe to be considered the most relevant.

As the opening piece, Madame Claude-France Arnould begins her contribution of *The Strategic «EU-Africa» Partnership for Peace and Security* by listing the four fundamental principles that comprise and support it: African unity, the interdependence between Europe and Africa, controlling one’s own destiny, and shared responsibility.

The Partnership has been made possible thanks to a series of transcendental decisions and actions: the transformation of the OAU into the AU (2001), the NEPAD (2001), the Protocol for the creation of the Peace and Security Council, the development of the European Security and Defence Policy and the European Security Policy (2003) in parallel to the appearance of new global challenges that have evolved the older and complex relations between both continents.

Next, the author delves deeper into the true nature and new dimension of this Partnership.

First, she points out the importance of institutionalising a political dialogue that goes beyond –without eliminating– the framework of aid for
development and economic exchanges. Second, she insists on the nature of «ownership,» understanding it as the need to establish the EU’s commitments at the request of the AU. Third, she refers to the principle of interdependence as recognised and formalised for the first time in the history of Europe-Africa relations. Finally, she highlights the multiform nature of this commitment that includes development policies and a common foreign and security policy, including that of security and defence. In other words, the Partnership goes beyond all types of traditional policies and introduces itself directly in the framework of the global strategy.

The approval of the Treaty of Lisbon offers a renewed opportunity for reinforcing the link between development and security, as well as the actions for maintaining peace, development and good governance, while the function of the High Representative, the Commission’s Vice President, and the creation of the European Foreign Service will contribute towards improving the overall coherence, effectiveness, and visibility of European foreign actions.

Next, Ms. Arnould addresses the matter of the Partnership as a global response to fragile situations and highlights the three priority actions (1):

- Strengthening political dialogue, implementing the peace architecture and funding the AU’s peacekeeping operations.

1. Strengthening political dialogue. Dialogue Political dialogue, which was already planned in article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement (2), involves both strategic discussions as well as regular consultations (3). However, in addition to this periodic and regular nature, she includes other characteristics or types that are worth mentioning. Therefore, a reinforced and selective dialogue exists with those nations that are particularly involved in regional security (South Africa, Nigeria, as well as Egypt and Morocco), and a growing triangular dimension as the Regional Organisations (ECOWAS, ECCAS, IGAD, AMU) increasingly participate in bilateral dialogue (4).

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(1) The author continues to point out that two thirds of these actions have already been launched.
(2) Simultaneously, other types of regional (as in the case of 5+5) and sectoral dialogue have been developed and institutionalised, such as the one recently organised by Minister Chacón in Mallorca between the EU’s 27 Ministers of Defence and their African counterparts.
(3) The AU’s Peace and Security Council and the EU’s Political Security Council have met regularly since October 2009.
(4) This has especially been the case since the Akasombo Conference (Ghana, December 2009).
Implementing the peace architecture. The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) covers the following areas of activity: conflict prevention; training African standby forces and improving their equipment, and finally, post-conflict reconstruction. The aim of conflict prevention is to reinforce the AU’s political-military capacities and those of the Regional Organisations (5). The aim of training the African Standby Forces is for these to acquire the initial operational capacity by the end of this year so as to plan and carry out peacemaking operations (6). The two year training cycle (AMANI AFRICA), which began in 2008 in Addis Abeba, is based on the French EUROCAM concept, transferred to the European framework, and is focused on training those with decision making capacity (civilians and military personnel). It’s scheduled to conclude this year with a final exercise that involves the AU’s Peacekeeping Operations Support Department. Aside from this training cycle, supporting African training centres is also essential, which will be carried out after obtaining the results of a joint Euro-African study about the needs and potential of these centres, and its launch is scheduled for the first half of this year. However, improving equipment is resulting to be financially problematic, since the EU aid instruments exclude the military aspect, and so the matter has been passed on to the G-8 (7).

The post-conflict reconstruction tends to share experiences, especially in the fields of security sector reform, disarmament, the fight against the illegal trade of small weapons, against terrorism, drugs, etc., with the aim of consolidating common knowledge and concepts.

In order to put into operation all of these initiatives, the EU and the AU have equipped themselves with certain instruments, of which Ms. Arnould highlights the creation of specific groups –and the assignment of their respective leaders– for this purpose, ensur-

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(5) The author offers the examples of supporting the continental early warning system through the Ispra Centre’s STCEN, and of certain nations such as Germany (in cartography matters), or the French-British MINAC initiative (Mechanism for Interactive Surveillance and Anticipating Crises).

(6) After Europe’s support for AMIS in Darfur, the current supports for AMISON in Somalia and MICOPAX in the Central African Republic have joined this objective.

(7) Aside from the financial problems, there are technical issues pending to be resolved, such as defining and agreeing on the standards, stock levels, etc., between the parts.
Summary and conclusions

ing specification and coordination in this manner. Along with these
groups, there are also other joint EU/AU panels of experts (8).

- Funding the AU’s peacekeeping. As far as funding, for one third of
  the Partnership’s priority actions, the main sources originate from
  the EU, especially from the «Peace Facility for Africa» (9) and the
  «Instrument for Stability» destined to address emergency situa-
tions. (10) Additionally, there are regional indicative programmes
  for all the regions that include this security dimension. Ms. Arnould
  summarises in approximately €1 billion the total European financial
  support (EU and FED) for peace and security matters in Africa.

In the second part of her piece, the author analyses with great clarity
the EU’s growing commitment towards crisis management in Africa, not
only in its historical-chronological sequence, but more importantly, in its
progressive level of depth and scope.

Recalling the historical evolution, Ms. Arnould points out the Euro-
pean Security and Defence Policy, which was initially focused on the Bal-
kans and was later oriented towards Africa in 2003, deploying the ARTE-
MIS operation (11). Once again, due to the elections in the DRC, the EU
intervened, this time from the Postdam Headquarters in Germany. Later,
it was involved in Darfur (12), and currently through the ATLANTA opera-
tion in the fight against piracy along the coasts of Somalia (13.)

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(8) The last meeting of the «Peace and Security» joint panel took place last October in
Addis Abeba.
(9) Nearly €400 million are from the FED, of which a portion is destined to pay AMISON
soldiers, and another portion to strengthen African peacekeeping capacities.
(10) This is a total of approximately €250 million, and may be applied as a complement for
crisis management actions. This was done in Chad in order to support troop training
efforts being carried out by the UN.
(11) In 2003, Kofi Annan asked Javier Solana for the EU’s urgent intervention to imme-
diately support MONUC, overwhelmed by the massacres in ITURI. Two weeks later,
with the support of France as the central nation, and the participation of other Eu-
ropean countries such as Sweden (which provided special land forces) as well as
non-European ones (South Africa, Brazil, Canada), the EU deployed the ARTEMIS
operation.
(12) The EU already provided financial, planning, and logistical support to AMIS. However,
in light of the destabilisation risk for neighbouring countries (such as the Central Afri-
can Republic and Chad), European intervention was requested, focused primarily on
displaced people and refugees.
(13) In carrying out the operation, the author clearly sees the EU’s progressive commit-
tment towards security aspects that go beyond defence. Thus, although initially cre-
ated to defend the World Food Programme’s ships, it has been focused on the fight
Therefore, the EU’s commitment has increasingly grown from situations of open conflict to the security sector, as was proven in the DRC, where the EU, aside from deploying military forces on two occasions, maintains two missions for police (EUPOL) and defence (EUSEC) reform. Another example is Guinea-Bissau, analysed in another chapter of this book, where the reform of the three basic and traditional pillars has been undertaken: defence, security and justice.

However, the inclusive nature of these actions is just as important, or even more so, which Ms. Arnould analyses on various levels.

First, on the European level. Historically, certain European nations have been especially tied to the African continent, while others have barely been in contact, or perhaps with occasional and very weak relations. This has been the case of Central European or Nordic countries. Today, they are fully integrated in Europe’s security policy in Africa (14).

Second, the EU has made an effort to coordinate its actions with those of other actors in the name of effectiveness. In particular, with the UN and the continental and regional African Organisations. All of Europe’s actions in Africa have been the result of consultations and operational cooperation with the AU.

Third, cooperation has reached third-party nations such as South Africa, Brazil, Canada (ARTEMIS), Russia (EUFOR Chad) in open conflicts, or with the EU in training Somalian soldiers, and with China, India, and Japan in Somali waters.

Madame Arnould focuses the third chapter of her contribution on the challenges for Africans and Europeans resulting from the «peace and security» partnership.

These challenges include: first, the availability of suitable African structures so that Africans themselves are the ones who assume ownership of their security. Second, promoting the AU’s Peace and Security Council, in operation since 2004, but that currently has certain limitations against piracy as well as protecting maritime traffic and fishing conditions, supporting the Federal Government of Somalia in creating a legal State with better security conditions.

(14) Germany has played a key role in the second operation in the DRC. Ireland, Poland or Austria have made important contributions to EUFOR in Chad. The Scandinavian nations systematically participate in operations, as well as in the «Battle Group» that they have established.
that must be overcome. Third, harmonising relations between the AU and regional organisations in order to promote the necessary continental integration. Fourth, to link local development policies with conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction, in such a way that the re-insertion of young warriors, the security sector reform, and the post-conflict reconstruction be accompanied by appropriate socio-economic development programmes. Fifth, to improve the coordination between EU member state policies and those of European community institutions through consensus on essential issues. In this point, the new EU Foreign Action Service, planned in the Treaty of Lisbon, is a fundamental factor. Sixth, to improve the effectiveness of the EU’s financial instruments, adapting them to fragile situations and guaranteeing that the necessary funding for crisis management reaches its destination on time. Seventh, to create the EU’s political and crisis management structures for its foreign policy via the creation of a single crisis management unit in the Council’s General Secretariat.

Finally, after first describing the EU’s growing process of addressing conflicts in Africa, Ms. Arnould then explains the EU’s extensive dimension, from open conflicts to problems related to peace and security; and third, she analyses the inclusive nature of the EU’s operations regarding third parties, and then states the last observation—the global nature of European action in Africa in which humanitarian aid, the various development programmes, and the political actions of the EU and its Member States are integrated in an organised and superimposed manner, creating the sum of the various resources available to the Union, in which the corresponding logics are respected, and the effectiveness will undoubtedly be reinforced after the implementation of the new instruments provided by the Treaty of Lisbon.

Ms. Arnould concludes that all of this requires for the Partnership’s African side to reinforce its regional and national structures in order to make them suitable for a continuously more effective cooperation that will ensure peace and security for the men and women in Africa.

II

Dr. Admore Mupoki Kambudzi begins his contribution titled «Internal Efforts, Complementary Processes, and Collaboration Issues for Facing Security Challenges in Africa in the 21st century: the Case of the AU and the EU», by pointing out that when discussing relations about peace and
security between the EU and Africa, the first thing that is asked is what have Africans themselves done in light of the challenges that threaten their continent, and then asking in what ways have we collaborated well and not so well, and finally considering what we can do better together in order to successfully face the challenges. The answers to these questions comprise the outline of his contribution.

Before discussing the answers, the author makes two important observations. The first is that ending violent conflicts and poor governance, and generating a culture of peace and justice are the greatest challenges in Africa. The second is the dual belief that there are currently real opportunities to successfully address this challenge, and that it can be essentially be undertaken by Africans themselves. Foreign action should play a role of complementary support. The basis for his optimism lies in the progressive application of the African Peace and Security Architecture.

To put into perspective the history of the challenges as well as the decision to face them, the author looks back on the 80s and 90s and the political and economic collapse that the African continent suffered at the end of the Cold War, when single party regimes collapsed one after the other, throwing the continent into a situation of dramatic instability in which innumerable warlike conflicts appeared with cross border implications, destruction of infrastructures, socio-economic regression, countless deaths and injuries, and huge masses of refugees and displaced people.

The creation of the OAU in 1963, aimed at preventing and resolving these conflicts, was unable to avoid the Rwandan genocide the following year, and the continent was simply unprepared to face these conflicts. Regarding this point, Kambudzi lists the numerous obstacles that played against the OAU’s 15 effectiveness, which was replaced by the AU (16).

(15) Insistence on the principle of not interfering in internal matters; absence of a continental mandate for protection; no obligation to provide security and protection to civilians; lack of inter-governmental commitment towards democracy, good governance and respecting human rights; impunity in light of political or military abuses against the population and individual liberties; absence of the obligation to provide security and protection for civilians, etc.

(16) The AU’s right to intervene in exceptional cases (crimes of war or against humanity, genocide); its right to protect; the growing irrelevance of objections based on respecting sovereignty in terms of peace and security; respecting human rights and constitutional procedures; accepting the decisions regarding peace and security made in name of the States, and therefore, obligated to support them; the growing intolerance of impunity, etc.
Along with the new and renewing principles that inspired it, the AU had a more effective structure, centred on the Peace and Security Council (PSC), supported by the Commission; the African Standby Force (ASF); the Panel of Experts (PoW); the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the Peace Fund.

To this structure, it is necessary to add the dynamics of the relations that complete its operativeness.

The first is the institutional relation with the African Regional Economic Communities that, due to their geographic proximity, are able to play a vital role in providing solutions for conflicts. The second, that is increasingly demanded socially, is the relation with the civil society and the NGOs that are able to indirectly contribute towards promoting and reinforcing. The third is the political relation with the UN, and especially with the Security Council, whose paramount international authority regarding peace and security makes its support essential. Finally, the cooperative relations with other international organisations are of great interest, especially those that are pertinent or interested in peace and security in Africa, such as the EU, among others.

In any case, the central piece and the key to this robust African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is the Peace and Security Council, and Kambudzi highlights its main characteristics, which include: the elective nature of its 15 members with two and three year rotations in order to ensure continuity and avoid a complete renewal at the same time; that it is permanently in session, allowing it to act at all times in light of emergency situations; it’s able to hold debates without the required presence of the parts involved in the conflict, which may be invited and heard, but may not pressure or condition the debates; the absence of the right to veto or the possibility to oppose considering or debating any matter related to peace or security; the capacity for decisions and initiatives with continental effects, without the possibility of invoking the principle of non-interference.

To these positive characteristics, he adds two more: the significant improvement of work methods and procedures, especially since 2007, when the «Conclusions on the Peace and Security Council’s Work Methods» were approved in Dakar, which aside from effectiveness, have introduced transparency and a greater interaction with civil society, especially with the adoption of the Interaction Mechanism between the Council and the Civil Society in promoting peace, security and stability (Livingstone, Zambia 2008).
After stating these clearly positive aspects, Kambudzi lists the negative aspects or limitations that the African Peace and Security Architecture has been subjected.

First, the forced prevalence given to conflict resolution has relegated the prevention, reconstruction, and re-establishment of post-conflict peace. For the author, the explanation is clear. The PSC emerged among conflicts, and attempting to resolve them has been its primary task, forcing it to focus primarily on putting out fires. As a result, the prevention and reconstruction tasks have been postponed.

Second, the scarcity of human resources, especially qualified human resources, has limited the Council’s capacity for action, especially in planning and managing peace operations. An example of this would be the recently concluded African Mission in Darfur (Sudan), or the current African Mission in Somalia.

To these limitations, a third must be added, related to the scarce logistical capacity for transporting troops, materials, and equipment to the operations stage in a specified or limited amount of time. The same must be said regarding the rotation of troops in the field, and although less serious, transporting them back to their place of origin.

A fourth and last limitation originates from the necessary lack of fluidity between the AU’s Peace and Security Council and the UN. In urgent situations (e.g., Rwanda 1994, Burundi 2002, Somalia 2006), the Security Council (UNSC) has moved slower than necessary in producing the necessary impact against the conflict’s evolution. Without a more effective and faster channel for interaction, the PSC is constrained to making certain decisions in a narrow environment of high risk, since they must be sanctioned afterwards by the UNSC. This situation clearly limits the PSC’s decision capacity and its effectiveness. There are consultation processes and periodic meetings in progress with the aim of sharing common views and assessments about certain potential conflict situations and possible actions to undertake together (17).

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(17) To illustrate this situation, Kambudzi refers to the specific case of Somalia, which was without a government since 1991. From Kenya, backed by IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority for Development), enormous efforts were deployed, with the mandate and support of the AU, so that Somalians would have political and administrative institutions during the two years of the Reconciliation Conference. The negotiations concluded with the establishment of the necessary state institutions: President, Prime Minister, Council of Ministers and Parliament. However, the problem that immediately
Summary and conclusions

If the positive and negative aspects are considered, along with the capacities and obstacles, and a global assessment was attempted, one would likely agree with the author that it’s still too soon to reach clear conclusions. There have not been spectacular or definitive results, but new trends seem to have been confirmed that must be consolidated in the future in order to definitively invert what remains of the previous situation.

These trends are: the clear commitment on behalf of Member States in supporting the APSA; the positive attitude of PSC Member States for it to assume its leadership and execute all the inherent capacities of its mandate; the acceptance on behalf of Member States, especially those of the PSC, regarding the need for humanitarian intervention in emergency situations; the confirmed improvement in the cooperation between the AU and the African Regional Economic Communities, as well as with the Regional Mechanisms for peace and security; the growing support from the civil society, given the increased cooperation between it and the African Union.

However, on another hand, the support of external partners has increased, which have become aware of the following needs: to better manage peace and security operations; to increase the capacity of the early warning mechanisms; to harmonise the actions of the Regional Economic Communities in order to obtain more uniform logistical arrangements between the AFS squads; to establish adequate structures that are less bureaucratic and more effective in order to better address the processes related to peace and security; to effectively mobilise financial and logistical resources, as well as internally; for the civil society to have a more active role in educating about and promoting the culture of peace and security; promoting the role of the private sector as a primary agent in post-conflict reconstruction and in socio-economic development.

All of this, as of when it allows a better understanding of the real situation in Africa, will enable a more fruitful international cooperation.

followed was how to take these institutions to Somalia and make them work. After some time, the PSC decided (May 2007) to deploy its African Union Peace Mission in Somalia (AMISON). However, Somalia was subject to the weapons embargo imposed by the Security Council in 1992 (Resolution CS/1993). The AU had to formally request an exception to the embargo’s application for the arms and other components that accompanied the AMISON troops. The fact that the AU deployed its peace mission without the prior consultation or express approval of the UNSC, with which the necessary agreement was only reached afterwards, shows the need of having more effective mechanisms for dialogue and consultation between the PSC and the UNSC.
It is in this area where Kambudzi contemplates his last question. How to make it possible for the cooperation established by the EU-AU Partnership to provide the best results? How to improve the meetings that have taken place each year since 2008, alternatively between Brussels and Addis Abeba? What must each of the parts do?

These are his recommendations:

• On the African side: the APSA must be completely effective from an operational perspective; it’s must be prepared to take the appropriate actions in light of situations with signs of deterioration; all of the AU’s Member States must sign, ratify, and put into practice the various instruments in effect in the areas of peace and security, democracy, elections, good governance, human rights, corruption, etc.; the notion of elections that are free, fair and transparent must be made a reality in electoral processes; a zero tolerance must be applied to anti-constitutional government changes; the necessary efforts must be made to promote good governance in the political, economic and cultural sectors; and finally, African nations must reconsider the fact of excessive foreign dependence in funding peace and security in Africa.

• On behalf of Europe: ideally, in the support it provides for peace and security efforts in Africa, the EU must pay more attention to the socio-economic aspects in such a way that the investments they entail be sustainable in the long term; unilateral initiatives carried out by individual States must be discouraged, fostering a single European channel because when residual colonial relations appear in a situation that affects peace and security, there is more risk of it complicating; it is essential for the EU to understand the in-depth causes, the triggering factors and the accelerating elements of crises in Africa so that its cooperation may be more effective; and finally, the EU, when dealing with peace and security in Africa, must give priority to African instruments over its own, first, because they each have different areas of application, and second, because it’s necessary for the African population to see up to what point African instruments are effective in achieving the planned objectives.

III

Ambassador Ognimba opens his contribution titled «Governance, Peace and Security in Africa. The African Union at a Crossroads of Challenges» with the confirmation of an unfortunate paradox: while the new
world order, which appeared after the Cold War, expanded the third wave of democratisation throughout the world, the African continent was submerged in a standstill of disorder and armed conflicts, pointing out the horrors of the Rwandan tragedy and the brutality of the wars in Angola, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, or the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

This required the AU to not only face ending them, but also creating lasting peace conditions, which is also considered to be a prior condition for any stable development. For this, the AU designed two main pieces of socio-political architecture: the first aimed at peace and security, and the second towards governance. As of this statement, Ognimba structures his work in four well differentiated parts.

In the first, he analyses the appearance of African disorder in the middle of a new world order, pointing out the different nature of the new conflicts and the Organisation of African Unity’s inability to stop them.

Regarding the new nature of conflicts, Ognimba begins a brilliant and effective description of its characters and consequences, highlighting its nature not so much of conventional wars between States or regular armies—although they existed, but in a minority—but rather internal clashes, within a regional framework—which do not fit perfectly in the traditional pattern of civil wars, although they could also be defined as such—between militias and armed or partly armed groups of soldiers and semi-soldiers, child soldiers, population groups that resulted to be actors and victims simultaneously, manipulated by the men of war that were sometimes tied to informal international financial networks and exploited the population’s ethnic or religious groups and weak borders.

He defines their consequences as a destabilising and devastating effect without relief, and as the most determining factor of the social and economic problems in the African continent: They have weakened the State’s authority and the social institutions, making entire nations un-governable, they have contributed towards promoting mercenaries and arms proliferation, which in turn have helped to spread these conflicts, complicating their conclusion or increasing the threat of new clashes, and by extending beyond the borders of fragile States, they have destabilised entire regions such as that of the Great Lakes, the Mano River, or the Horn of Africa. The human pain and cost has been significant, with countless deaths, crippled or displaced people, refugees, ex-warriors abandoned to their fate, etc.
After his description, Ognimba doesn’t focus a lot on the causes, because he is more interested in the importance of their effects than their aetiology, but he is firm in his belief that attributing them merely to the effects of colonisation is far too simplistic (18).

On the contrary, he attributes the Organisation of African Unity’s proven inability in preventing and resolving these conflicts to its excessive ties with the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention that marked all of post-colonial history. Regarding this point, the author correctly highlights the enormous importance of the paradigm shift by African leaders in granting the AU, first of all, the right to intervene, based on the decision of the Assembly of Chiefs of State and Government, in a Member State (in extreme situations), such as genocide or crimes against humanity, and offering, secondly, Member States the ability to require the AU’s intervention in order to re-establish peace and security when they are threatened. Along with this dual possibility, he reminds us of a third line of action: suspending the condition of AU Member State to those nations whose Governments have obtained power via anti-constitutional methods, citing the examples of Comoros, Mauritania, Guinea, Sudan and Somalia to ratify the effective use of the measure.

In the second part, the author analyses, with the appearance of the disorder described, the emergence of a priority political line of action in light of this disorder, for which he establishes 1993 as the start date, the year of the Declaration of Cairo for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts, and the end date in 2002, with the approval of the *Constitutive Act of the AU* on one hand, and the *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU* on another. Both comprise the two essential instruments related to peace and security in the continent (19).

The first highlights two strong lines: on the one hand, peace, security, and stability as a condition for development; and on another, the application of certain democratic principles as a condition for peace.

(18) Further on, citing Jean du Bois de Gaudusson, he will refer to «economic misery, social injustice, and political oppression as deep causes of violence and war.»

(19) Along with these two documents, the author cites others of paramount importance: Framework for the operational application of the continental early warning system, adopted by government experts in Kepmton Park, South Africa (2006); Operational Modalities for the Panel of Experts, approved by the Peace and Security Council in Addis Abbeba (2007) and Agreement Protocol on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security Between the AU, the Regional Economic Communities, and the Coordination Mechanisms for International Standby Forces in Western Africa and Northern Africa (2007).
Next, Ognimba lists the five pillars that support the AU’s African Peace and Security Architecture: The Peace and Security Council, the Panel of Experts, the Continental Early Warning System, the African Standby Force and the Peace Fund. After describing in detail its composition, functions and objectives, providing the legal texts that support them (20), the author opens the question of the levels of effectiveness reached by the Peace Architecture and recognises that, although there has been significant improvement in terms of peace and security, success should be considered as limited, and immediately states the reason: one of the two lines of force, that of good governance, has been relegated and marginalised, omitting the complementary nature of both within the African peace architecture.

Ognimba focuses the third part on the need to integrate good governance in the processes for promoting peace. In this area, he describes the structure of good governance as three pillars. The first is the «regulatory pillar,» comprised of a rich cluster of judicial instruments created between 1990 and 2007, which make up the sources for inspiration, make up the agenda, and provide the vision of the objectives to be reached (21). The second is the «institutional pillar,» which includes the organisations, entities and actors responsible for applying and putting into practice the regulations of the first pillar (22). The third pillar, or the «operational pillar,»

(20) In this section, the author highlights the relevance that the legal texts give to the AU’s collaboration with the regional African entities and international organisations such as the UN and others related to the field of peace and security; the political importance of collaborating with other countries in the fight against threats (such as terrorism), and the need to compensate the insufficiency of economic resources through foreign contributions. He cites the EU as the main contributor (e.g., Peace Facility for Africa), and within it, nations such as Italy and Spain. In Asia, he mentions China, South Korea and Japan.

(21) These are: The Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place Throughout the World (1990); the previously mentioned Declaration of Cairo (1993); the Cairo Agenda on Anti-Constitutional Government Changes (1995); the Algiers Decision on Anti-Constitutional Government Changes (1999); the Declaration and Plan of Action on Human Rights in Africa (1999); the AU’s Declaration of Lomé on Anti-Constitutional Government Changes (2000); the New African Development Partnership, adopted in Lusaka (2001); the OUA/AA Declaration on Governing Principles for Democratic Elections in Africa (2002); the Kigali Declaration on Human Rights in Africa (2003), and the most important, the African Letter on Democracy, Elections and Governance of the AU (2007).

(22) The author includes more than a dozen institutions in this pillar, of which the most relevant are worth highlighting: The Peace and Security Council, the AU Commission, the Representatives Committee, the Pan-African Parliament, the Continental
consists of the decision making procedures and the creation of policies that should be followed by the actors in the second pillar on a continental, regional, and national level in order to achieve with greater efficiency the objectives established in the first one, such as the consolidation of the State of Law, respecting Human Rights and democratic principles, good governance and peace.

In the fourth and last part of his work, Ognimba discusses the strong bond between governance and peace, and makes reference to various international events throughout the world where this correlation has been highlighted, both before conflicts (as far as a prevention factor), during conflicts, their resolution, and post-conflict situations.

Regarding prevention, he correctly states that respecting the principles of democracy and good governance is today universally accepted as the most effective solution for preventing conflicts, both as an undisputed theoretic axiom as well as its proven practical effectiveness, and invokes the conclusive statement by Bois de Gaudisson: «today, the various forms of war don’t emerge from the States, but rather from their weakness.»

During a conflict, governance can also play an important role; for example, by applying sanctions, because these form part of the framework of a good strategy that actively promotes governance. An example is the AU’s determination of not tolerating anti-constitutional government changes, such as the ones that have taken place in Guinea, Madagascar or Mauritania.

According to Ognimba, the AU’s vision on conflict management is to take the previous situation into consideration in order to determine its causes, and to always leave an ulterior space, beyond the conflicts, because it must be considered that these must end and not remain. The first tends to create the conditions of the irreversibility of the conflict, and the second to once again give societies that have suffered the conflict the opportunity of continuing their development in another manner.

This way, conflict resolution is aimed at reconstruction, because after successful mediation, negotiation, or peace agreements, beyond the important issues of demobilisation, disarmament, reintegration of fighters,
the return or re-establishment of populations that have been displaced, and reconciliation, the communities that have been victims of conflict must face new political, economic and social challenges. Thus, reconstruction must set the foundation of good governance in political, economic and social aspects.

After stating that the peace and security architecture, although it has obtained certain evident achievements, has not provided all the results desired and this is because of the little attention given to the dimension of governance, Ognimba proposes, in light of the new nature of conflicts and with the dual alternative that the AU continue the strategy followed so far or attempt to change it, for another one that integrates the dimension of good governance in the specific actions related to peace and security and of reviewing its internal governance.

To conclude, he makes a calling to those nations that maintain a partnership with Africa, for them to not limit themselves simply to supporting peace operations, but rather that they adopt and maintain a vision and a global focus that is none other than searching for peace and security based on good governance.

IV

The contribution by Mr. Thembani Mbadlanyana and Dr. Jakkie Cilliers, «Development and its Relation to Peace and Security: Observations from the Africa-EU Joint Strategy,» is centred on the relationship between development and security, and although it establishes that there isn’t always a clear relation of causality between both concepts, it does affirm that there is a clear consensus in that conflicts, aside from human pain and death and destructing political and government institutions, shatter all perspectives of development (23).

They also doesn’t state that there is an automatic link between the absence of development (poverty) and the presence of conflicts, but recognise that the explosion of violence is more common in lesser developed nations than in developed ones (24).

(23) The World Bank estimates that the average length of a civil war is six years, with a 2.2% reduction in the growth rate per year.
(24) The United Nations Programme for Development (UNPD) statistics indicate that 22 of the 32 countries with the lowest human development index have suffered conflicts at some point in their history.
In any case, they note the existence of a growing interest in the relationship between development and security, motivated by difference causes.

The first, of a more academic nature and based on what has been stated, is to consider this correlation as an essential part of the global response mechanisms regarding the prevention and management of conflicts.

The second motivation does not lack egotistical elements: in a global world, the problems that accompany instability in Africa affect the entire international community, and as a result, Africa’s development is in the interest of our own security (25).

The third addresses the honest and altruistic will of cooperating towards sustainable development and lasting peace in Africa.

By stating the empirical relation between development and security, and the confirmed growing interest in this correlation, Mr. Mbadlayana and Dr. Cilliers put into perspective the concepts of development and security, affirming from the onset that both are elastic, and as a result, conditioned by the theoretical focus adopted in time and space, as their fields of application and instruments for analysis are also elastic.

Thus, the concept of security, which during the Cold War was centred on the State’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and indirectly on also protecting the spheres of influence, became humanised after the fall of the Berlin Wall, making a spectacular turn in its reference towards people and social groups. While traditional security was centred on defending the State against possible foreign attacks, the new concept addresses the protection of individuals and social groups against any type of violence, including that of the State. Secondly, the concept has extended to include the vital human environment. Thus, not only individual human security will be discussed, but also food security, environmental security, etc (26).

(25) One type of «ideologically» interested motivation could also be the one described by the authors regarding the hidden ideological confrontation between China and the Western world in Africa, which is very much related to differentiated interpretations of security and development, and the link (or lack thereof) of the objectives for democratic principles, human rights, and good governance, a central topic in this contribution.

(26) The authors correctly and graphically include the nomenclature by J. Nye in order to describe the humanisation process of security, comparing the new concept (soft security) to the traditional and original one (hard security), centred on the State.
Something similar could be said regarding the concept of development, which if it initially referred to economic growth achievements, then after the decomposition of the USSR, it primarily centred on individuals and it was conceptualised around the idea of empowering personal capacities to a maximum so as to apply them in the best manner possible to the various fields of human activity and make them available to the community and the surroundings, including the relationship with nature (human development, social development, sustainable development).

Although they are similar, instead of a parallel evolution of the two concepts, in reality it has been more of a simultaneous evolution of convergence, complementarity and mutual correlation, coinciding in granting the maximum priority to humans, their needs, capacities and dignity, as well as the environment.

This new concept presents certain implications and evident effects that extend beyond the traditional horizon. Thus, security entails not only protection against physical aggressions, attacks, violent acts, and warlike conflicts, but also against food security, environmental degradation, climate change, etc.; in summary, against any type of threat that affects or impedes the well being of individuals or communities.

Similarly, the priority given to individuals and their environment implies a requirement of comprehensive development, and not only economic. Therefore, development must create the necessary conditions in the various orders (political, economic, social, cultural, healthcare, religious, military, judicial, etc.) that make it possible to cultivate and promote human capacities for personal benefit and that of the community.

From this perspective, it is easy to understand the deep link between security and development as powerful instruments for maintaining peace, preventing and managing conflicts, and post-conflict reconstruction, as well as the proximity to the concept of *Larger Freedom* that the author associates (27).

In parallel, along with this new concept of security and development, new threats have also emerged, such as the radicalism of political Islam in Africa, and certain uncertainties, such as the drastic change in the

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(27) The previous Secretary-General of the UN referred to this concept as the right of men and women anywhere in the world to be governed by their own consent, protected by law, in a society where all individuals may, without discrimination or compensation, speak, adore their God, and associate freely.
balance of powers represented by China and India compared to the hegemony of the United States, which could lead, like at the end of the Cold War, to a re-conceptualisation of security and development.

After describing the evolution and transformation of the concepts of security and development, Dr. Cilliers addresses the connection between the two in Africa as the third question.

As an objective piece of reference data, he begins by affirming that the reality of this connection has already been recognised by the UN World Summit in 2005 (28) and by the G-8 summits in Gleneagles (2005) and Heligendamm (2007). Therefore, the argument of authority has been established. His empirical confirmation is easily confirmed in Africa, especially from the connection’s pejorative side: poverty and the lack of sufficient development in many countries has generated countless conflicts.

In line with the notion of comprehensive development, poverty and underdevelopment tend to coincide with a limited or weak capacity of the State. That this is the case in Africa is beyond doubt.

Regarding poverty, many of the poorest nations throughout the world are located in the African continent (29).

If we refer to the strength or weakness of political institutions, we find a similar situation. Africa has the greatest number of fragile or collapsed states in the world.

Thus, the connection is closed in a form of vicious circle. «With more poverty and less State capacity, there is a higher risk of war.» (30). The reason for the large number of conflicts suffered in the African continent is explained and reflected in this manner with the data provided by Mr. Mbadlayana and Dr. Cilliers (31).

(28) «Development, peace and security, and human rights are related and mutually reinforce each other.»
(29) According to the Human Development Index (2009), the 22 last countries on the list are African, with Chad at number 175, the Democratic Republic of the Congo at 176, and the Central African Republic at 179, which places these countries far beyond any possibility regarding the 2015 Millennium Goals.
(31) From 1946 to 1991, more people were killed in Africa than in any other part of the world. During the years leading to the 21st century, there were more deaths from armed conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa than anywhere else in the world combined. Another eye-opening fact: in 2007, UN military personnel were deployed in 68.6% of Africa.
Summary and conclusions

The reality is, as the authors state, that from Somalia, to the East, towards the western coast (Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea Conakri), and from Sudan, to the North, the Central African Republic, to the centre, and Angola, to the South, many nations are trapped in an explosive combination of economic underdevelopment and poverty, all types of crime, and a lack of strong political institutions.

What practical conclusions can the International Community extract from this? According to both authors, the attitudes vary.

In some cases, when a conflict appears, cooperation is reduced and minimised to what is considered essential. In others, the region of conflict is either abandoned completely, or cooperation is replaced with humanitarian aid programmes until peace returns.

Other actors, in turn, have understood the connection between development and security, and recognise the complex causes that surround certain situations (social inequality, ethnic tensions, state fragility, human rights violations, etc.), and decide that it is necessary to act in the direction of the correlation (32). In other words, it would be necessary to focus on the convergence of strategies and activities related to security and development, and for societies that are at risk, in conflict, or post-conflict.

Next, Mr. Mbadlanyana and Dr. Cilliers begin to analyse the relations between the EU and the AU with the most obvious and inevitable historical reference of the colonial era. Despite the fact that two important events have taken place since then (the African independence and European integration movements), the EU continues to be the primary political, economic, commercial and cooperation partner for development in Africa.

Regarding this point, the authors make a detailed journey through the evolution of these relations, which although they were established in the mid 60s (the Yaundé 1964-1975 and Lomé 1976-2000 Conventions between the EC and ACP nations), they did not address security topics

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(32) The author points out that the OECD and the EU, as well as other Western Agencies (he mentions the cases of the Danish Agency for Development, DANIDA, and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, DFID), are including in their programmes topics such as democracy, human rights, institutional reinforcement, as well as conflict prevention. Some, regardless of their specific purpose (education, healthcare, economy, women’s empowerment, etc.) even believe that the primary focus should be aimed at conflict prevention. Therefore, according to the author, an added value is introduced since through this route, it’s possible to directly reach the source of the problems.
until 2000 at the EU-Africa Summit in Cairo and the Cotonou Agreement, which entered into effect in 2003. While the Cairo Declaration is considered a symbolic starting point, the Cotonou text marks a balanced focus between development and security (33).

The peak of this evolution is associated to the EU-AU Joint Strategy, adopted in Lisbon in 2007, that establishes privileged relations between the two continents, reconfigures the nature, content and structure of past bilateral and multilateral relations, recognises the interdependence between development and security, and is oriented towards the creation and reinforcement of African capacities in four sectors: Peace and Security, Democratic Governance and Human Rights; Commerce and Regional Integration; Key Development Issues (34).

The Strategy was followed by a Plan of Action that described eight areas (35) and three priority actions (36), establishing an institutionalised, prioritised, specific and clear framework on how to address the development-security connection in Africa from which other international actors could learn.

In conclusion, it is established that the inseparable relation and mutual reinforcement between development and security is particularly visible in Africa, where underdevelopment and poverty are associated to insecurity and conflicts. This fact has led to the growing recognition of the inevitable link between both concepts. However, Mr. Mbadlayana and Dr. Cilliers insist that it’s not enough to identify or understand this correlation; it must be addressed in practice as a determining element in order to face factors associated to underdevelopment, which leads to insecurity in Africa.

(33) Its Article 11 establishes that the Parts will undertake policies that are active, coherent, and integrated with maintaining peace, preventing and resolving conflicts within the Partnership framework.

(34) The first pillar of «Peace and Security» includes the following topics: 1) Conflict prevention, 2) Threats to common security, 3) Peacekeeping operations in Africa, 4) Disarmament, 5) Post-conflict situations, 6) Resources during conflicts.

(35) Peace and Security; Democratic Governance and Human Rights; Commerce, Regional Integration and Infrastructures; Millennium Development Goals; Energy; Climate Change; Migration, Mobility and Employment; Science, Information Society and Space.

(36) 1) Promoting dialogue over the challenges to peace and security; 2) the fully operational African Peace and Security Architecture, and 3) Predictability in funding African peace operations.
Colonel Pardo de Santayana (The Challenges to Carrying Out the ESDP in Africa) highlights the African continent’s accentuated personality, which produces both fascination and confusion. Equipped with enormous potential and constrained by countless conflicts and obstacles, it is difficult to establish whether as a whole, it advances or moves backwards, and maintains Michèle Alliot-Marie’s opinion of a great difference between nations and an overall situation that is not uniformly sombre, which leaves room for a feeling of certain optimism and pessimism.

With this ambivalence, the internal challenges of the ESDP regarding Africa are undertaken, those it must face in light of the continent’s situation, and those it faces together with the EU and the AU.

The greatest challenge of the ESDP in Africa is the need for a greater integration of efforts. The reasons are clear: there is an enormous multiplicity of actors, audiences, international organisations and institutions (UN, NATO, G-8, EU, IMF, the World Bank), States (United States, China, Russia, Japan, India, Brazil, Iran, Turkey, among other, aside from the numerous European nations), and countless NGOs (37).

However, the greatest number of relevant actors in Africa corresponds to European representatives. By simplifying the European framework through coordination, the general panorama would be significantly improved and the coordination--better yet, the integration--of efforts in the EU, as proposed by the EU Strategy for Africa, would produce better synergy in light of the ESDP’s objectives.

The multiplicity of actors has a relevant parallel background: on the one hand, the disproportion among many international efforts committed to a large number of initiatives in the area of international security, and on the other, the scarce performance in terms of results. Integrated efforts and unified action are the two essential conditions for achieving the ESDP’s objectives in Africa. As a result, only a more integrated EU would provide real hope to Africans and Europeans in order for it to be an authentic factor towards change. Otherwise, Europe will continue being a social giant and a political dwarf.

(37) From the African perspective, an excessive number of actors is unmanageable, leads to a perception of confusing or contradicting messages, may produce disorientation in parallel to possible uncoordination, and promotes the manipulation of sympathies and unclear games of preferences over one another, which may also play against the EU.
Improved coordination and integration would provide mutual benefits for Africa and Europe. For the first, more effective work and results. For the second, a rationalisation of efforts and costs, and better quality results (38).

Therefore, how is the integration of European efforts addressed? According to Colonel Pardo de Santayana, there are two realistic methods for this. The first and more attractive, although distant, is a greater integration of the ESDP itself; the second, a specialisation and distribution of functions between the various European actors. To avoid the risks of excessive specialisation, he recommends the procedure already used at British and French headquarters in Africa: the significant exchange (not cosmetic) of personnel (e.g., one third). This way, duplicities and wasted resources would be avoided, and the activities would be reinforced without reducing plurality or individual presence.

In dealing with the African obstacles, Colonel Pardo de Santayana summarises them in a form of Decalogue (39).

The first obstacle is the situation of women and the first challenge is promoting them, because the future of Africa largely depends on its women, who make up the cement of African society and are a leading economic factor. African women are in the fields or at the market, as frequent promoters of small businesses and more developed ones, with a clear tradition in the African business world. Practically all of them are merchants, regardless of their social status. They are negatively affected by global competition, the lack of aid and education, and they deserve

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(38) Colonel Pardo de Santayana uses the example of Al Qaeda’s strong expansion in Africa, first in the Maghreb, and then in the Sahel (from Senegal to Somalia), and the efforts of intelligence agencies from various European countries such as Spain, France and Italy to monitor the Jihad terrorist development, especially in Northern Africa, and points out, despite the mechanisms for cooperation and information exchange in the always secretive world of intelligence, the loss of energy, knowledge and opportunity for action as a result of the multiple actors. The same could be said regarding organised crime, piracy, illegal trafficking, etc.

(39) The Decalogue includes: Promoting women; loss of faith on behalf of many Africans towards their leaders; difficulty in transforming discussions and agreements into a practical reality; different concept in the use of time for Africans; a small focus on the mid and long term by the cultures, and the lack of predisposition for planning; poor budget management due to insufficient financial management training for personnel; lack of critical mass of qualified professionals for undertaking the challenges of modernness; greater difficulty in building multinational organisations in the African continent.
to be supported with less traditional training programmes (new technologies or accounting) and financial assistance such as microcredits.

In addition to working in the fields and markets, they also take care of the children, family and the home, and actively address the community’s needs.

Despite all of this, African women are not well valued by society, especially by the male portion. Gender discrimination and various forms of sexual exploitation are very common. The author advocates significant improvements regarding polygamy and increased efforts in the fight against AIDS (40).

All of this requires a change of attitude in men for more respect towards women in general, and towards their wives in particular, abandoning polygamy and assuming a greater responsibility of their children. This requires time and social acceptance as opposed to impositions, but it’s urgent to contribute towards balancing the African society in terms of inequality and exploitation of women, because women represent the best values of the continent’s traditions. Female human capital is calling out to play a key role in Africa’s future. The change in male attitudes, more fair and equal, towards women and in sexual behaviour is an essential element for promoting the ESDP’s objectives in Africa, so as to avoid, as the author says, what has occurred up until now--women focus on working, men on enjoying themselves, and the elite and leaders on consumption and waste.

This is where a new obstacle appears--that the majority of the African population has lost faith in its leaders, who aside from a few exceptions, appropriate resources, only address their ambitions, and forget their obligations and responsibilities. In light of this situation, the author suggests for the resources provided to not contribute towards increasing distrust, and that they be aimed at a wide array of beneficiaries and focused on different sectors other than where leaders flaunt power. This is not an easy task because the natural flow is the official one, but creative formulas have already been implemented for this.

Another obstacle, also related to leaders, lies in the difficulty of transforming discussions and agreements into an effective reality. Africans are

(40) On this topic, the author highlights the example of the campaign against the spread of HIV in Uganda (58% of women were affected before the campaign, compared to 6.5% today). Thanks to this campaign, 93% of Ugandans changed their sexual behaviour, revealing that it’s possible to change individual and social attitudes.
aware of what the continent needs for its development: The problem lies in how to do it. The large conferences, the declarations of intent, the exchange of information, the designed strategies....generally do not provide results. Thus, it’s recommended for any project to have a very practical focus and to be able to assess it in terms of quantifiable benefits. It’s important to rely on the participation of the beneficiaries and to maintain a constant proactive attitude, avoiding that the progressive transfer be done by creating gaps, and to be patient.

Patience is key. When it is said that stress does not exist in Africa, a different concept of urgency is being established that must be understood and respected, especially in light of the frenzy in extremely developed nations, but it is also necessary to clearly convey the message of the rational use of time and fostering a dynamic and entrepreneurial attitude. In any case, before the ESDP begins a project, it must assess the degree of dynamism in the society or the setting where it will be carried out, and make an appropriate selection of the people that it would like to work with. Rushing is a poor advisor in Africa, and although it’s easy to postpone, it’s difficult to schedule.

This is another obstacle that must be faced. The author makes the frequent reference to the link between cultures of foresightedness and cold winter climates (which require provisioning), and warm climates of generous nature that incite relaxation and enjoying the moment, where vital attitudes based on the present tend to rule. However, the attitude of foresightedness and planning is acquired through use and habit, and one of the greatest contributions that the ESDP projects can make in Africa is to foster the culture of mid and long term planning, incorporating African personnel--with especially little predisposition in these tasks--to European upper management and general staff work in order to educate and train them in this field.

Something similar must be said about management abilities. All of the ESDP’s activities are associated to a budget, and in many cases, this budget is generated by European funds and administered by personnel from African organisations. One of the obstacles for the proper use is inadequate budget management because of clear corruption irregularities, deviation to other simultaneous problems that must be resolved, abusive per diem payments, and naturally also due to a lack of technical knowledge. The education and training of African personnel that are responsible for planning and managing budgets should be one of the ESDP’s priority elements.
However, this obstacle is part of a larger one: the lack of qualified professionals since decolonisation in order to face the countless tasks of the new States at that time, and their modernisation today. The demand of qualified personnel grows at a faster rate than its availability, first, due to a lack of motivation given the small salaries; second, because of a lack of a prepared actors for making effective use of the material and intellectual resources that are available for training or personnel selection; third, because personnel are selected with insufficient or inadequate qualifications; and finally, because although suitable programmes are carried out, the results are only seen in the mid-long term. Therefore, due to the lack of qualified professionals, it will be necessary for the ESDP to adapt its objectives in terms of the capacities available.

The insufficiency of qualified personnel is reflected institutionally in the less efficient comparison of African international organisations, due to (aside from this insufficiency) the economic and institutional weakness of the States, the heterogeneity of the organisations, their recent creation and the complexity of the problems they must face, which are limitations that the ESDP must take into consideration in developing the APSA.

Similarly, the African personnel involved in the activities and projects promoted or subsidised by the ESDP must also be considered. It is not uncommon for the qualifications of the personnel sent by the States to the multinational African headquarters to be more or less adequate in terms of the State’s greater or lesser political and economic commitment with the headquarters (41). A poor selection creates a dual negative effect: an inefficient system and overloading the more qualified personnel with work. The time continuance, which tends to be short, could depend on the level of competency and effectiveness, prolonging those who are more effective, which would indirectly promote a better selection on behalf of the States. Without an adequate selection of personnel (as well as for other activities, such as educational courses and training exercises), there is a risk of wasting resources and efforts.

Finally, covering the initial topic of coordinating and integrating efforts, Colonel Pardo de Santayana lists the various security problems where there is a clear convergence of interests between the EU and the AU, and the opportunity to develop African capacities: Jihad terrorism,

(41) Colonel Pardo de Santayana cites the careful selection of personnel that he sends to Kenya to the EASBRICOM Headquarters, located in the region, compared to other States that are less committed.
uncontrolled immigration and the organised crime associated to it, kidnappings, piracy and sea traffic security, the security of energy resources, etc.

VI

In his contribution, «The Security Sector Reform, an ESDP Tool for Africa,» General Juan Esteban Verástegui describes his valuable personal experience in the specific case of Guinea-Bissau to show the differences between wishes and reality, theory and putting into practice.

Regarding the theory, he addresses the previous question of the precedence between stability and development, opting for the first since it’s less costly in terms of time and resources. Regarding the practice, he states that the institutions of sovereignty (Armed Forces, Security Forces, and Justice), which should have consolidated the new independent African States, in many cases became their biggest problem, generating a situation of instability that has drawn the concern of the developed world and fostered the urgent need of reforming these institutions.

Next, he outlines the conceptual framework of the Security Sector Reform (SSR), adopting the OECD’s definition (42), precisely identifying the actors (armed forces, police forces, including border control and the coast guard, intelligence services, and when applicable, armed militias, without omitting the State’s political and administrative institutions related to security) and highlighting the four aspects of the definition: political (subjecting to the State of Law), social (effective citizen protection), economic (sustainability and support for economic growth), and institutional (proper operation). As far as the current setting, he points out that not all situations are suitable for security sector reform (e.g., nations at war or failed States), but that situations of peaceful emergence from dictatorships or those with socio-political agreements for overcoming internal conflicts are, concluding that the possibilities for success are directly proportional to the length of time since the conflict and the Government’s residual capacity for control over its security forces. He concludes the conceptual framework with the dual precision that the SSR model refers

(42) «Transformation of the security system that includes all the actors, their functions, responsibilities and actions so that they are managed and executed in accordance with the democratic norms, following principles of good governance and contributing towards the correct operation of all the security forces.»
to situations that require foreign cooperation, and the need for society and political authorities to assume ownership of the project (Local Ownership).

In the next section, he includes a brief list of the difficulties and risks entailed in these projects, pointing out the difficulty in ascertaining the level of «local ownership» and that of foreign intervention, because either the foreign advisors surpass themselves in the proposals, which are ultimately not accepted, or the opposite occurs and the project lacks impulse. In other cases of praetorian situations, the predominance of military power over civil power makes it impossible for there to be consensus between both and complicates decision making. Finally, the region tends to have an abundance of conflicts of competencies or protagonism (Turf Wars) between international organisations, NGOs, and Diplomatic Representatives.

After the previous considerations (the conceptual framework and the reference to the most common risks), the author begins with the specific case of Guinea-Bissau, a country located on the western coast of Africa, between Senegal and Guinea Conakry, which after a long war against Portugal (1961-1974), obtained its independence, establishing a single party communist regime (joined by all the former soldiers) that did not give signs of opening to pluralism until 1994. Four years later (1998), a civil war broke out that forced President Bernardo (Nino) Vieira to flee to Portugal, leaving the Government to Kumba Yala, who was subsequently deposed after a coup d’état that would lead to new elections (2005) that returned power to Vieira. After his return, Vieira announced a national reconciliation policy, which included the «Strategy for Security Sector Reform» (2006), an excellent document that was internationally presented at the Geneva Round Table (2006) and that received a positive response from the Portuguese Presidency of the EU (Sintra, 2nd half of 2007).

Thus, on January 10, 2008, President Vieira requested from J. Solana a civil mission within the framework of the ESDP to support the security sector reform. On the next February 12, the European Council created the EUSSR Guinea-Bissau, with the following schedule: immediate deployment in the beginning of March, and a term of office until May 31, 2009, broken down into three months (March-May) of preparation work (in which the Head of Mission--HoM--was to prepare the Operations Plan--OPLAN--to be approved in one month), and twelve months to execute the OPLAN, which would begin on June 1.
In practical terms, it consisted of creating new Armed Forces of 3,440 men, with two immediate effects: reducing personnel and costs (recruitment would cover 70% of the positions), and a demilitarisation of capital (with 90% of the military soldiers). In the police area, reducing the police forces from nine to four (National Guard, Public Order, Judicial Police, and Intelligence Services (43), and reducing their dependence on four different Ministries to simply the Ministry of Interior. In the justice sector, where the EU had a programme managed by the Commission, the Plan focused on the public prosecutor’s office and its relations with the Judicial Police.

Next, General Esteban Verástegui describes how the calendar was carried out. The planned deployment of an advanced team (HoM, administrative personnel and two advisors, military and police), established in the Joint Action for before the beginning of March, was not possible. Only the HoM and part of the initial planned team arrived in Bissau in mid April, half the time established for the prior installation work before declaring the operative status (June 1).

This was followed by a series of problems related to logistics (the Mission’s location, which was to have been available in May 2008, could not be accessed until February and the renovations were completed in April 2009, practically one month before the end of the term of office in May); politics (the planned spring elections did not take place. Therefore, instead of a Government established for four years, the Mission had to deal with a provisional one); institutions (lack of understanding between the Armed Forces and the Police. While the first was in favour of the reform, the second was reluctant out of fear of losing its privileges); and social issues (insufficient knowledge of the reform’s importance on behalf of the population).

In conclusion of this first phase, the following observations can be stated: insufficient knowledge of the situation and the time to obtain it; setting objectives that are too ambitious for such a short term of office; designing an excessively minimalist mission of limited effectiveness; systematically not meeting deadlines; inexistence of public information about the reform that impeded having society and the armed forces assume ownership of it.

(43) This last group was not included in the reform based on a decision by national authorities.
On June 2, 2008, with a two week delay compared to the scheduled plans, the operational phase began, but the European and African political clocks were not in sync. In July, the Parliament was dissolved and political attention was focused on the electoral campaign, with a complete void of attention towards SSR. The defence sector, in which the AJEMA had been exiled because of a supposed coup d’état, experienced a serious clash between the Ministry and the General Staff. It denied to consider the SSR. However, there was technical progress in the police area. The drafts of the Law for the Ministry of Interior and the Organic Laws for the Public Order Police and the National Guard were written with their Regulations, Codes of Conduct, etc. In the judicial field, there was certain success in improving the relations between the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Judicial Police.

In these conditions of asymmetrical advances, the elections took place with an overwhelming and clear majority (70 seats out of 100) in favour of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) (45), with the positive coincidence that the SSR had been one of the important issues in its campaign.

The promising horizon opened by the election results collapsed with the armed attack to President Vieira’s residence (November 23, 2008) at the hands of supposed dissidents of the Armed Forces. The President created his own praetorian guard against the criteria of the Defence Chief of Staff, who was responsible for the President’s security. At the beginning of the following year (January 2009), in another obscure incident, the presidential guard was accused of attempting to assassinate the Defence Chief of Staff, and it was dissolved. In this setting of pressure and attempted attacks against the civil and military leaders, it was impossible for the Mission to advance.

It was during these tumultuous moments when the idea arose of creating a Pensions Fund under the control of donors, which was presented at the 3rd Meeting of Friends of Guinea-Bissau (Brussels, January 2009) and included in the agendas of all the bilateral and international enti-

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(44) To assess the importance of these events, one must take into consideration that the Police, unlike the Armed Forces (which had extensive regulations but that were not applied), lacked legal coverage for its actions.

(45) Created during the war of independence, it governed as a single party and with an iron fist during the 20 years that followed the independence.
ties involved in the process (46). With the hope of obtaining the necessary funding at the Round Table scheduled for June, a new extension of six additional months was requested (until November 30) from the PSC, which agreed. A few days later, the Defence Chief of Staff, General Tagme, was assassinated, and a few hours later, President Vieira was killed in retaliation. In light of these dramatic events, there was an enormous generalised reaction, both within and outside the nation, about the imperative need to urgently reform the security sector. Thus, an international meeting was scheduled in Praia (Cape Verde) (47) with the intent of «re-launching» the SSR that had attracted a lot of attention, but «had not achieved the expected results,» and so a Plan of Action was agreed upon that covered the various projects and actions, and a meeting of donors was scheduled to finance those projects.

General Esteban Verástegui understands that although this meeting gave the SSR an international focus and provided some advantages, it also brought several inconveniences (48).

Among the positive aspects was the recognition of the SSR’s central importance, as was verified after the elections that gave the victory to Malam Bacai Sanha: for the first time, civil and military authorities did

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(46) The initiative was very attractive to everyone. As has been pointed out, after the independence, the former soldiers were placed in all of the areas of the State, which was unable to fire them or assume the cost of their massive presence. An important reform objective, to which the Defence Chief of Staff was reluctant, was precisely that of reducing the number of personnel and the cost in the Armed Forces. The Pension Fund made it possible to remove a large number of military and police personnel, and alleviated the Defence Chief of Staff’s concerns by avoiding having his soldiers sent to retirement in precarious conditions, thus changing his attitude towards the reform.

(47) More than 100 delegates from 20 countries and 10 international organisations attended this meeting, including the UN, the AU, ECOWAS, or the CPLC (Community of Portuguese Language Countries).

(48) Among the inconveniences, the Plan of Action introduced projects that were already in the OPLAN and others that were not, but without sufficient systematics or coherence, as well as changed criteria regarding basic objectives of the reform that had been clearly defined in the Strategies Document; it did not introduce clear leadership or monitoring for the region; it proposed troubling suggestions such as deploying a police-military force focused on the presidential electoral process, forgetting the precedent of the arrival of troops from Senegal and Guinea-Conakry in support of Vieira that led to the 1998 civil war; the scheduled Round Table of donors, proposed by ECOWAS, had yet to take place. It also failed in its attempt of generating «fast impact» projects. In summary, it generated duplicities, distraction, confusion and disorientation, and it had better intentions than results.
not clash, and both, along with the opposition, recognised the SSR’s relevance. In light of this event and other considerations, such as the proximity of the term’s end, the Mission requested a new extension proposal (September 2009) from the PSC, reiterated by the Prime Minister (October 9) (49).

Once the second extension was approved (until May 31, 2010), the Strategic Review was started, which presented two alternatives to the PSC: departure or a new action. On February 5, it approved the launch of a new mission aimed at putting into operation the educational and training system for the armed forces and the police forces, as well as the institutional reinforcement for carrying out the necessary structural transformation, with the prior condition that before June 2010, the necessary legislative reform for moving ahead with the effective reform be sanctioned.

With this decision, the author understands that the result of the initial mission can be considered validated, which was none other than preparing the necessary conditions in the region for launching the reform (50), and its implementation could be carried out in three to five years (with funding and after overcoming the usual obstacles).

As of this moment, General Esteban Verástegui undertakes a series of important considerations and reflections that I’d like to summarise in two: One, of a practical nature, related to the importance of the topic of funding in terms of the reform’s future. In his opinion, this has become stagnant for two reasons: a lack of truly serious initiatives and the technical capacity for preparing a structured and attractive dossier for donors (51).

(49) The letter contained three clear commitments: clarifying the assassinations, progress without delays in approving the legal framework, and respecting the national Strategies Document, the origin and base of the ESDP’s actions.

(50) Among the obstacles that complicated progress during the first phase, he identifies four in particular: the large difference between the planning data and reality; the reduced workforce and the scarce capacity for redundancy in order to cover advisor absences; the incompatibility between the European and African paces, and the insufficient assessment of the nation’s real capacities in assuming the process’ «local ownership.»

(51) The author describes how at the Praia meeting, ECOWAS assigned itself the responsibility of organising a donor round table, and after not fulfilling its proposal, surprised everyone after the meeting of its Chiefs of State (January 2010) by announcing that it «positively welcomed» Europe’s initiative in organising the round table in question. Although surprised, the EU accepted and began to immediately work (that same month of January) on the dossier, considering June as the earliest option and October
Another, more transcendental and of greater depth, and thus also for the future, is the question as to whether the ESDP framework (now CSDP) is suitable for carrying out a security sector reform. His response is more than ambiguous, doubtful (neither yes or no) in believing that the tool is not appropriate since it was designed for crisis management and not for this purpose, and when the design is not suitable, collateral damage to the tool, the target, or both, is inevitable.

The relation with time frames and deadlines is another important problem described by the author. The delayed start of action leads to a degraded environment and losing the best opportunity. The constant feeling of temporariness in the terms of office or the short extensions in light of the mid/long term problems produce feelings of temporariness in the mission, scepticism or doubt in Brussels, and of insufficient support in the country. The action’s conclusion must also be planned (always limited, by definition) as an exit strategy in order to avoid damaging the EU’s credibility or the fragile stabilisation process that has been commenced. Therefore, what mechanisms should be used once the ESDP action has concluded (now CFSP)? The future EU embassies could continue the long reform processes, monitoring that the European investments fit the project’s real needs.

In summary, if the case of Guinea-Bissau can be considered pilot, because for the first time, the ESDP action has been undertaken simultaneously on the three classic pillars (defence, security and justice), then the new implementation phase can be an intermediate step along this line of evolution and open up to a new formula with other actors such as the UNOGBIS, ECOWAS, or the EU Delegation itself, which could be backed by a SSR office and transform the project into “crisis management” with long term support that is more in line with the foreseeable situation.

as the best alternative. In the meantime, the High Representative of the UN General Secretary for the United Nations referred to a meeting, which seemed to be the one for funding, but reconverted towards analysing the situation in Guinea-Bissau and the mentality of possible donors.
COMPOSITION OF THE WORKING GROUP

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General, Spanish Army  
Head of the EU mission in support of Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau.
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